S. Suryamurthy, J. - (1.) THESE two civil revision petitions arise out of a common order passed by the learned appellate authority (Subordinate Judge), Madurai, under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. C.R.P. No. 1112 of 1975 has been preferred against the order of the learned appellate authority in C.M.A. No. 452 of 1972. C.R.P. No. 1147 of 1975 has been preferred against the order of the same learned appellate authority in C.M.A. No. 473 of 1972. The respondent herein filed the petition for eviction of the tenants from the portions in their respective occupation inter alia on the ground that the building was required for demolition and reconstruction. The tenants contended that as Madurai City had been declared a Corporation, the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, is not applicable, that there was no valid notice to quit, that they are the sub -tenants of the first respondent in the petition for eviction and that the building was not required bona fide for demolition and re -construction. These contentions were negatived by the learned Rent Controller, and eviction was ordered. Against the order of the learned Rent Controller, the civil miscellaneous appeals were filed. Both the appeals were dismissed by the appellate authority on 3rd February, 1975. C.R.P. No. 1112 of 1975 was filed in this Court on 11th April, 1975 and C.R.P. No. 1147 of 1975 was filed in this Court on 25th April, 1975. While the appeals were pending before the learned appellate authority a notification dated 12th August, 1974 in G.O.Ms. No. 1998, Home, was issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu exempting all the buildings owned by the Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious trusts and charitable institutions from all the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (referred to hereinafter as "the Act"). This notification was issued by the Government by virtue of the power conferred on it under Section 29 of the Act. Section 29 of the Act states that, Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Government may, subject to such conditions as they may deem fit, by notification, exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of this Act.
(2.) IT is contended by the learned Counsel for the civil revision petitioners that the G.O. aforesaid was passed while the appeals were pending before the learned appellate authority and that, therefore, the learned appellate authority had no jurisdiction to pass any order disposing of the appeals. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on a decision in Ambiga Ammal v. Selvaraja Mudaliar : (1975) 2 MLJ 51 . wherein Paul J., has laid down that, No doubt, at the time when this revision petition was filed, the petitioner had the right to file a revision petition under Section 25 of the Act before this Court. But in view of the fact that the Government by its notification has removed all buildings belonging to religious trusts from the purview of the Act, in my view, this Court's jurisdiction to pass any orders in regard to the premises in question in this case which by reason of the aforesaid notification has been exempt from all the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act including Section 25, has come to an end. Paul J., has further observed that, The effect of the notification passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu mentioned above is that in respect of the premises in question, the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, would no longer apply and no order can be passed in respect of such a building under any of the provisions of the Act including Section 25 which provides for a revision to this Court. Per contra, Gokulakrishnan, J., has laid down in C. Sebastian v. R.C. Doicese, Madurai : (1976) 1 MLJ 435 . that, As far as the G.O.Ms. No. 1998, Home, dated. 12th August, 1974, is concerned, it contemplates only exemption for the religious institutions and other charitable trusts from coming under the purview of the Tamil Nadu Act XVIII of 1960. The intention of the Government Order is only to facilitate the religious institutions to have its buildings for its own purpose without recourse to the Rent Controller's Court. That does not mean the right the institution had before the passing of the Government Order has been nullified. The Government Order is only to facilitate the religious institutions to have quicker remedy for having the building of its own for its own purpose. If that be so, there is no question, of the orders passed or pending proceedings in the Rent Controller's Court under Section 10 (3) (b) getting nullified. On the other hand, it is clear from the Government Order that there is no question of any retrospective effect given, for the exemption granted by the said Government Order under Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Act XVIII of 1960.
(3.) REFERRING to the decision of Paul J., Ambiga Ammal v. Selvaraja Mudaliar : (1975) 2 MLJ 51 . Gokula krishnan, J., has observed that' It is clear from the decision rendered in G. Ambiga Ammal v. Selaaraja Mudaliar : (1975) 2 MLJ 51 . that the effect of passing such Government Orders in respect of the pending proceedings and also proceedings ended prior to such passing of the Government Order had not been discussed, in the light of various decisions that had been rendered on such subjects. Unless the Legislature makes its effect retrospective the amendment will not in any way affect the pending proceedings. As far as the present case is concerned, the Government Order enacted by the Government under the provisions of Section 29 of the Act, cannot be construed as a substantive law, nor one which gives the retrospective effect to such provisions mentioned in the Government Order. Gokulakrishnan, J., has subsequently referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Income Tax Officer, Alleppey v. M.G. Pannose : [1970] 75 ITR 174 (SC) . and has extracted the following passage to the effect that, It is open to the Sovereign Legislature to enact laws which have retrospective operation. The Court will not ascribe retrospectivity to new laws affecting rights unless by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention, of the Legislature. The Parliament can delegate its legislative power within the recognised limits. Where any rule or regulation is made by any person or authority to whom such powers have been delegated by the Legislature, it may or may not be possible to make the same so as to give retrospective operation. It will depend on the language employed in the statutory provision, which may in express terms or by necessary implication empower the authority concerned to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effect. But where no such language is to be found, it has been held by the Courts that the person or authority exercising subordinate legislative functions cannot make a rule, regulation or by -law which can operate with retrospective effect. Thereafter, Gokulakrishnan, J., has observed that Section 29 of the Act "has not empowered the Government to pass any Government Order giving retrospective effect for such amendments. Applying the abovesaid Supreme Court decision, the present Government Order cannot be considered as one giving retrospective effect. On the other hand, the pending proceedings are saved from the language of the present Government Order in view of the Supreme Court decision referred to above" Gokulakrishnan, J., further referred to a decision of the Bench of this Court in M/s. Killick Nixon Ltd. v. V.R. Narayana Rao, (1974) 1 M.L.J. 16. wherein it has been laid down that, If the Legislature intended the amendment to be retrospective so as to affect vested rights, it would have made a specific provision for abatement of the pending proceedings and the decisions rendered therein as was done when the Amending Act (II of 1962) was passed. It cannot be held that Act XXIII of 1973 either expressly or by necessary implication has provided for abatement of pending proceedings. In the absence of any such provision, it has to be taken that the amending Act was only prospective. Thereafter, Gokulakrishnan, J., concludes that, As far as the present case is concerned, there is no such amending Act by the Legislature excepting the Government passing a Government Order under the powers conferred upon them under Section 29 of the Act. Hence, it is clear that the present Government Order can neither affect a decision rendered nor interfere with the pending proceedings inasmuch as there is nothing retrospective in the exemption granted to the religious institutions by the said Government Order. Gokulakrishnan, J., therefore, held that this Court has jurisdiction to continue the proceedings which arose prior to the passing of the Government Order referred to above.;