JUDGEMENT
Mukul Mudgal, J. -
(1.) This is an appeal under Section 37(2)(a) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act')
against the order dated 24th July, 2003 by which the Arbitral Tribunal held the
claim Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the respondent/contractor adjudicated by
the Disputes Review Expert (hereinafter referred to as the 'DRE') beyond the
scope of reference to the arbitration and thus declined to entertain the pleas of
the appellant in respect of such claims.
(2.) The facts of the case as follows:
The respondent/contractor was awarded on 29th December, 1995 the
work of four laning of Km. 8000 to Km 24,000 of Agra-Gwalior Section of NH-
3 in the State of Uttar Pradesh (Contract Package No. NS-4/UP) by the
appellant National Highway Authority of India (NHAI). Thereafter disputes
arose between the parties. The DRE stood appointed on 8th February, 2001. On
16th October, 2001, 20 disputes were referred to Engineer for his decision by the
respondent/contractor under Clause 24.1 which reads as follows-
"24.1 If the Contractor believes that a decision taken by the Engineer was
either outside the authority given to the Engineer by the Contract or that
the decision was wrongly taken, the decision shall be referred to the
Dispute Review Expert within 14 days of the Notification of the Engineer's
decision."
(3.) The other relevant clauses of the contract between the parties read as
follows:
"4. Engineer's decision
Except where otherwise specifically stated, the Engineer will decide
contractual matters between the Employer and the Contractor in the role
representing the Employer-
24 Disputes (already extracted)
25. Procedures for disputes
25.1 The Disputes Review Expert shall give a decision in writing within
28 days of the receipt of a notification of a dispute.
25.2. He shall be paid daily at the rate specified in the Contract Data
together with reimbursable expenses of the types specified in the Contract
Data and the cost shall be divided equally between the Employer and the
Contractor, whatever decision is reached by the Disputes Review Expert.
Either party may refer a decision of the Disputes Review Expert to an
Arbitrator within 28 days of his written decision. If neither party refers the
dispute to arbitration within the above 28 days, the Disputes Review
Expert's decision will be final and binding.
25.3 The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the arbitration
procedure stated in the Special Conditions of Contract."
Even before the Engineer's decision had been arrived at under Clause 4
extracted hereinabove the respondent referred 20 disputes to DRE. The Engineer
in the meanwhile on 6th November, 2001 had given his decision rejecting all the
20 disputes raised by the respondent/contractor. On 27th December, 2002 the
DRE gave its decision by allowing claim Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10 (called 'A'
group for convenience) in favour of the respondents/contractor and rejecting
the contractor's claim Nos. 5, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20 (called 'B' group).
However, the remaining four claims were settled between the parties. On 23rd
January, 2003 the respondent/contractor invoked the arbitration clause in
respect of dispute Nos. 5, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20 (group 'B') which were rejected
by the DRE within the period of 28 days of the DRE's order as stipulated by
Clause 25.2. It is not in dispute that within 56 days of the order of DRE and
beyond the period of 28 days stipulated in Clause 25.2, the appellant herein also
referred the claims of the respondents which were allowed by the DRE for
reference to the arbitration. On a plea raised by the respondent about the
maintainability of the arbitration in respect of the 'A' group claims, the Arbitral
Tribunal held that it did not have any jurisdiction in respect of the claims
sought to be referred by the appellant on the 56th days as Clause 25.2 of the
contract barred the reference of dispute to the arbitration beyond 28 days. The
said order of the Arbitral Tribunal has been challenged before this Court under
Section 37 of the Act. Section 37 of the Act reads as follows:
"37. Appealable orders.-(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders
(and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from
original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely:
(a) granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9;
(b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under
Section 34.
(2) An appeal shall also lie to a Court from an order of the Arbitral
Tribunal-
(a) accepting the plea referred to in Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3)
of Section 16; or
(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17.
(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this
section, but nothing in this Section affect or take away any right to appeal
to the Supreme Court."
The other relevant sections of the Act necessary for disposal of this appeal are
Sections 5 and 43(3) which read as follows:
"5. Extent of judicial intervention.-Notwithstanding anything contained
in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this
Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this
Part."
"43. Limitations -(1)...........
(2).............
(3) Where an arbitration agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration
provides that any claim to which the agreement applies shall be barred
unless some step to commence arbitral proceedings is taken within a time
fixed by the agreement, and a dispute arises to which the agreement
applies, the Court, if it is of opinion that in the circumstances of the case
undue hardship would otherwise be caused, and notwithstanding that
the time so fixed has expired, may or such terms, if any, as the justice of
the case may require, extend the time for such period as it thinks proper."
While there is no pleading in respect of the undue hardship specifically
contained in the memo of appeal, the learned Counsel for the appellant has
nevertheless relied upon paragraph (m) at Page 7 of the appeal which reads as
follows to contend that Court can derive the plea of the undue hardship on the
basis of averment contained in the appeal:
"(m) For that the impugned order is highly prejudicial and exposes the
appellant to the liability of more than Rs. 80 lakh."
It is apparent that the pleadings are woefully deficient and do not even take
note of the mandate and requirement of Section 43(3) of the new Act. Section
43(3) does not require a mere legal pleading but undue hardship has to be based
on factual pleadings which are not properly present there in the present case.
In the interest of justice, the Court could have adjourned the matter so as to
permit the appellant to amend to the memo of appeal subject to the payment
of the cost. This would have unnecessarily delayed the disposal of this matter
and the pending arbitration between the parties. However, Mr. Sharma, the
learned Counsel for the respondent was gracious enough not to insist upon this
resort provided costs were paid to the respondent. In this view of the matter,
in the event of appellant's succeeding in this appeal, the costs are required to
be imposed on the appellant.;