- (1.) THIS revision is directed against the Order in i. A. No. 1610 of 1992 in O. S. No. 330 of 1992 on the file of the District Munsif, kovilpatti, in which the learned District Munsif has passed an order, holding that the document dated 23. 8. 1992 is not admissible in evidence.
(2.) SHORT facts are: The respondent has filed the suit in o. S. No. 330 of 1992 for permanent injunction against the petitioner herein. He also filed petition in I. A. No. 1610 of 1992 under 0. 39, Rule 1 and sec. l51,c. P. C. ,prayingfor temporary injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with his possession. That was opposed by the revision petitioner herein who was the respondent in the trial court. In that enquiry, the revision petitioner herein had filed the document dated 23. 8. 1992 given by the respondent herein, duly attested by two witnesses. Objection was raised f6r eceiving it in evidence. On that objection, the learned District Munsif has passed an order, holding that it is not admissible in evidence. Aggrieved by the same, this revision petition is filed. Mr. K. Alagiriswamy, the learned senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would submit that this document does not extinguish any right in an immovable property and as such it may be received in evidence. Inter alia he submitted that at any rate the said document can be admitted in evidence for the collateral purpose of showing possession. Per contra, Mr. Peppin Fernando, would submit that according to the affidavit, the rent payable by the tenant for this lease was Rs. 700 and it was not disputed in the counter and as such it was a monthly tenancy with a rental over Rs. 100 and as such extinguishment of the tenancy right can be only by a registered document and in as such as this document was not registered, it cannot be admitted in evidence. He would further submit that lower court has stated that it was not made out as to for what collateral it should be received as evidence and as such it cannot be received in evidence even for collateral purpose and in view of that reasoning, this document cannot be received in evidence either for any collateral purpose. I have carefully considered the submissions made by learned counsels. At the outset, I shall refer to the rulings relied upon by the learned counsels: In M. S. Ram Singh v. B. S. Surana, A. I. R. 1972 Cal. 190, it was held that surrender of lease by an instrument in writing purporting to extinguish right of a tenant valued at over Rs. 100 is compul-sorily registrable. In Neelakanda Rao v. State of Mysore, A. I. R. 1960 Mys. 87, it was held that a surrender deed by a tenant in favour of the landlord in respect of the tenancy, the value of which exceeds Rs. 100 is clearly an instrument which purports to extinguish the right of the tenant and as such comes within clause (b) of Sec. 17 (1) of the Registration Act and therefore is compulsorily registrable, and if such document is not registered, it cannot be received in evidence of the transac-tion of surrender, affecting the property in view of sec. 49 of the Registration Act. In Muruga Mu-daliar v. Subba Reddiar, (1950)2 m. L. J. 818 (F. B.), it was held that Sec. 49 (c) of the Registration Act prohibits the use of an unregistered instrument in any legal proceeding in which such a document is sought to be relied on in support of a claim to enforce or maintain any right, title or interest to or in immovable property. So long as the document is not sought to be relied on as evidence of any right, title or interest to or in immovable property, there is nothing to prevent the document being received in evidence. It was held that the prohibition against admissibility enacted by Sec. 49 of the Registration Act is not an absolute one, but the section renders that unregistered document inadmissible only for the two limited purposes specified in clauses (a) and (c) and leaves it available to be used in evidence for other purposes. In Roshan Singh v. Zile Singh, (1989)2 M. L. J. 18, the ratio of this ruling is that the document could always be ' ' looked into for the collateral purpose of proving the nature and character of possession of each item of property. In Mst. Kirpal Kaur v. Bachan Singh, 1958 s. C. R. 948, it was held that the document concerned in that case was inadmissible in evidence in view of Sec. 49 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. From the above rulings, the following proposition of law can be deduced: The prohibition against admissibility enacted by Sec. 49 of the Registration Act is not an absolute one' but the section renders the unregistered document inadmissible only for the two limited purposes, specified in Clauses (a) and (c) and leaves it available to be used in evidence for other purposes. Sec. 49 of the Registration Act in so far as it is material for our purposes runs thus: ' ' No document required by Sec. 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be registered shall ' ' (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or. . . . (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. . . . . unless it has been registered. ' ' Straightaway, I shall reproduce the document concerned in this case. It reads as follows: The last sentence would amount to extinguishment of the lease. As such this is a document compulsorily registrable under Sec. 17. of the registration Act, inasmuch as monthly rent was Rs. 700. So to evidence extinguishment of the lease, this document cannot be received as evidence. But the penultimate sentence would indicate that possession was handed over by thilakaraj to Seetha-lakshmi. For the purpose of showing that possession was handed over, this document can be received in evidence, since it is for a collateral purpose. If we apply the proposition of law, which I have deduced above, this document is made available to be used in evidence for the other purposes, viz. with regard to handing over possession. As such, the trial court is wrong in refusing to receive this document as' ' evidence. Though not for the purpose of extinguishment of the leasehold rights, but for the purpose of handing over possession which is a relevant factor in a suit for injunction, the document can be received in evidence. The trial court has stated in the last portion of para. 4 of its order that it is not clear as to for what collateral purpose this document was sought to be produced as evidence. Now, k. Alagiriswamy, the learned senior counsel, would submit that the revision petitioner is relying upon it for the purpose of showing that possession was no longer with the respondent herein. To that limited extent, the document ought to have been received in evidence.
(3.) MR. Peppin Fernando, would submit that now plaint has been amended and now the relief sought for is for recovery of possession. In case this document was relied upon for extinguishment of the leasehold rights, definitely the trial court can reject such an argument. Suffice it for me to state at this juncture that the lower court is wrong in rejecting this document totally and ought to have received it in evidence for the collateral purpose of showing possession. In view of the above, this civil revision petition is allowed, setting aside the order of the trial court refusing to receive this document in evidence. The document shall be received in evidence not for showing extinguishment of leasehold rights, but for the limited purpose of showing possession. .;