Grover, J. - (1.) This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court decreeing the suit filed by the respondent for possession of certain land by pre-emption.
(2.) The facts may be shortly stated:Santa Singh was the owner of some land in village Samadh Bhai, tehsil Moga. He died leaving a widow Shrimati Sobhi. He also left a daughter Shrimati Jai Kaur from his other wife. On February 3, 1958 Smt. Sobhi sold 73 kanals 14 marlas of land to the appellants, the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deed being Rs. 8,000/-. Smt. Jai Kaur filed a suit for possession by pre-emption of the land which had been sold by Smt. Sobhi. According to her a consideration of Rs. 4,000/- only had been paid by the vendee. The trial Court decreed the suit in May 1959 granting a decree for possession on payment of Rs. 6,500/- together with costs. The Second Additional Judge to whom an appeal was taken dismissed it. In the High Court the learned Single Judge took the view that Smt. Jai Kaur not being the daughter of the vendor Smt. Sobhi had no right of pre-emption under Section 15 (2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 as amended by the Punjab Pre-emption Amendment Act, 1960. The suit was dismissed. Smt. Jai Kaur filed an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court. Relying on an amendment made by the Punjab Pre-emption Amendment Act, 1964 in the first paragraph of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, hereinafter called the Act, the Division Bench reversed the judgment of the Single Judge and decreed the plaintiff's suit.
(3.) The relevant provisions of the statue may now be noticed together with the amendments made in 1960 and 1964. Section 15 of the Act was substituted by Section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1960. According to the substituted section the right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land and village immoveable property shall vest thus: (1) ********** (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),- (a) where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her father or brother or the sale in respect of such land or property is by the son or daughter of such female, after inheritance, the right of pre-emption shall vest,- (i) if the sale is by such female, in her brother or brother's son; (ii) if the sale is by the son or daughter of such female, in the mother's brother or the mother's brother's sons of the vendor or vendors;" By the Amendment Act, 1964 in the first paragraph of Section 15 (2) (b) between the words "such" and "female" the words "husband of the" were inserted. The result was that after the amendment the portion of clause (b) relevant for our purpose was to read as follows: "FIRST, in the son or daughter of such husband of the female." Now if the Amendment Act of 1964 could be regarded as having retrospective operation so as to affect pending proceedings there can be no dispute that the judgment of the Division Bench was right and must be affirmed. The contention which has been raised on behalf of the appellants is that there is no indication in the Amendment Act of 1964 that it was to have retrospective operation and therefore the amendment made by it should be deemed to be only prospective. It may be mentioned that by Section 6 of the Amendment Act of 1960 a new Section 31 was inserted in the Act. That section provided, "no court shall pass a decree in a suit for pre-emption whether instituted before or after the commencement of the Punjab Pre-emption Amendment Act of 1960 which is inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act". In Ram Sarup vs. Munshi, (1963) 3 SCR 858 this Court held that the language used in Section 31 was comprehensive enough so as to require an Appellate Court to give effect to the substantive provisions of the Amending Act whether the appeal before it was one against a decree granting pre-emption or one refusing that relief. Although Section 31 was inserted in the Act for all times the phraseology employed therein does not show that its language was meant to cover those amendments which would be made subsequent to the Amendment Act of 1960. The word "said" can have reference in the context only to the enactment of 1960 and to no other. It would not be legitimate for the courts to give an extended effect to a provision which has retrospective operation unless the language used and words employed warranted such a course being followed. That does not appear to be the case here.;