S.B.MAJMUDAR, J. - (1.) LEAVE granted in the special leave petitions.
(2.) THESE writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India as well as the two special leave petitions being SLPs (C) Nos. 13755 of 1996 and 12989 of 1998 moved by the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa and the Bar Council of India respectively raise a common question for our consideration, namely, whether the Bar Council of India Training Rules, 1995 (for short 'the rules') as amended by the resolution of the Bar Council of India in its meeting dated 19.7.1998 relating to training of entrants of the legal profession are within the competence of the Bar Council of India or are ultra vires its rule-making powers under the Advocates Act, 1961 (for short "the act") and in the alternative, whether these Rules are unreasonable and arbitrary and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The writ petitioners, who have successfully completed their legal education by getting requisite Law Degrees from the Universities concerned have contended before us in these writ petitions that their right to practise Law as made available under the relevant provisions of the Act is being arbitrarily denied by the impugned Rules framed by the Bar Council of India and, therefore, their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India is being violated. That the said Rules do not impose any reasonable restrictions on the exercise of their fundamental right. It is also contended that in any case, the Rules are so framed as to be totally unworkable and are highly unreasonable and discriminatory in character and hence they offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India also. The civil appeal arising out of the SLP by the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa brings in challenge the decision of the Bombay High Court which upheld the impugned Rules and dismissed the writ petition field by it and that is how the State Bar Council is before us. Its contention is on the same lines as canvassed by learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners. While civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 12989 of 1998 filed by the Bar Council of India, on the other hand, brings in challenge the judgment and order rendered by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, who took the view in favour of the original writ petitioner, the respondent herein, that the impugned Rules would not apply to the writ petitioner who had obtained his Law Degree in 1981 as the Rules were purely prospective in character. It is, therefore, obvious that all these matters raise a common question regarding legality and validity of the impugned Rules. If the Rules are upheld, then the only further question where they are prospective in nature or not would survive. This Court has treated Writ Petition (Civil) No. 398 of 1996 as the leading petition and, therefore, we shall also refer to the pleadings of the parties and the relevant documents filed therein in the latter part of this judgment. By order dated 16.9.1997, a three-Judges Bench of this Court, presided over by S.C. Agarwal, J., appointed Shri Joseph Vellapally, learned Senior Advocate as amicus curiae to assist the Court on behalf of the petitioner. All the other petitioners-in-person were permitted to submit their written submissions and the oral arguments were permitted to be submitted on behalf of all of them by learned amicus curiae Senior Advocate. We have to place on record our high sense of appreciation for the pains taken by amicus curiae Senior Advocate, Shri Joseph Vellapally, who has been good enough to look into all the relevant aspects of the matter and has placed his oral and written submissions in this connection. By order dated 21.2.1997, another two-Judges Bench of this Court, while treating Writ Petition (Civil) No. 398 of 1996 as a leading petition, directed that the other petitions that are pending in the High Court or which may be filed thereafter shall remain stayed till further orders of this Court. The parties have exchanged relevant pleadings which are all brought on record supported by documents on which they rely. It appears that earlier when this group of matters reached final hearing, in the light of what transpired in the Court then, a Bench of this Court consisting of S.C. Agrawal and B.N. Kirpal, JJ, by order dated 30.9.1997 adjourned these proceedings to enable the Bar Council of India to take a fresh decision in the matter in the light of its decision taken in the earlier meetings regarding suitable modification of the impugned Rules. It appears that ultimately on 4.8.1998, before a bench of three learned Judges, Shri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel placed a copy of the resolution of the Bar Council of India whereby the Rules were amended. We have also mentioned the earlier resolution by which the impugned Rules were amended. It is thereafter that this group of matters reached for final hearing before us. We, therefore, have to examine the legality and validity of the impugned Rules as amended by the resolution of the Bar Council of India dated 19.7.1998. Rival contentions.
(3.) WE may briefly mention the rival contentions submitted for our consideration by learned counsel, Shri N.N. Keshwani, who appeared in support of Writ Petition No. 425 of 1998, as well as learned amicus curiae Shri Joseph Vellapally on behalf of the other writ petitioners and Shri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the Bar Council of India, which is the author of the impugned Rules in support of their respective cases. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted, tracing the history of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules, that there is no power with the Bar Council of India to frame the impugned Rules. That Section 7 of the Act lays down the statutory functions of the Bar Council of India. The provisions thereof do not entitle the Bar Council of India to frame such impugned Rules prescribing a precondition before enrolment of an applicant as an 'advocate' under the Act by requiring him to undergo pre-enrolment training and apprenticeship as laid down under the impugned Rules. It was also submitted that Section 24 sub-section (3)(d) of the Act also was not available to the Bar Council of India to frame such Rules. As a sequel, it was submitted that the rule-making power of the Bar Council of India as laid down by Section 49 could not be pressed into service by it in support of the impugned Rules.;