- (1.) The only question that this petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by a former employee of the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, raises is as to whether the order of the Institute purporting to terminating the services of the petitioner could be said to be per se penal or otherwise a measure of punishment.
(2.) The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Foreman Machine Shop on 5-12-1966 (Annexure C) on a probation of one year. The period of probation of the petitioner was extended from time to time until December 2. 1971. when by an order of that date (Annexure A) the services of the petitioner were terminated with effect from the date of expiry of one month from the date of the issue of the order. By a subsequent order of December 16, 1971 (Annexure A-1) it was pointed out that since the notice had been served on the petitioner on December 3, 1971 his services shall stand terminated on January 2, 1972 on the expiry of one month period. Earlier, on June 19, 1968, on the basis of certain reports of misbehaviour against the petitioner (Annexures G.H. and I) made by his colleague and superiors a charge-sheet (Annexure K) was issued to the petitioner informing the petitioner that it was proposed to take disciplinary action against the petitioner on the basis of the aforesaid reports. The petitioner submitted a reply to the charge-sheet (Annexure L) denying the allegations and sought art.. opportunity of a personal hearing. It appears that on May 22, 1968 the Registrar of the Institute purported to confirm the petitioner pursuant to which the petitioner was allowed to participate in the Provident Fund (Annexure D). The confirmation was, however, not approved by the Director and before the order of confirmation was conveyed to the petitioner it was decided to extend the period of his probation for a further period. It further appears that, even though the order of termination is ex facie innocuous, in that it does not indicate the reasons for the termination except that the services were no longer required, the original record which was placed for the inspection of the Court, and the fact is not denied indicates that the termination of the services of the petitioner had its genesis in the several allegations made against the petitioner of misbehaviour by his colleagues and superiors, some of which had been made the basis of the charge-sheet against the petitioner earlier.
(3.) The first contention that is urged. on behalf of the petitioner is that on the confirmation of the petitioner by order of the Registrar of May 22, 1968 the petitioner became a permanent employee of the Institute and had. therefore, a right to continue in its service until retirement, resignation or removal in accordance with the provisions of law. This contention is not sustainable. The petitioner was admittedly appointed on a probation. The statutes, which regulate the conditions of services of the petitioner did not contain any bar to extension of probation from time to time. The authorities were, therefore, empowered either to terminate the services of the petitioner or to extend the period of probation from time to time until they come to the conclusion that the petitioner had given satisfaction and was, therefore, fit to be confirmed. The order made by the Registrar on May 22, 1968, purporting to confirm the petitioner, and the fact that vide Annexure D the petitioner was allowed to participate in the Provident Fund, do not appear to be of any avail. It was not disputed that the order of confirmation was never conveyed to the the petitioner and before it could be acted upon a decision had been arrived at to extend the period of probation of the petitioner on account of the adverse reports against him. Mere participation in the Provident Fund Account would not amount to giving effect to the order of confirmation In this view of the matter the further question in controversy between the parties as to whether the Registrar was competent, by virtue of any delegation of power, to make an order of confirmation would be irrelevant. This contention must, therefore, fail.;