- (1.) This appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' has brought in challenge the order passed by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India in a transferred case whereunder respondent No. 1 advocate was exonerated of the charge of misconduct levelled against him by the appellant-complainants. In order to appreciate the grievance of the appellants, it is necessary to have look at the relevant facts leading to these proceedings.
(2.) Respondent No. 1 was enrolled as an advocate by the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana under the provisions of the Act in 1963 and he started his practice as an advocate at Faridkot in the Punjab State. Subsequently, he was selected as a judicial officer by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and he joined judicial service in the year 1965 and got his licence to practise suspended. In the year 1972 respondent No. 1 was posted as Judicial Magistrate-cum-Sub-Judge Ist Class at Samrala in Ludhiana District of Punjab State. During his tenure, complaints of bribery and commission of other misconduct were made against him by several persons to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. After preliminary inquiry by a Judge of the High Court, a regular departmental inquiry was held against him. The Inquiry Officer found respondent No. 1 guilty of offence punishable under Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 as well as misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, though he was exonerated of three other charges. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana accepted the report and recommended his dismissal from judicial service to the Government of Punjab. The State Government by its order dated 30-6-77 accepted the recommendation of the High Court and dismissed him from service. Respondent No. 1 unsuccessfully challenged the dismissal order in Writ Petition before the High Court and thereafter his challenge to the dismissal order also failed before this Court when his Special Leave Petition was dismissed by this Court on 26-3-1979. In the meanwhile, after the dismissal order, the respondent requested the Chairman of the State Bar Council, Respondent No. 3 herein, to permit him to resume his practice as an advocate. The said request was accepted by the Chairman of the State Bar Council on 26-7-77. It is not in dispute between the parties that since that date respondent No. is practising as an advocate in the Taluk Court at Samrala wherein earlier he was functioning as a Presiding Judge. Certain members of the Samrala Bar including its President filed objections dated 21-11-77 against the grant of resumption of licence to practise as made available to respondent No. 1. The then Chairman of the State Bar Council by his order dated 26-7-79 confirmed the earlier order dated 26-7-77 granting resumption of licence to practise to respondent No. 1. Under these circumstances, seven members of Samrala Bar including the present appellants filed Revision Petition No. 14 of 1980 before the Bar Council of India on 12-4-80 praying for quashing the order passed by the State Bar Council. The Bar council of India by its order dated 25-7-81 set side the earlier orders of the State Bar Council observing that 'prima facie' in appears that respondent No. 1 was guilty of criminal misconduct under Section 5(1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and other charges' and directed that appropriate disciplinary proceedings be initiated by the State Bar Council against respondent No. 1. The appellant, along with four other members of the Bar Association at Samrala, by an application dated 28-8- 81, moved the State Bar Council for drawing up of proceedings under Section 35 of the Act. These proceedings were registered as Disciplinary Case before the appropriate disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council against respondent No. 21. In the said proceedings, evidence was led by the respective parties and the matter was pending for arguments. However, in the meantime, period of one year prescribed by law for finalisation of the case by the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council expired. Consequently, the disciplinary case against respondent No. 1 stood statutorily transferred to the Bar Council of India. The Bar Council of India heard the disciplinary case and it ultimately dismissed the same by its order dated 11-2-89. It is against the said order that present appeal is moved by the appellant-original complainants as aforesaid.
(3.) Learned counsel appearing for the appellants in support of the appeal submitted that respondent No. 1 was guilty of misconduct and was liable to be proceeded against under Section 35 of the Act. He, however, fairly stated that it is not the case of the appellants that respondent No. 1 should be proceeded against under Section 24-A of the Act. But it was submitted that respondent No. 1 was guilty of 'misconduct' other than professional misconduct under Section 35 (1) of the Act as at the time the complaint was filed against him he was an advocate on the roll of the State Bar Council and consequently was liable to be proceeded against for an appropriate punishment order as envisaged by Section 35 of the Act and that the Inquiry Officer wrongly proceeded on the basis that because Section 24-A was not attracted, nothing more could have been done against respondent No. 1. It was vehemently submitted that the words 'other misconduct' as contradistinguished from 'professional misconduct' mentioned in Section 35 (1) of the Act, clearly cover the facts of the present case. Respondent No. 1 was unfit to continue as an advocate being guilty of such other misconduct when he was found liable to be dismissed from judicial service on proved misconduct of corruption as found by the High Court as his disciplinary authority at the relevant time. That such person should not continue as an advocate and was liable to be punished as per Section 35 of the Act. It was also submitted that even though the misconduct was committed by respondent No. 1 while he was not actually practising as an advocate and had surrendered his certificate of enrolment, as per Rule 5 of the Bar Council, still his name did continue on the roll of advocates maintained by the State Bar Council. Hence Section 35(1) got attracted. The disciplinary committee, therefore, had the jurisdiction to pass appropriate punishment provided by Section 35(3) of the Act.;