M.P. Thakkar, J. - (1.) The Central question which has come to the surface in the present group of matters comprising of four Second Appeals and one Letters Patent Appeal is whether the order of termination of services of an employee of the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation (hereafter referred to as the "Corporation") without complying with the principles of natural justice and/or without complying with the relevant regulations framed for the conduct of disciplinary proceedings can be struck down as null and void and whether a declaration can be granted that an employee concerned continues to be in the service of the Corporation.
(2.) On August 19, 1974, two Second Appeals, Second Appeal No. 41/73 and Second Appeal No. 228/73, came up for hearing before Rane, J. The learned Judge referred these two matters to a Division Bench in view of a conflict between a decision rendered by J.M. Shetb, J. on the one band and a decision rendered by A A. Dave, J. on the other in regard to the question as to whether a declaration can be granted in favour of an employee of the Corporation to the effect that the order of dismissal passed against him is null and void and that he continues to be in the service of the Corporation. The same question across before Rane, J. in Second Appeal No. 214/73 which he again referred to a Division Bench by his order dated August 20, 1974 for the same reasons. Thereafter on October 10, 1974 this very question arose before him in Second Appeal No. 656/70. He referred this matter also to a Division Bench. Thus four Second Appeals (Nos. 41/73, 214/73 228/73 and 656/70) came to be referred to a Division Bench. It appears that J.M. Sheth, J. had taken the view that "an employee of the Corporation was not entitled to a declaration that the order dismissing him from service was a nullity and that he continued in service. This view was taken in Second Appeal No. 405/71 which was disposed of by him by his judgment and order dated 5-7-1972. He granted a certificate of fitness for preferring an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent In view of this certificate Letters Patent Appeal No. 131/74 came to be instituted by the original plaintiff who felt aggrieved by the view taken by the learned Single Judge.
(3.) This very question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Mofatlal Narndas Barot v. J. D. Rathod, Divisional, Controller, State Transport Mehsana and another A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court 1964. It was a case of an employee of the Corporation whose services had been terminated. The Supreme Court took the view that the Corporation was an autonomous statutory corporation formed under the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act. 1950. The Supreme Court expressed the view that an employee of the Corporation was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment including an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence. The Supreme Court further more took the view that the impugned order was passed in contravention of the relevant regulation and in violation of the principles of natural justice, and, therefore, was bad in law. The ratio of the said decision is that an order passed in violation of principles of natural justice and in contravention of the relevant regulations would be a nullity in the eye of law. If this decision holds good, there can be no room for doubt that an employee of the Corporation would be entitled to a declaration that his order of dismissal is null and void and that he continues in service in case he is able to establish that there has been violation of principles of natural justice and/or non-compliance with the requirements of the relevant regulations. J.M. Sheth, J. in disposing of Second Appeal No. 405/71 by his judgment and order dated 5/7-7-1972 took the view that the decision in Mafatlal Narandas Barot's case (A.I.R. 1966 S. C. 1364) did not take into account material factors which had been considered in Executive Committee of U. P. State Warehousing Corporation, Lucknow v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi (A.I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 1244). In the course of the decision J. M. Sheth, J. formulated the question in the following form "The only question that can survive for decision will be : whether the decision of the Supreme Court in Mafatlal Barot's case, which was also the case of an employee of the Corporation, will govern the present case." He then proceeded to examine the provisions of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950, and the provisions of the Air Corporation Act, 1953. After examining the relevant provisions in just a position the learned Judge was of the opinion that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Bai, A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 1823 and the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Executive Committee of UP. State Warehousing Corporation, Lucknow, v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, A I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 1244 , had an impact on this question and that notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court in Mafatlal Narandas Barot's case (supra) an employee of the Corporation was not entitled to such a declaration The view taken by the learned Judge is reflected in the following passage from his judgment:- "On examining the Scheme of this Act and the Scheme of the Air Corporation Act, 1953 and the relevant material section, which required consideration for these purposes. I find there is no substantial difference. The present case would, therefore, be clearly covered by the ratio of the two decisions of the Supreme Court, viz. Warehousing Corporation's case and Indian Airlines Corporation's case. It is, therefore, evident that the each respondent concerned in these appeals cannot successfully urge that the order of dismissal passed against him is unlawful, null and void and inoperative. The order of dismissal will be merely wrongful and not unlawful. The respondent, therefore, would be only entitled to a claim for damages and would not be entitled to get a declaration that he continues in service or that he be reinstated in service. The relief granted by the two Courts below in this behalf cannot be granted in view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court." In other words though the learned Judge does not say so in so many words, the learned Judge appears to have reached the conclusion that an employee of the Corporation was not entitled to such a declaration notwithstanding the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Mafatlal Narandas Barot (Supra) in view of the later decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of U.P. Warehousing Corporation (supra) and Indian Airlines Corporation (supra). ;