- (1.) THIS is an appeal against the judgment of Ramanujam, J. , dated 3rd February. 1978, allowing W. P. No. 5889 of 1978 preferred by the first respondent herein. The first respondent herein was originally appointed by the Union Co-operative Insurance Society Limited by an order dated 2-1-1963 as a Probationary Field Officer. The said order of appointment provided that his services might be deemed to be terminated at any time by giving one month's notice on either side. Subsequently he was confirmed as a Field Officer by an office order dated 29-9-1963 with effect from 1-9-1963. He was then promoted as a Development Officer and later as Development Secretary. Later by an order dated 19-2-1970 the first respondent was promoted as Development Manager of the Madras Regional Office with effect from 1-2-70. While he was functioning as Development Manager, a Custodian was appointed for the Union Co-operative Insurance Society Limited, under the General Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Act, 17 of 1971. At that stage certain powers given to the first respondent to represent the Society in the matter of signing polices would appear to have been withdrawn by the Zonal Manager as a result of which misunderstandings arose between the first respondent and the Zonal Manager. Later under the provisions of Act 17 of 1971 the management of the Union Co-operative Insurance Society Limited, hereinafter referred to as the Society, was taken over by the Central Government and entrusted to a Custodian. Subsequently the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 57 of 1972, came into force, and under a notification issued thereunder the said Society merged with the appellant-company. As a result of Section 7 of that Act, the first respondent became, from the date of the merger, an employee of the United India Fire and General Insurance Company Limited. After his services stood transferred to the appellant-company, by an order dated 4-10-1973 his services were terminated by giving one month's salary in lieu of month's notice with reference to the office order dated 2-1-1963.
(2.) THE first respondent filed the writ petition referred to above for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the above order. He challenged the above order principally on three grounds : (i) The terms contained in the original order of appointment dated 2-1-1963 could not be taken to be the conditions of his service as Development Manager which post he was holding at the time of the termination of his service and, therefore, the termination of his service as per the original letter of appointment, even by giving one month's notice would be illegal. (ii) Even if the terms of the original order of appointment dated 2-1-1963 continued to govern the relationship between the parties, still the termination of the service of the first respondent by giving him one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice was not in accordance with that order, because that order did not provide for the termination of service by giving one month's salary, but provided for termination of service only by giving one month's notice. (iii) The terms and conditions contained in the original order of appointment having become statutory in view of S. 7 of Central Act 57 of 1972, he was entitled to approach the High Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the illegal order of termination.
(3.) RAMANUJAM, J. , by his order rejected the first contention of the first respondent, but accepted the second contention of the first respondent. For the purpose of accepting the second contention, he relied on a Bench decision of this Court in P. E. Warne v. Ouchterlony Valley Estate, (1956) I M. L. J. 556. Consequently he came to the conclusion that the order passed by the appellant terminating the service of the first respondent was not in accordance with law. The learned Judge then considered the stand of the appellant herein that, even if the termination was illegal, the first respondent should have been directed to seek his ordinary remedy of claiming damages in a suit for unlawful termination of his services, that he was not entitled to the issue of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and that in any event the appellant was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The learned Judge overruled these contentions and allowed the writ petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the appellant terminating the services of the first respondent. It is against this order the present writ appeal has been filed.;