Shelat, J. - (1.) Two question arise for determination in this appeal, by special leave, against the judgment of the Appellate Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, namely, (1) whether a correction in its award by the Labour Court, Lucknow, was one of an error arising from an accidental omission within the meaning of Sec. 6 (6) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act XXVIII of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and (2) whether, even if it was so, it could so correct after its award was published and held become enforceable.
(2.) The Central Wage Board for sugar industry, appointed by the Union Government for determining a wage-structure, revision of categories of workmen, their fitment into such categories and for fixing the principles governing the grant of bonus, had made certain recommendations. Amongst its recommendations, the Wage Board had recommended that its decision should be brought into effect as from November 1, 1960. By its notification dated April 27, 1961, the U.P. Government accepted those recommendations including the one that they should be brought into force with effect from November 1, 1960. On a dispute having arisen between the appellant-company and its workmen on the company failing to implement the said recommendations, the State Government referred it to the Labour Court for adjudication under Section 4 (k) of the Act. The dispute involved two questions (1) whether the company should fit the workmen named in the reference in the revised categories and in the new wage scales and (2) if so, with effect from what date. By its award dated November 6, 1963 the Labour Court held that two of the said workmen should be fitted in Grade II (B) and Grade IV respectively and directed the company to do so within one month after the award became enforceable. It, however, ommitted to fix the date from which such fitment should have the effect. On December 7, 1963 the said award was published in the State Gazette. The company thereafter fitted the two workmen in the said two grades from a date one month hence after the award became enforceable and not from November 1, 1960. The workmen's union thereupon applied to the Labour Court to amend its award on the ground that it had omitted to answer the second question arising under the reference and the Labour Court accordingly amended its awarded directing that the two workmen should be placed in the said grades with effect from November 1, 1960. The order amending the said award was gazetted on June 20, 1964. The company filed a petition in the High Court for certiorari and for quashing the said order of amendment. Nigam J., who heard the petition in the first instance dismissed it holding that (1) the Labour Court had made an error arising from an accidental omission to answer the said second question and therefore had the power to correct it under Section 6 (6) of the Act, and (2) even if there was no such error arising from accidental omission, the amendment merely provided what was already contained in the notification dated April 27, 1961, that once the Labour Court had directed the company to fit the workmen in the said grades, such fitment had, under the force of that notification, to take effect from November 1, 1960 and that result was arrived at not by reason of the correction of the award but by force of the original award read with the said notification. On a Letters Patent appeal having been filed against the said judgment, the Appellate Bench of the High Court agreed with Nigam, J., that the correction amounted to one of an error arising from the accidental omission to answer the said second question within the scope of Section 6 (6) of the Act. The Appellate Bench, however, proceeded to examine the various provisions and the scheme of the Act and held (1) that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the Act was of a limited character, (2) that it gets seisin of an industrial dispute only when its jurisdiction is invoked by a reference under Section 4 (k) or by a voluntary reference to arbitration under Section 5B, (3) that under Section 4D proceedings before it are deemed to commence from the date of such reference and are deemed to be completed on the date when its award becomes enforceable, (4) that its jurisdiction which emanates from the reference gets exhausted on the completion of the proceedings before it and the Labour Court itself becomes functus officio on the date when its award becomes final and enforceable, (5) that it cannot thereafter reconstitute itself of take seisin of a dispute, which it has already adjudicated and proceedings relating to it have become concluded, without a fresh reference and (6) that, therefore, its correctional jurisdiction under Sec. 6 (6), unlike that of a Civil Court under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not unlimited. The Appellate Bench on this reasoning held that the two extreme points during which the Labour Court could correct its award were the date of its signing it an the date when the award becomes final and enforceable. Consequently, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to correct the award after it became final and enforceable, i.e., after January 7, 1964, on expiry of 30 days from December 7, 1963 when it was published and the correction, therefore, was in excess of its jurisdiction and invalid. The Appellate Bench, however, declined to issue the writ on the ground that the correction did no more than doing justice to the workmen by ordering implementation of the said notification of April 27, 1961 and observing that equity was on the side of the two workmen dismissed the appeal as also the said petition.
(3.) Dr. Singhvi, who, on behalf of the company, disputed the correctness of the judgment, contended that (a) no clerical or arithmetical error through any accidental slip or omission had arisen, that Section 6 (6), therefore, did not apply to the facts of this case, and if at all, the application ought to have been under Sec. 11B, which however, was never invoked; (b) that power under Section 6 (6) could be exercised only until the date on which the said award became enforceable and not thereafter, that the correctional jurisdiction under Section 6 (6) is not without any limit as to time within which it could be invoked or exercised and expired or exhausted itself when the award became final; (c) that the principles of industrial law postulate the finality of an award made under it and that subject to exceptions as in Section 6A, once the award had become final it did not contemplate any disturbance of it by amendment or otherwise, and (d) that the High Court was in error in refusing remedy on a supposed consideration of equity once it found lack of jurisdiction in the Labour Court as it in fact did and, therefore, ought to have issued the remedial writ and quashed the impugned order of correction.;