JUDGEMENT
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(1.) The point for consideration in this case is that, on a private complaint if the
matter is referred to the police for enquiry and to submit a report under Section
156(3), Cr. P,C. and on receipt of such a report and its acceptance, whether the
Magistrate can order to issue notice to the complainant for fresh examination. To
answer this point, it is proper to make a reference to the order under challenge
which reads as follows:
"10-5-1991. State by A.P.P.
Accused,
Notice issued to the complainant.
Case called out.
Complainant absent,
Re-issue notice to complainant.
Call on 20-7-1991."
(2.) A few facts leading to the above order are: Respondcnt-2 had advanced a sum of Rs. 30,000/- to the petitioner. On demand,
the petitioner issued a cheque for the said sum representing that as soon as it is
presented for encashment, the same would be honoured. Believing his words, the
2nd respondent presented the cheque for encashment. It was dishonoured. Hence,
the 2nd respondent issued a notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, as the transaction in question covered under the said Act. The said notice was
served on the petitioner. Inspite of the demand made in the said notice, the
petitioner failed to pay the amount. Then, the 2nd respondent filed a complaint
under Section 200, Cr. P.C. read with Sections 138 and 142 of the Act before the VII
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore City, to take action against
the petitioner. The said complaint was filed on 29-11-1990. The procedure
regarding recovery of the amount and taking action for the failure to pay the amount
has been prescribed under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') which read as follows:
"138. Dishonour of cheque for in.su/T1ciency, etc., of funds in the accounts:
Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with
a banker for payment or any amount of money to another person from out of that
account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is
returned by the bank unpaid either because of the amount of money standing to
that credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds
the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with
that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall,
without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may
extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless,
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months
from the date on which it is drawn or within a period of its validity whichever is
earlier,
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be,
makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice
in writing to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of
information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;
and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount
of money to the payee or as the case may be to the holder in due course of the
cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
142. Cognizance of offences,
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974),-
(a) no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section
138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee, or as the case may
be, the holder in due course of the cheque.
(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause
of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138;
(c) no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial
Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138."
Reading of these two sections makes it clear that on presenting a private complaint
under Section 200, Cr. P.C., it is not necessary for the learned Magistrate to make a
direction tolhe police to enquire and submit a report under Section 156(3), Cr. P.C.
This position is implied in the section itself. Inspite of that, on receipt of the complaint
on 29-11-1990 the learned Magistrate ordered to refer the complaint to the
Police for investigation and to report under Section 156(3), Cr. P.C. On 28-12-1990
the police submitted the report, viz., charge-sheet. The same was accepted and the
case came to be numbered as C.C. No. 1636 of 1990. Then the learned Magistrate
ordered to issue summons to the accused returnable by 10-5-1991. On 10-5-1991 the
learned Magistrate ordered to issue summons to the complainant/respondent 2
herein. On 25-7-1991 notice was issued to the complainant. Aggrieved by the said
proceedings the petitioner who is the accused in the said case has filed this petition
contending that the approach of the learned Magistrate in directing to issue summons
to the complainant amounts to taking cognizance twice which is forbidden in
law.
(3.) According to Sri Sriram, learned counsel for the petitioner, when once the matter is referred to the police who in turn submits the report under Section 156(3),
Cr. P.C. and the same is accepted, it is not proper for the learned Magistrate to call
upon again the complainant to give her/his statement, otherwise such an approach
amounts to taking cognizance both on the private complaint and on the
charge-sheet filed by the police. In support of his contention, Sri Sriram, learned
counsel for the petitioner, relies upon a decision of the Kerala High Court in
Kesavan Natesan vMadhavan Peethambaran and Others, 1984(1) Kar. L.J. 324. For
these reasons, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that entire proceedings
on the file of the learned Magistrate be set aside as the same have resulted in
miscarriage of justice. Further, according to him, if the proceedings are continued,
the same amount to abuse or process of the Court.;