Grover, J. - (1.) This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Punjab High Court, (Circuit Bench, Delhi). The facts may be briefly stated:One Gajju Mal had five sons, Badri Pershad, Ganesh Dass, Devi Chand, Narain Das and Ishar Das. The first four were by his first wife, whereas the 5th son Ishar Das was by his second wife Smt. Kanso Devi. Gajju Mal died in 1947 leaving him surviving the said five sons and Smt. Kanso Devi. On August 5, 1950 Tulsi Ram Seth was appointed by the parties as an arbitrator for resolving certain differences which had arisen relating to partition of the urban immovable properties and other assets and liabilities left by Gajju Mal. On October 31, 1950 the arbitrator gave his award. Under cl. 6 of this award Smt. Kanso Devi was awarded three sets of property including bungalow No. 20, Alipore Road, Delhi.The award was made the rule of the court. It was stated in the award that Smt. Kanso Devi would have a widow's estate in the properties awarded to her. It was also provided that the immovable properties allotted and awarded to the various parties would be individually and exclusively owned by them and each party would be entitled to take physical or constructive possession of the properties allotted and awarded to his or her share.
(2.) Badri Pershad, the appellant before us, filed a suit in August 1961 against the respondent Smt. Kanso Devi pleading inter alia that she was a limited owner of the property which had been given to her by the award and that she was trying to alienate the same and commit acts of waste to the prejudice of the reversioners. He asked for a perpetual injunction restraining her from committing acts of waste and from alienating the suit properties. The respondent contested the suit. On the plea of the parties the trial court framed seven issues out of which the material one was No. 4 which was in these terms: "Whether the defendant was awarded life estate only in the property in suit - On April 17, 1963 the trial court dismissed the suit holding that no act of waste on the part of the respondent had been proved and that she had inherited the property under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act 1937 and that the award had simply separated her share by metes and bounds, and under section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act she had become full owner thereof. The first appellate court and the High Court affirmed the decree of the trial Court.
(3.) The sole question for determination is whether the case of the respondent was governed by sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, hereinafter called the Act. This section reads: 14 (1) "Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.-In this sub-section, "property" includes both moveable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." According to the appellant the suit property was acquired by the respondent under the award given by Tulsi Ram Seth or alternatively under the decree based on the award, the estate being restricted by both the award and the decree. The provision in the award that the respondent was to have a widow's estate under Hindu Law, it is said, conferred on her only a limited estate and sub-s. (1) would be inapplicable. The position of the respondent throughout has been that she had interest in all the joint properties together with the right to partition under the provisions of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act 1937 (Act XVIII of 1937). Thus the property was acquired by the respondent at a partition within the terms of the Explanation to sub-s. (1) of S. 14. As she was possessed of that property at the time the Act came into force she became full owner thereof by virtue of S. 14 (1) of the Act even though previously she was a limited a owner. ;