JUDGEMENT
S.B.Majmudar, C.J. -
(1.) In this writ appeal, the writ petitioner has submitted that the alienation of the disputed land in his favour made as early as 20th February, 1953 by the
original grantee, who was a member of the Scheduled Caste, cannot be
voided under the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, for
short the 'Act'. The transaction was declared null and void by the authorities
and the possession of the land was ordered to be restored to original
grantee-Appellant's vendor. He challenged that action unsuccessfully,
before the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 26674/1992. That is how
he has come by way of this appeal.
(2.) A few relevant facts are to be noted to appreciate the grievance made by the appellant for our consideration. An extent of 2 acres-and 3 guntas
comprised in Sy.No. 81 of Doddiganahalli, was regranted to one Mudduga
Bin Hanumanthuga in the year 1942-43. The said grantee had sold the
aforesaid extent of land to the appellant by a registered sale deed dated 22nd
February, 1953. The Karnataka Legislature enacted the aforesaid Act, which
came into force from 1-1-1979. Section 4 of the said Act provided as
under:
"Notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract or
instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or after the
commencement of the Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant, of
such land or the law providing for such grant, or sub-section (2) shall be
null and void and no right, title or interest to such land shall be conveyed
nor be deemed ever to have conveyed by such transfer.
(2) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire
by transfer any granted land, without the previous permission of the
Government.
(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to the sale
of any land in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of any
award or order of any other authority."
The original vendor's son one Shri A.K. Hanumappa, initiated action before
the Assistant Commissioner for resumption of the land in question. He submitted
before the authority exercising powers under the Act that the transaction
of sale in favour of the appellant had become null and void as per Section
4 (1) of the Act, as his father belonged to Scheduled Caste and therefore, the
transaction entered into by his father in favour of the appellant would be hit
by Section 4 of the Act. The authority exercising powers under Section 5 of
the Act passed order on 22nd July, 1987, declaring the sale transaction effected
in favour of the appellant as not valid. It may be noted that the
aforesaid proceedings were initiated before the competent authority, under
the Act, in November, 1983, Against the order of 1984, there was an appeal
preferred by the appellant. The appellate authority by its Order dated 7-11-
1985 allowed the appeal and remanded the matter for fresh disposal. After
remand, the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner initiated action once
again and gave notice to the parties. The Assistant Commissioner after
giving opportunity to parties by his Order dated 22nd July, 1987 declared the
sale transaction effected in favour of the appellant as invalid and directed
resumption of the property. Appellant once again preferred an appeal to the
Deputy Commissioner, Kolar District. The appellate authority, dismissed the
appeal on the 25th September, 1990, confirming the Order of the Assistant
Commissioner, dated 22nd July, 1987. Under these circumstances, the appellant
came to this court by way of writ petition.
(3.) The contention of the writ petitioner before the learned single Judge and which is repeated before us is to the effect that as the transaction in
favour of the appellant was entered into by the original grantee on 20th
February, 1953, the appellant completed continuous period of adverse
possession within 30 years from the date of the transaction i.e., by 20th
February, 1983 his adverse possession became complete and he become the
full owner of this property not liable to be subjected to proceedings under
Section 4 read with Section 5 of the Act. The action was initiated for the first
time on the application of original vendor's son Shri A.K. Hanumappa in
November, 1983 and by that time the appellant had already completed more
than 30 years of adverse possession and consequently sale transaction could
not be held to be void under Section 4 read with Section 5 of the Act. He
further submitted that though it was true that on 1-1-1979 when the Act came
into force the appellant had not completed 30 years of adverse possession but
only because the Act was enacted, without taking any action against him and
destroying the continuance of his adverse possession, the running of adverse
possession could not be intercepted and consequently running of 30 years got
completed from the date of transaction and not prior to initiation of action
under Section 5 read with Section 4 and therefore, curtain must drop on this
case and the transaction becomes immune from the sweep of the Act. The
learned counsel in support of this contention placed reliance on the following
two decisions of the Supreme Court: (1) In Manche Gowda v State of
Karnataka and Others, 1984(2) Kar. L.J. 1 (SC): ILR 1984(2) Kar. 1 and as
later clarified by the same Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of (2)
Sunkara Rajyalakshmi v State of Karnataka, ILR 1987(3) Kar. 2076 (SC).
Relying on these decisions the learned counsel submitted that the concept of
adverse possession by the transferees of such transactions has been
recognised by the Supreme Court in connection with the present Act and if
that is so, running of adverse possession would naturally not stop on
1-1-1979 when the Act was enacted and therefore 30 years period which
should be counted for deciding the adverse possession of the transferee of
any voidable transaction under the Act must be computed with reference to
the date of initiation of the proceedings under Section 5 read with Section 4
of the Act and not prior thereto. The learned single Judge did not agree with
this contention and in our view rightly so. The aforesaid decisions of the
Supreme Court, put an end to the controversy raised before us.;