A. Alagiriswami, J. - (1.) The plaintiffs are the appellants. They filed the suit under S. 77 of the Registration Act for the compulsory registration of a sale deed executed on 25th January 1962 by the defendant. The document was presented for registration to the Sub -Registrar, Orathanad, who refused to register the same. An application to the District Registrar was also dismissed on 4th January 1963. The plaint was originally presented in the court of the District Munsif, Tanjore, on 31st January 1963. The District Munsif returned it on 18th March 1963 holding that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and en that very day, it was represented to the District Mursif, Pattukottai, who had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Along with the plaint en application under Ss. 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act was also filed for condoning the delay with the allegation that the property conveyed was within the jurisdiction of the District Munsif, Tanjore, and as the order of the District Registrar was pronounced at Tanjore, the plaint had been presented bona fide to the court of the District Munsif, Tanjore on 31st January 1963. Both the courts below have refused to excuse the delay. In this second appeal by the plaintiffs, the first objection taken on behalf of the defendant is that no question of law arises and that this court in second appeal cannot give any relief to the plaintiffs. Reliance is placed upon the decision in Raghavayya v Vadudevayya Chettl : A. I. R. (1944) Mad. 47. In that case King J observed. The only question of law which It realty arises in this appeal is whether the good faith of the advocate is at all relevant. It is not referred to expressly in S. 14. Can it be argued that the good faith of the party alone need be considered good faith which would normally be established by the mere act of relying upon professional advice? Mr. Appa Rao for the appellant cannot argue that the law can be stated so comprehensively. All he says is that something equivalent to dishonesty or gross negligence most be found before the appellant should be made to suffer by reason of his advocate's shortcomings. No authority, however, has been cited which goes even this far. It is true that in certain cases, mistakes or slips on the part of an advocate have been condoned. It is human to err and such mistakes may be consistent with a general mental attitude on the part of an advocate to apply due care and attention to his professional work. But here we return to the realm of fact. Whether an advocate has shown due and attention is a question of fact to be decided on the evidence adduced in any particular case. No absolute rule of law can be laid down, and whether a judge's decision on this point be right or wrong, it cannot be upset in second appeal on the ground that he has transgressed such a rule of law.
(2.) I am afraid the learned Judge was not quite correct in assuming that the question whether due care and attention has been shown is a question of fact. In Ramgopal v/s. Shanshaton 191. A. 229 the Privy Council after referring to their decision in Ramratan Sukal v/s. Nandu 191.A.1 that a third court cannot entertain an appeal upon any question as to the soundness of findings of fact, by a second court however unsatisfactory such finding, if examined, may be pointed out that the facts found need not be questioned and that it is the soundness of the conclusions from them that was in question and that was a matter of law. In Nafar Chandra pal v/s. Shukar, 45 I. A. 113 P. C. the Privy Council again pointed out that questions of law and of fact are difficult to disentangle and the proper legal effect of a proved fact is essentially a question of law; but the question whether the fact has been proved, when evidence for and against has been properly admitted, is necessarily a pure question of fact. In Kameswaramma v/s. Subba Rao : A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 884 the Supreme court has pointed out that the (legal inference from proved facts may raise a question of law. Thus it is clear that the question for decision in this case is a question of law.
(3.) There is no dispute about the facts of this case. The only question is whether on the facts proved the matter falls within S. 14 of the Limitation Act, S. 14 (1) is as follows. In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or in a court of Appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.;