- (1.) THIS is second bail application. The first bail application was dismissed on merits. The learned counsel contended that the prosecution case is un natural as according to the prosecution the applicant made no attempt to commit murder of the person who had committed murder of his father. He also contended that the prosecution could not explain as to how the spade was brought on the spot. In my opinion, these arguments cannot be considered in second bail application as they are beyond its scope.
(2.) THE learned counsel contended that the incident is of 9-2-1998 and despite the fact that more than two years have elapsed nor a single eye-witness has yet been examined. He has produced photo-state copy of the order sheet from 14-5-1998 till 27-11-1999. A perusal of the order sheet indicates that for reason or the other the evidence could not be recorded. THE delay appears to have been caused by what can be called system delays. Only incom plete statement was recorded at the fag end of8-3-1999. The question whether delay in trial constitute a ground for granting bail arose for consideration in Criminal Misc. II bail application No. 11186 of 1999, Munna Singh v. State. The discussion and in ference drawn are reproduced below: The learned counsel for the applicant referred to two Full Bench decisions of Patna High Court. It was held in The State v. Maksudan Singh and others, AIR 1986 Patna 38, that the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy public trial in all criminal prosecutions now flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution is identical in content with the express constitutional guarantee inserted by the Sixth Amend ment to the American Constitution. The various judgments of Supreme Court have declared in uncompromisingly categorical terms that the right to speedy and public trial is a constitutional guarantee under Article 21. The majority view of the Full Bench is that, once the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial and the right to a fair, just and reasonable procedure under Article 21 has been violated, then the ac cused is entitled to an unconditional release and the charges leveled against him would fall to the ground. It cannot be said that the violation of right of speedy and public trial pertains to the realm of sentence alone.
(3.) IN a later Full Bench decision in Madheshwardhari Singh and another v. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 Patna 324, scope of Article 21 was widened and it was held that the fundamental right to a speedy public trial extends to all criminal prosecu tions for all offences generically, irrespec tive of their nature. The right to speedy-public trial is applicable not to the actual proceedings in the Court but includes within its sweep the proceeding police in vestigation in a criminal prosecution as well. Speedy investigation and trial of criminal prosecution is manifested both by letter and spirit of Code giving effect to fundamental right of speedy public trial therefore would not in any way conflict with provisions of Code. It was further held that laying down of an outer time limit to concretise the right to speedy public trial is envisioned both by principle and precedent. A callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extra-ordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capi tal ones plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21. Unless the fundamental right to speedy trial is to be whittled down into a mere pious wish, its enforceability in Court must at lease be indicated by an outer limit to which an investigation and the trial in a criminal prosecution may ordinarily extend. Holding otherwise would merely paying lip service to a pre cious right whilst denuding it of the benefits of its actual enforceability.;