Decided on May 30,2013

Varun Kumar And Another Appellant


- (1.) On an FIR lodged by complainant / informant Ashraf Ali on 13.08.1999 in police station Gang Nahar, Roorkee against Varun Kumar and Yogendra alias Yogi for the offences punishable under Sections 324, 504 of IPC, investigation started. After the investigation, chargesheet was submitted against both the accused in respect of offences punishable under Sections 307, 324 and 504 of IPC. The accused persons underwent trial. They were convicted under Sections 307 and 504 of IPC and were sentenced appropriately. Aggrieved against said order dated 07.10.2002, both the convicts preferred criminal appeal no. 68 of 2002, which was partly allowed. While the conviction of the accused-appellants under Section 307 of IPC was affirmed, the appeal in respect of offence punishable under Section 504 of IPC was set aside vide order dated 14.02.2007. Aggrieved against the conviction and sentence, present criminal revision was preferred by the revisionists Varun Kumar and Yogendra alias Yogi.
(2.) A Compounding Application CRMA No. 767 of 2013 is filed by the informant as well as the injured for permission to compound the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC against the accused-revisionists. Ashraf Ali (complainant) alongwith Firoz (injured) are present in person before the Court, duly identified by their counsel Mr. Pramod Tiwari, Advocate. Accused-revisionists Varun Kumar and Yogendra alias Yogi are also present in person before the Court, duly identified by their counsel Mr. Rajendra Singh, Advocate. Firoz (injured) and Ashraf Ali (complainant) submitted before this Court that they are not interested in prosecuting the accusedrevisionists. They said that they have amicably settled their dispute out of Court with the intervention of few gentlemen and therefore, they don't want the accusedrevisionists to be send behind bar.
(3.) Offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC is non-compoundable offence within the scheme of Section 320 of Cr.P.C. The question is whether, the injured should be permitted to compound the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC against the accused persons or not Learned counsel for the parties drew attention of this Court towards the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 6th December 2012, in Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 115 of 2012, Dimpey Gujral vs Union Territory, wherein the injured was permitted to compound the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 of IPC. Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to follow the decision of a larger Bench rendered in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another, 2013 1 SCC(Cri) 160. The relevant paragraph of said judgment are reproduced here-in-under for ready reference: "The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint of F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statues like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.";

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