Fazal Ali, J. - (1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment of the Delhi High Court convicting the appellatn under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, read with Section 2 (ix) clauses (a) and (g) of the Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. This order was passed by the High Court in a revision filed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi against the Order of the Trial Court which convicted the appellant under Section 7/15 (sic) (7/16) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act read with Section 2 (ix) (k) of the Act and sentenced him to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 500/-, a revision against this order to the Sessions Judge was unsuccessful and hence a further revision was taken by the Delhi Administration before the High Court.
(2.) The facts of the case are detailed in the Judgment of the High Court and the Magistrate and we need not repeat and same all over again. The Food Inspectors, namely, one Mr. James and Mr. Sinha took samples of a preparation called Para Excellent and Para Asli from the shop of the appellant who according to the Food Inspectors sold these preparations as saccharin, a fact which is not admitted by the appellant. The Trial Court after considering the evidence and the report of the Chemical Examiner found that the case of mis-branding under Section 2 (ix) (a) and (g) was not made out by the Prosecution, but it was certainly mis-branding as contemplated by Section 2 (ix) (k) of the Act. He, accordingly convicted the appellant as indicated above. Mr. Frank Anthony, Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the High Court was wrong in law in interfering with the Order of the Magistrate, firstly, because the finding of fact by the Magistrate was binding on the High Court in revision and secondly, because the High Court took a legally erroneous view of the law on the interpretation of Section 2 (ix) (a) and (g) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
(3.) We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the judgment of the High Court and we are of the opinion that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is well founded and must prevail. We have perused the original label which described the preparation sold to the Food Inspectors. There is nothing to show that the appellant in any way tried to give an impression to the purchaser that either saccharin or some preparation of the type of saccharin was being sold so as to amount to misbranding as contemplated by Section 2 (ix) (a) and (g) of the Act. All that the appellant purported to convey under the label was that the preparation sold was as sweet as saccharin but not as bitter as saccharin. This was intended merely to lay emphasis on the sweetness of the preparation when it was compared to the sweetness of saccharin. When the label clearly described the fact that the preparation was not as bitter as saccharin if clearly intended to convey that it was neither something like saccharin nor saccharin itself, in any form or of any type. Mr. Sorabjee appearing for the respondent submitted that the use of the word saccharin itself amounts to mis-branding and gives the impression that the preparation sold was saccharin or something akin to saccharin. We are unable to agree with this contention. In the facts and circumstances of the present case and the contents of the label and the description of the preparation, we are satisfied that there was no misbranding, nor was there any attempt on the part of the appellant to sell his preparation as saccharin or some sort of saccharin. Section 2 (ix) (a) runs as follows: "Misbranded" - and article of food shall be deemed to be misbranded - (a) "if it is an imitation of, or is a substitute for, or resembles in a manner likely to deceive, another article of food under the name of which it is sold and is not plainly and conspicuously labelled so as to indicate its true character.";