HIGH COURT OF DELHI
STATE OF DELHI
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Vijender Jain -
(1.)This is a petition under Sections 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) filed by the petitioner, aggrieved by the order of learned M.M. dismissing his complaint on 21.1.93. Mr. Sud has argued that complainant filed the complaint dated 8.1.93 on 20.1.95. He has also contended that the petitioner has alleged in his complaint that on 22.12.93 at about 8.30. p.m. the respondent waived and called the complainant in filthy language and threatened the complainant with dire consequences in the event the complainant did anything against the said Shri Jai Kishan Aggarwal. The exact word used by the respondent are as follows:
"BEHENCHOD AGAR TU AGARWAL KO TANG KIYA TO MAIN TERI MA CHOD DOONGA OR TUJHE UTHWA KAR VA TERE BAR KO UNDER KARVA DOONGA."
(2.)Mr. Sud has contended that on these allegations the evidence under Sections 503,504, 505 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code were made out. Mr. Sud has also contended that the learned M.M. by his impugned order dismissed the complaint on 21.1.93 without following the provisions of Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code Mr. Sud has argued that the sole ground of dismissing the complaint was that the complaint was filed against SHO, Ranbir Singh, who was a Police Officer, on the ground that under Section 197(3), Criminal Procedure Code Court cannot take cognizance unless the prior sanction of the Government is obtained and in the absence of such sanction the Court cannot take cognizance.
(3.)What has been contended before me by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that M.M. complete mis-read the provisions of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. He has further contended that all acts done by the Police Officer, sanction would not be pre-requisite for lodging or maintaining prosecution if those acts are not done in purported official duty by such Police Officer. Mr. Sud has further contended that at best this defence ought to have been taken by the respondent after, he has been summoned or in case he was not summoned then the M.M. ought to have been satisfied himself by taking recourse of Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code by examining the complainant or such witnesses. Another leg of the arguments of the learned Counsel is that even if the Magistrate was of the opinion that sanction was required, he could have taken recourse to Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code but abrupt dismissal of the complaint by the learned M.M. amounts an act of abdication of jurisdiction. In support of his contentions he has citedAIR, 1955SC309,1985Cr.L.J. 1190, AIR 1979 SC 1841.
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