S.K.KAPUR - (1.) The subject-matter of acquisition in this case is a house situate in Sundernagar within the Municipal limits. Before anything is said on the rival contentions, I would like to point out that Sundernagar is one of the places which has assumed considerable importance in view of Sutlej Beas Link Project.
(2.) The dispute in this case relates only to the superstructure and not to the land on which it is built. The house was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act in pursuance of notification dated May 13, 1958, under section 4 of the said Act and the award was made by the Collector on January 16, 1962. The Collector fixed compensation at Rs. 1,160 which was enhanced by the learned District Judge to Rs. 6,848. It appears that the house was originally owned by Bijai Ram and Mohan. The Collector awarded compensation to Amin Chand son of Brjai Ram, Rukmani daughter of Mohan. Mitter Dev and Saradhu, son and widow of Mohan respectively. The Collector appor tioned compensation equally amongst four claimants. Out of the said four claimants, Amin Chand, Mitter Dev and Saradhu applied under section 18 of the said Act to the District Judge for enhancement of compensation. Rukmani was impleaded as a respondent and it was alleged in the application for reference that she had relinquished her interest in favour of the other three claimants. On an objection by the Collector that in the absence of a reference application by Rukmani no enhancement could be allowed with respect to her one fourth interest in the acquired property, the learned District Judge decided that Rukmani having relinquished her interest the three applicants could ask for revision of compensation with respect to the entire property. The learned District Judge, therefore apportioned the total compensation between the three applicants namely Amin Chand, Mitter Dev and Saradhu.
(3.) Aggrieved by the award of the learned District Judge, the Collector has filed an appeal in this Court and the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is regarding the jurisdiction of the District Judge to allow any increase in the compensation with respect to the one-fourth share of Rukmani. The learned counsel for the parties do not dispute that the aforementioned four persons have to be treated as co-owners because each one of them got one-fourth share in the compensation. On behalf of the appellant the main contention is that no relinquishment having been proved the award of the Collector to the extent of Rukmani's share became final. The special jurisdiction enjoyed by District Judge is circumscribed within the four corners of sections 18 to 22 of the said Act. Under section 18 any person interested who has not accepted the award may apply to the Collector in writing for reference of the matter for determination by the Court "whether his objection be to the measurement by the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested." Section 20 enjoins the Court to serve notice on the applicant, the persons interested and in certain cases the Collector, "specifying the day on which the Court will proceed to determine the objection." The words "the objection" in section 20 has reference to the 'objection' of the applicant under section 18. The jurisdiction of the Court, therefore, arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector's award. It is confined to the consideration of that objection. The Court does not exercise appellate powers over the Collector. The scheme of the Act indicates, which indication has the support of inherent reasonableness that persons who have not applied for a reference even though they are brought before the Court cannot be allowed to ventilate their own grievance against the award. Persons interested even though parties to the award but not satisfied therewith cannot intervene in a reference at some one else's instance and ask for increse of their compensation. Persons not applying for reference are treated as persons who have accepted the award and qua them the award becomes final. Section 21 which prescribes the scope of inquiry does not enlarge its amplitude so as to embrace the consideration of the interests of all possible persons including those who would like to have higher compensation. There may be cases where a co-owner having no distinct and specified share or a joint owner may apply on behalf of all so that any enhancement in the compensation by the Court may enure to the benefit of all. But I am not in this case called upon to decide that question because in my opinion where each co-owner has a distinct and specified share in the property he can represent only his own interest and each one of the co-owners must ask for a reference. In this view I am supported by State v Narayani Pillai Kuttiparu Amma, AIR 1959 Kerala 136. It was for the applicants to prove the facts entitling them to apply on behalf of the four owners They did not allege or prove their right to apply as co-owners or joint owners, but based their claim on relinquishment alone. I am, therefore, obliged to answer the point on that footing.;