K. Veeraswami, J. - (1.) The appellant, a Sub Inspector of Police, was dismissed from service by the Deputy Inspector General of Police. Southern Range, Madurai, who was the appointing and competent authority. This resulted from a departmental finding that certain charges of corruption made against the delinquent officer had been proved. He was serving last at Palani Taluk Station, within the administrative jurisdiction of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who was directed by the Superintendent of Police to conduct an enquiry under the Service Rules. He accordingly conducted an enquiry, at which oral evidence was directed for and against the charges, and the enquiry officer submitted his findings that the appellant was guilty of the charges. The Deputy Inspector General of Police accepted the findings provisionally and issued a Memorandum to the appellant asking him to show cause against the proposed penalty of dismissal from service. Along with the memorandum was enclosed a copy of the findings of the enquiry officer. The appellant was given an opportunity by the Deputy Inspector General of Police to make further representations. After considering those representations, the Deputy Inspector General of Police came to the conclusion that the charges were proved, with some modifications. The appellant unsuccessfully challenged the order of dismissal. Before Ramakrishnan J. a number of points were urged in support of the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. But, in the appeal before us, the only contention urged for the appellant was that the enquiry by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, at the instance of the Superintendent of Police, neither of whom was a competent authority, was incompetent and illegal. Ramakrishnan, J. was of the view that R. 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of the Madras Police Subordinate Services Discipline and Appeal Rules 1955, authorised delegation of the power to enquiry. We are inclined to approach the matter in a slightly different way.
(2.) It has not been contended before us that the dismissal order contravened any provision of the Constitution. Art. 311 (1) of the Constitution enjoins that no person who is a member of the civil service of a State, or who holds a civil post, shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. In the instant case, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who passed the order of dismissal, was the appointing authority. That the procedure, prescribed by Art. 311 (2) had been complied with has not been disputed. The argument, however, is that initiating enquiry into misconduct and holding enquiry are part of the procedure culminating in dismissal, and that therefore, in the absence of a delegation by the competent authority to a lower authority of the power to initiate and conduct in the enquiry, the dismissal order is not valid. In our opinion, Art 311 does not lend any support to the contention. Sub-Art. (2) of that Article does not require that the enquiry under the procedure enjoined therein should also be conducted by the appointing authority. Both the sub Articles of Art. 311 read together, and in the light of each other, suggest that while there is no prescription as to who should conduct the enquiry, the decision on the materials gathered at the enquiry in accordance with sub-Art. (2) can be arrived at only by the appointing authority. On that view, we are unable to accept the contention that initiating and conducting an enquiry to be valid should be by an authority delegated by the appointing authority. The object of initiating and conducing an enquiry is but to gather materials in the light of the prescribed procedure for eventually enabling the competent authority to come to a conclusion on the punishment by way of dismissal or removal. With respect, therefore, we are unable to share the view in Shardul Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1966 MP 193. We also note that this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh (1970) I SCWR 65 : 1970 SLR 101 , though on a different line of reasoning.
(3.) We are also of opinion that there is nothing in the Madras Police Subordinate Services Discipline and Appeal Rules 1955, which renders the order of dismissal in the instant case, invalid. R. 4 indicates that the authority competent to impose the penalty of dismissal of a Sub Inspector is the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who is also the appointing authority. This power of dismissal cannot be delegated under Art. 311 (1), and R. 4 also provides accordingly. Naturally, therefore, R. 3 (a) provides that it is the competent authority that should, on the basis of the proceedings contemplated by R. 3 (h) (i) arrive at a provisional conclusion as to the proposed penalty. The guarantee provided under Art. 311 and the Rules is that the provisional as well as final conclusion as to the penalty should be of the competent authority, on the materials gathered in accordance with the prescribed procedure. In this case, neither the District Superintendent of Police, who initiated, nor the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who conducted the enquiry and submitted his minutes to the competent authority, had anything to do with the decision made in respect of the punishment proposed, or finally imposed.;