- (1.) BY this petition, the petitioner, who is a bank employee, has challenged the suspension order dated 21-3-1992, passed BY the deputy general manager of the syndicate bank in exercise of the powers under clause 19.12 (b) of bipartite settlement. The petitioner has prayed that a writ of certiorari be issued quashing the suspension order aforesaid as well as the modified order dated 8-9-1992 contained in annexure - h. The petitioner further prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the petitioner's reinstatement and to grant her All consequential reliefs including financial benefits. Without going into the details about the facts of the case, it may be mentioned that the petitioner who is a permanent employee of the syndicate bank as typist-cum-clerk, had been appointed in the year 1984 has been suspended pending enquiry against charge, vide order dated 21st march, 1992, a copy of which has been annexed as annexure-c to this petition. The petitioner has challenged the said order as being illegal and without jurisdiction. I have heard Sri p. Vishwanath shetty learned senior advocate assisted BY Sri s.a. kalagi an advocate and Sri ramdas on behalf of the opposite parties. Sri p. Vishwanath shetty learned senior advocate submitted that the reason for the suspension order being illegal, null and void is that no charge has been issued against the petitioner either on or before the date of passing of the suspension order and as no charge-sheet had been issued nor no date for enquiry had been fixed, the suspension order could not be passed. He submitted that when certain powers are conferred and it is provided that these powers are to be exercised in certain circumstances that the mode is provided for exercise thereof with reference to the time, that power will have to be exercised in that manner alone and other modes are closed. Sri P.V.Shetty, also made a reference to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in this Connection Reported in N.V.Ramanadham v State of Bank of India. On behalf of the bank Sri ramdas has disputed these contentions BY saying that suspension order could be passed even in contemplation of the disciplinary action and it is not necessary to issue the charge-sheet before issuing the suspension order and made a reference to para 19.12 of bipartite settlement. In the alternative Sri ramdas submitted that as per Amendment in view of the expression used in the Rules as amended for expression "pending enquiry", expression 'pending such enquiry' or 'initiation of such enquiry have been substituted and so it is not necessary that enquiry should be pending even at the initiation of such, enquiry, suspension order can be issued. I have applied my mind to the contention of the learned counsels for the parties. The validity or otherwise of the suspension order so far as this ground is concerned, will depend upon the construction of clause 19.12 of bipartite settlement. The material clauses to be considered are clauses 19.12(a) and (b), they are being quoted herewith extenso. "clause 19.12(a). An employee against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken shall be given a charge-sheet clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and a date shall be fixed for enquiry, sufficient time being given to him to enable him to prepare and give his explanation so also to produce any evidence that he may wish to tender in his defence. He shall be permitted to appear before the officer conducting the enquiry, to cross-examine any witness on whose evidence the charge rests and to examine witnesses and produce other evidence in his defence. (b) pending such enquiry he may be suspended, but if on the conclusion of the enquiry it is decided to take no action against him he shall be deemed to have been on duty and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowances and to All other privileges for the period of suspension; and if some punishment other than dismissal is inflicted the whole or a part of the period of suspension, may, at the discretion of the management, be treated as on duty with the right to a corresponding portion of the wages, allowances etc." a perusal of sub-clause (b) of clause 19. 12 shows and provides that the delinquent officer or employee can be suspended pending such enquiry. The question that arises, the expression 'such enquiry' refers to what enquiry? The expression 'such enquiry' refers to the enquiry referred to in earlier clause i.e., clause (a) of para 19.12. So we will have to refer to clause (a) which has been quoted earlier. Clause (a) provides that when a disciplinary action is proposed against an employee or action is likely to be taken against that employee, he shall be given the charge-sheet clearly setting for the particulars of the charges appearing against him and then it shall also fix a date for enquiry and then sufficient time shall be given to him to enable him to prepare and give his explanation etc. And other proceedings will take place in course of time. A reading of this clause per se shows that first there should be a proposed disciplinary action and it should be conceived that disciplinary action has to be taken, but that mental action of determining that action will be taken is not sufficient. Enquiry does not start at that stage. According to the requirements of clause (a), a charge-sheet has to be given and that date has to be fixed for the purpose of holding enquiry, i.e., the enquiry will commence from the date, which will be fixed for commencement of the enquiry and the date is to be mentioned in the charge sheet itself. So the enquiry in such a case will commence only if the charge-sheet is served and a particular date is specified from which it is to commence. Until that is done, in my opinion the enquiry does not start. Giving charge-sheet is a condition precedent and along with that fixing of the date for holding enquiry is also necessary. Thus the expression 'such enquiry' in my opinion refers to the enquiry as aforesaid i.e., the enquiry for which the date has to be fixed while serving the charge-sheet and that is the date of commencement of the enquiry. Thus in my opinion unless and until the charge sheet is served on the delinquent officer and he is informed of the date of enquiry it cannot be said that any such enquiry is pending. An enquiry can be said pending when it has commenced and until the conclusion thereof BY passing of the final orders. So unless it has commenced, enquiry cannot be said to be pending and therefore commencement of the enquiry starts from that point of time which is fixed as the date for starting enquiry. Any order of suspension which is passed earlier, as in the present case, cannot be said to be an order passed under clause 19.12(b) of the bipartite settlement, because in the present case the charge-sheet has been served on the petitioner on 2-11-1993, while suspension order has been passed on 21-3- 1992. I am informed BY learned senior counsel Sri P.V. Shetty BY placing the charge sheet before me that no date of enquiry has been fixed so far and it had been mentioned that enquiry officer had been appointed and he will inform the date of enquiry. In view of the provisions of bipartite settlement vide clause 19. 12 (b) as no enquiry had commenced on 1-3-1992, nor date had been fixed and perhaps up till now as intimated BY learned counsel for the petitioner, the present suspension order so far is concerned, is definitely without jurisdiction, because on the date it was passed no enquiry had been pending and as such, the petitioner could not be suspended on that date. (emphasis supplied) the learned counsel for the bank brought to my notice an Amendment subsequently made in para 19. 12 (b) of settlement, whereBY for the expression "pending such enquiry", the expression 'initiation of such enquiry' has been substituted. But as regards the present case it does not make any difference. Even if it be considered as initiation of such enquiry, it is not the enquiry in contemplation. Question for determination is when "such enquiry" is initiated, commenced or is pending. The enquiry that is referred in 19.12(b) is nothing but the one mentioned or referred in sub-clause (a) of clause 19.12. In my opinion initiation of enquiry referred to in clause 19. 12 (a) or (b) is to take place from the date fixed for i.e., enquiry- is being held or commenced and intimated to delinquent officer or employee as date fixed for enquiry after the serving of the charge-sheet on him. When I so opine, I find support from the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of N.V. Ramanadham, (supra), interpreting paragraph 521 of the sastry award, particularly clause 10 thereto, the Andhra Pradesh High Court had been pleased to take the same view as I have taken. The relevant portion of that judgment reads as under : "paragraph 521 of the sastry award reads thus: "a person against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken should, in the first instance, be informed of the particulars of the charge against him; he should have a proper opportunity to give his explanation as to such particulars. Final orders should be passed after due consideration of All the relevant facts and circumstances. With this object in view we give the following directions: (10) the procedure in such cases shall be as follows : (a) an employee against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken shall be given a charge-sheet clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and a date shall be fixed for enquiry, sufficient time being given to him to enable him to prepare and give his explanation as also to produce any evidence that he may wish to tender in his defence. He shall be permitted to appear before the officer conducting the enquiry, to cross-examine any witness on whose evidence the charge rests and to examine witnesses and produce other evidence in his defence. He shall also be permitted to be defended BY a representative of a registered union of bank employees or, with the bank's permission, BY a lawyer. He shall also be given a hearing as regards the nature of the proposed punishment in case any charge is established against him. (b) pending such inquiry he may be suspended, but if on the conclusion of the enquiry it is decided to take no action against him he shall be deemed to have been on duty and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowances and to All other privileges for the period of suspension; and if some punishment other than dismissal is. Inflicted whole or a part of the period of suspension, may, at the discretion of the management, be treated as on duty with the right to a corresponding portion of the wages, allowances etc. a reading of these clauses clearly shows that an employee against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken shall be given a charge-sheet clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and a date shall be fixed for enquiry and pending such enquiry he may be suspended. Therefore, the power to suspend an employee would arise only when there is a charge-sheet given to the delinquent employee setting forth clearly the circumstances appearing against him and a date is fixed for such enquiry. So, the action of the respondent keeping ramanadham under suspension pending investigation into the alleged misconduct is illegal and ramanadham must be deemed to be not suspended till june 29, 1972, until then it shall not clothe them with any power to keep an employee covered under the sastry award under suspension." having thus considered, I am of the opinion that the suspension order in the present case is not covered BY sub-clause (b) of clause 19,12 of the bipartite settlement and as such is illegal, null and void, as it has not been passed in accordance with the requirements of that clause. Therefore the suspension order dated 21-3-1992, annexure-c and annexure - h, dated 8-9-1992, which is in continuation and supplementary to the suspension order, are liable to be quashed. Therefore, I allow the writ petition and hereBY quash the suspension order dated 21-3-1992 and the order dated 8-9-1992, whereBY the said suspension order has been modified. As the suspension order has been quashed, a writ of mandamus is issued to the opposite parties to pay off the petitioner's dues up to date and to allow the petitioner to work. These directions will in no way adversely affect the power of the opposite party to suspend and to consider the question of suspending the petitioner according to law after the commencement of enquiry, if it is thought necessary and proper. The cost of the writ petition are made i.e., the parties to bear their own costs.;