- (1.) D. K. Seth, J. The facts giving rise to the present ease may be summarised as follows:
(2.) AN agreement for sale was ex ecuted on 24th February, 1972 by one Shri Someshwar Nath Bhargava in favour of Smt. Kusum Kumari in respect of an im movable property for a consideration of Rs. 99,879/ -. The respondent No. 4 having failed to perform his part of the contract, Smt. Kusum Kumari filed a Civil Suit No. 17 of 197'7 before the Learned Civil Judge, Allahabad against the respondent No. 4on 19th January, 1983. The suit was decreed. Respondent No. 4 preferred First Appeal No. 172 of 1983. By a judgment and decree dated 7th May, 1992, a Division Bench of this Court dismissed the appeal. Respon dent No. 4 preferred a Special Leave Peti tion, which was also dismissed. The decree was sought to be executed through Execution Case No. 8 of 1984. Various objections raised by the respondent No. 4 in the ex ecution having been rejected, he preferred Revision No. 787 of 1990 since dismissed on 7th May, 1992. Since the respondent No. 4 did not execute the sale deed, the Executing Court had executed the sale deed on 4th May, 1990 under Order 21, Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure and was sent for registration to the Sub-Registrar, Allahabad through Court. The Sub-Registrar sought a report from the respondent No. 2, who by an order dated 12th September, 1994 had found that the sale deed was in- sufficiently stamped. On a revision being preferred, the respondent No. 1 by his order dated 13th June, 1994 (ANnexure-2) affirmed the order of the respondent No. 2. The review sought for before the respondent No. 1 was dismissed by an order dated 12th September, 1994. During the pendency of the execution, Smt. Kusum Kumari having died, the petitioners in this proceeding, being her legal heirs, had stepped into her shoes. The order dated 13lh June, 1994 (ANnexure-2) by respondent No. 1 affirming the order dated 15th July, 1993 (ANnexure-3) passed by Respondent No. 2, and the order dated 12th September, 1994 (ANnexure-1) passed on revision in Stamp Revision No. 737 of 1993/1994 by the Respondent No. 1 affirming the order dated 15th July, 1993 (ANnexure-3) passed by the respondent No. 2 in Case No. 423 under Section 47-A read with Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act (Stamp Act for short have since been challenged in this writ petition. In the present case Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken a point as to the stamp duty payable on the deed that is being executed by the Court in terms of a decree passed in a suit for specific performance of sale. According to him the valuation for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction as accepted by the trial Court shall be the valuation for the purpose of payment of stamp duty while registering the document executed by the Court. It is not open to the registering authority to dispute the valuation ac cepted by the Court. In elaboration of his contention he submits that when a decree is passed it is open to the Court to examine the valuation of the suit property and decided the sufficiency of the Court Ice. In the decree itself it is indicated that the stamps paid are sufficient. Unless such decree is revised or reversed or set aside, it is not open to dispute the valuation of the suit property as has been explained or jus tified in the decree itself. A decree is bind ing not only between the parties, but, so far as the valuation is concerned it is based on the deed or agreement, which is sought to be specifically enforced on the Registering Authority. Even if the valuation under goes changes or enhancement, when a decree is passed or when in execution of the decree the sale deed executed by the Court is sought to be registered even then the same cannot be a ground for considera tion of initiation of a proceeding under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act. A decree of a Court is capable of being executed. When a decree is being executed, the Court can not go behind the decree. It is not open to a third party to challenge the valuation of the decree, while it is sought to be executed or in the process of the execution. The question of valuation is also one of the aspect, which has gone into judicially in a judicial proceeding and pronouncement about the sufficiency of the valuation of the Suit is a judicial verdict culminated in the decree upon the judicial pronounce ment. The executive has no authority or jurisdiction to sit in appeal on the judicial pronouncement. The Stamp Act has not authorised by means of any provision that the authorities under the said Act shall be entitled to sit on appeal in regard to the valuation confirmed by the Court decreeing the suit. Admittedly this decree was sub jected to appeal upto the highest Court of the country being the Apex Court where the decree stood confirmed. Since a decree had received a stamp of affirmation not only by the High Court but by the Apex Court and having no dispute with regard to valuation, the question of valuation also stood so affirmed by the Apex Court, and as such cannot be reopened by the executives in the manner it has been sought to, as above. He further contents that if such a proposition is accepted then in exercise of power conferred on the authorities under the Stamp Act, under Section 47-A, such authority would be entitled to question the valuation by the Court, in that event, the question of valuation would become an unending process and it would be giving a handle to the executives to cast an asper sion on judicial process and an inter ference with the course of justice. There must be a concept of finality. After the judicial determination culminating into a finality, it cannot be subjected to a further round of uncertainty to" keep the process continuous without bringing an end to it.
(3.) HE further contends that parties had agreed to sell the property at a par ticular price on the date of the agreement and as such the valuation in the agreement shall the valuation even when the agree ment is specifically enforced through Court. The delay in the process cannot be used to the disadvantage of the purchaser. Therefore the decision rendered by the authorities under the Stamp Act through the respective orders dated 15-7- 1993, 13-6-1994and 12-9-1994. The matter was heard and an order was dictated in open Court on 27-10-1998. Cut before the said order could be signed, certain clarifications were felt necessary on certain questions which necessitated further hearing of the matter. Therefore, the same was placed for orders when the counsel asked for time to address the Court. The matter was head on successive occasions and ultimately the judgment was reserved.;