- (1.) THE Order of the Court is as follows :- Both the petitions are filed to quash the orders of adjudication passed by the Additional Collector of Customs, Bombay .
(2.) NOTICE of motion has been ordered in both the writ petitions on 21-1-1992. Mr. C. A. Sundaram, the learned Additional Central government Standing Counsel appears for the respondents and has filed a counter-affidavit. A preliminary objection has been taken by Mr. C. A. Sundaram, the learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions and that both writ petitions have to be dismissed in limine on that ground. He also relies upon a decision of the Karnataka High Court intrishala Shoes (P) Ltd. v. Union of India-and the decision instate of Rajasthanv. Mis. Swaika Properties, for the proposition. The learned counsel also states that even after the Amendment to the Constitution, 15th Amendment Act, 1963, it cannot be said that this Court has got jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, interfere with the impugned order. Mr. R. Thiagarajan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, on the other hand, submits that the petitioner has got a branch office at Madras and refers to Section 142 of the Customs Act which appears in Chapter XVI with regard to the recovery of the sum due to the Government. The learned senior counsel also points out that where any duty or penalty is demanded from any person, an appropriate officer may take action for the recovery of the amount payable to the Government. After referring to Section 142 of the Customs Act, the learned senior counsel contends that even though the orders have been passed at Bomba y , the impact will be known at Madras office. In short, the learned senior counsel states that when the transaction would have taken place at the branch office at Madras , this Court has got jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He further points out that this court can entertain the writ petitions under article 226 of the Constitution of India against orders passed by the Collector of Customs at Bombay . I am inclined to decide the question raised as the preliminary objection and so I am not to enter into the merits of the case. Article 226 of the Constitution has been amended by the 15th Amendment Act, 1963 by which sub-section (2) to Article 226 has been inserted and it reads as follows: ". . . . . The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or persons may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. . . . . " In view of this sub-clause, whether this Court has got the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is the question posed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. Learned counsel for the respondents Department strenuously contends that by no stretch of imagination, the petitioner herein can invoke the provisions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel refers to me the bills of lading which have shown the address in Gujara t. The orders of adjudication have also been made by the Assistant Collector of customs, Bombay . In view of that the learned counsel for the respondents states that simply because a branch office is at Madras , it does not mean that the petitioner can come to this Court and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The decision intrishala Shoes (P) Ltd. v. Union of India- arose in similar circumstances, and single Judge of the Karnataka High Court has held that the cause of action in that case entirely arose out of Karnataka and in such circumstances it has held that the fact that the petitioner company is located within the State has no relevancy at all to constitute a'cause of action'to challenge the levy of customs duty at Bombay. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the issue raised on different situations. In a land acquisition proceedings, notice under Rajasthan Act was served on the owner at West Benga l. The owner thought if fit to file a writ petition at Calcutta challenging the land acquisition proceedings. The Calcutta High Court entertained the writ petition. On an appeal by the State, the Supreme Court instate of Rajasthanv. Mis. Swaika Properties- has held that therule nisiissued by the Calcutta High Court on the petition and thead interim ex parteprohibitory order restraining the State Government from taking any steps to take possession of the land acquired are liable to be set aside. In the above-mentioned case, the Supreme Court has deprecated the practice which was prevalent in the Calcutta High Court and observed as follows : (at p. 1292), ". . . . . . . . Quite recently, Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Court inassistant Collector of Central Excise, West Bengalv. Dunlop India Ltd.- administered strong admonition deprecating the practice of the High Court of grantingad interim ex parteorders which practically have the effect of the grant of the main relief in the petition under Art. 226 of the constitution irrespective of the fact whether the High Court had any territorial jurisdiction to entertain such a petition or whether the petition under Art. 226 was intended and meant to circumvent the alternative remedy provided by law or filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter delaying and protracting the proceedings by one device or the other particularly in matters relating to public revenue or implementation of various measures and schemes undertaken by the Government or the local authorities for general benefit. Although the powers of the High Courts under Art. 226 of the constitution are far and vide and the Judges must ever be vigilant to protect the citizen against arbitrary executive action, nonetheless, the Judges have a constructive role and therefore there is always the need to use such extensive powers with due circumspection. There has to be in the larger public interest an element of self-ordained restraint. . . . . . . " In Union of Indiav. M/s. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. the supreme Court was considering the interim relief granted by the Calcutta High court. That was a case arose under Clause 8-B of Import (Control) Order, 1955 and anex parteorder passed by the Calcutta High Court. Chinnappa Reddy, J. while dealing with a situation where the petitioner therein has come to a Court having its registered office at Ludhiana in the State of Punjab and a branch office at Calcutta observed at p. 1265 as follows : ". . . . . . Having regard to the fact that the registered office of the company is at Ludhiana and the principal respondents against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi, one would have expected the writ petition to be filed either in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or in the delhi High Court. The writ petitioners however, have chosen the Calcutta High court as the forum perhaps because one of the interlocutory reliefs which is sought is in respect of a consignment of beef tallow which has arrived at the calcutta Port. An inevitable result of the filing of writ petitions elsewhere than at a place where the concerned offices and the relevant records are located is to delay prompt return and contest. We do not desire to probe further into the question whether the writ petition was filed by design or accident in the Calcutta High Court when the office of the company is in the state of Punjab and all the principal respondents are in Delhi. . . . . " In that case the registered office of the Company was at ludhiana and the principal respondents against whom the primary relief sought for were at New Delhi and the writ petition was filed at the Calcutta High court and as such the Supreme Court observed that the writ petition ought not to have been filed at Calcutta High Court. On the facts of this case, the head office is at Bombay and the branch office is at Madras and the bill of lading has been made at Gujarat. So taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the preliminary objection taken by the counsel for the Department has to be upheld and this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction with regard to the orders impugned before me. Mr. R. Thiagarajan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners relies upon a judgment of the single Judge which is reported inatlas Exportersv. K. V. Imiraya, ACCIE. When deciding the territorial jurisdiction to try the writ petition, the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in that case has held that the business of export was carried on in Bombay, that the impugned order has been passed by the respondent therein in Delhi and that the consequences flowed from that order are visited upon the petitioner therein in Bombay and the petitioners business of export being carried on in Bombay are virtually affected. I am of the view that on the facts of this case, it cannot be said that the decision of the learned Single judge of the Bombay High Court in the above-mentioned case is right in holding that the Bombay High Court has got jurisdiction in that case. That is not the case here. I have already narrated the facts in the earlier portion of this order and I do not think that it need be repeated. I think the view taken by the Karnataka High Court intrishala Shoes (P) Ltd. v. Union of India- has to be followed in this case also. So also a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has also held with regard to the territorial jurisdiction in 1968 AIR (Delhi)225. In my view the inaction or action of the Central Government should have a reasonable nexus, within the High Court jurisdiction, to the cause pleaded by the petitioner to entitle the petitioner to move to a particular High Court. The fact that the petitioner is a local person and he is carrying on his trade activities within the State by way of having a branch office itself is not enough to create a "cause of action" to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A reference to the decision inveeri Chettiarv. Sales Tax Officer, Bombay- 1971 air (Madras) 155 can be usefully referred to. In that case, a Division Bench of this Court has observed as follows (at p. 160) :". . . . . Cause of action" has always been understood as referable to the bundle of facts in a legal proceeding and if a limb of that bundle of facts is available, seen or discernible in one particular place which is a seat of the High Court, then such High Court has the power to exercise all the powers conferred on it under article 226 (1a) notwithstanding the fact that the authority against whom the ultimate rule has to be issued and whose act has created a cause of action as a whole or in part, is situate outside its territorial limits. The person primarily affected by the respondent issuing the notices from time to time to the petitioners and calling upon them to produce the accounts of their business carried on in the State of Tamil Nadu and again by proposing to assess them to the best of his judgment on the assumption of certain jurisdictional facts, is the addressee of such notice and such affection relates to the bundle of facts in the totality of the list or proceeding concerned, and such impact necessarily gives rise to a cause of action, though it may be in part. It is established that in fiscal laws a proposal to assess forms part and parcel of the machinery of assessment and thus understood, the service of notice to assess and calling upon the petitioner to explain has given rise to a cause of action as is popularly and legally understood and the machinery of assessment has been set in motion and the impact of that motion is felt by the petitioners within the territorial limits of this State. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that a part of the cause of action has arisen in the State of Tamil nadu.' This is not the case here. The view I take that this court cannot entertain the petitions filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and proper remedy would be to move the High Court at Bombay or Gujarat if it so advised. Therefore, the writ petitions stand dismissed. No costs. . ;