S.B.MAJMUDAR,J. - (1.) This Special C.A. is moved by Misc. Mazdoor Sabha through its Secretary on behalf of its members who were workmen working with respondent No. 3 at the relevant time. Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are joined as constituted attornies in charge of the said concert while respondent No. 6 is joined through its Managing Director being parent company whose wholly owned subsidiary is respondent No. 3 industries.
(2.) The case of the petitioner-Union is that services of all the employees working with respondent No. 3-Company were terminated illegally on 3.2.1988 by notice at Annexure 'B' without following the provisions of Sections 25F, 25FFA, 25N and 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('the Act' for short) and Section 66 of the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act, 1948. Respondent No. 3 was registered as a private company on 20.12.1982 According to the petitioner, one of the objects of the company, as seen from the Articles of Association was to carry on business of manufacturing, preparing for market and/or selling and dealing in Mosquito net and allied products. The manufacturing operation of mosquito nets was carried on by the Mosquito Netting Plant managed by respondent No. 6 company which is a parent company. According to the petitioner, though the mosquito net plant was still manufacturing mosquito nets at the relevant time and even though it was not closed by respondent No. 6, respondent No. 3, a subsidiary company terminated the services of all its employees being 74 in Number. Thus, it was a wholesale termination of services of all the employees on the ground that sewing thread division of Ahmedabad Jubilee Mills had stopped working and all the divisions are closed and, therefore, the employees of Diwan Chemtex Industries Limited, will not be given work after working hours, w.e.f. 3.2.1988. It was stated therein that if the production will start in future, it will be informed in advance and the eligible employees will have their rights in respect of gratuity, leave encashment arrears of salary, termination salary and salary in lieu of notice required under the Administrative Rules. Names of employees and their categories whose services were terminated were shown in enclosed Annexure to the said notice and they were 74 in number. According to the petitioner, none of the relevant provisions of the I.D. Act of Bombay Shops and Establishment Act were followed and, therefore, the impugned notice was null and void and the concerned employees are entitled to be treated to have continued with respondent No. 3 and as they were not being given work, they has made complaints to respondents No. 1 and 2, specially respondent No. 2 who was discharging his functions under the Act and hence respondents No. 1, 2 are required to be directed to prosecute respondents No. 3 and 6 which according to the petitioner is the parent company. .............
(3.) So far as the grievances in the main petition are concerned, the first question to be decided is as to whether a direct petition under Article 226 is maintainable against respondent No. 3 and/or respondent No. 6 which are companies registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and if such a petition is maintainable, further question would arise as to whether the impugned notice at Annexure 'B' is null and void and even if it is null and void, whether any relief can be given against respondent No. 6 in the present proceedings when highly disputed questions of facts are raised as to whether respondent No. 3 is in any way part and parcel of respondent No. 6 company and where they result in such disputed questions of fact, petitioner should be relegated to the remedy under the I.D. Act or not. We shall, therefore, first deal with the question of maintainability of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against respondent No. 3 or for that matter, respondent No. 6. Maintainability of writ petition:- Sub-clause (1) of Article 226 provides thus : "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto an certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose". It becomes clear that as per said provision, High Court can issue writ to any person, authority or Government and such writ or direction can be issued to them for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights covered by Part III and for any other purpose. It is now well settled that any other purpose would include enforcement of statutory rights and obligations. However, the moot question is whether private company like respondent No. 3 or 6 covered by the phrase 'any person' as employed by sub-clause (1) of Article 226. It may be noted that the word 'person' is defined by the Constitution. However, Article 367 can be resorted to in this connection. It defines "Unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897 shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under Article 272, apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for he interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India". When we turn to General Clauses Act, 1897, we find definition of the term 'person' as provided by Section 3(42) as meaning any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not". In the context of Article 226(1), there is nothing to contraindicate applicability of this definition of the term 'person'. Consequently, it can safely be assumed that while the framers of Constitution employed the term 'person' in Article 226(1), the said term had the same meaning as laid down in Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as provided by Article 367 of the Constitution. Consequently, it has to be held that provision Article 226(1) would apply to companies like respondents No. 3 and 6. However, the more fundamental question which is required to be answered in this context is as to whether any writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus for enforcement of even statutory obligations of respondents No. 3 and 6 can be issued against them. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction is a the nature of a public law remedy and it was never be invoked for enforcement of any private rights. Consequently, the words 'any Person' in Article 226 even though they may include within their sweep companies, like respondents No. 3 and 6, no writ can be issued against them under Article 226 unless they can be treated to be persons who have committed breaches of statutory provisions imposing duties of public nature. It becomes, therefore, clear that even if a company like respondent No. 3 or respondent No. 6 may be bound by any statutory provisions and may be enjoined by the provisions of the Act to act in a particular manner before, it can take any appropriate steps to terminate service of an employee, unless such statutory provisions can be said to partake character of public duty, such actions would remain in the domain of private duty qua concerned aggrieved workmen and would entitle them to claim writ of mandamus against such companies, however wider connotation of the word 'person' in Article 226(1) may be. It is in this connection that Mr. Clerk for the petitioner vehemently contended that respondent No. 3 or respondent No. 6 have been enjoined by provision of Sections 25FFA, 25FFF and 25-O of the Act to follow statutory procedure for closing down of their undertakings and that procedure imposes duty of public nature on them as such an action has impact on the livelihood of the entire mass of workmen and that would only affect their right to life under Article 21 but would spell a disaster only to the workmen but also to the large number of their dependents being members of their families and such action taken by the respondents would remain a purely private action like retrenchment and therefore, at least in cases of closure of undertakings, without following procedure of Sections 25FFA, 25FFF and/or 25-O, as the case may be, statutory obligations of concerned employers should be treated to be of the nature of public duties and obligation and private duties and obligations especially when they are cast by statute based on public policy and, therefore, writ petition should be treated as maintainable against them.;