STATE Vs. HARIJAN KACHARA SADA
HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
HARIJAN KACHARA SADA
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V.B.RAJU, J. -
(1.)THIS Judgment will dispose of Confirmation Case No. 1 of 1960 and Criminal Appeal No. 282 of 1960 arising out of the judgment of the learned Judge at Mehsana convicting the applicant Kachara Sada Dhed -Harijan under Section 302 I.P. Code for having murdered Bai Mangu aged 17 years wife of one Ishwar and under Section 394 and 397 I.P. Code for having robbed her of her ornaments and for having used a deadly weapon while committing robbery.
(2.)IT is contended that Keshavlal is the only eye -witness who according to the prosecution had seen the appellant at the scene of offence and that when the prosecution case depends on the evidence of only one eye -witness his evidence requires to be corroborated and for this purpose the Learned Counsel for the appellant relied on a ruling reported in : 1956CriLJ777 .
This case is distinguishable from the present case because in that case a person who had seen the perpetrator of a crime had not given information of it to any one else and it was held that such a person can be regarded in law as an accomplice. But in the instant case Keshavlal who had soon the crime at about 11 -30 a.m. went immediately to the house of Amichand and had given information to Bai Pashi. The remarks of Their Lordships therefore do not apply to the facts of the present case. The principles relating to corroboration have been laid down Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras (1957) Supreme Court Reports 981 at p. 991 as follows:
(3.)THE following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established: (1) As a general rule a Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated one credible witness out weights the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character.
(2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute Courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence that corroboration should be insisted upon for example in the case of a child witness or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character.
(3) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes.
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