(1.) One Leeladhar, the original appellant herein, entered into an agreement to sell 18 bighas of land for a sum of Rs.40,000/- with Deshraj, father of the plaintiffs-respondents herein on 15.02.1985. Admittedly, an amount of Rs.35,000/- was paid in advance. This agreement to sell was registered on 18.02.1985. On 26.03.1985 another document (Exhibit P-14) was entered into between the parties. Leeladhar was paid balance Rs.5,000/- and the subsequent agreement notes that he gave possession of the land to Deshraj. On 20.01.1988, Deshraj issued a legal notice to Leeladhar asking him to get the sale deed executed. According to the plaintiffs, they and their father went to the office of the Sub-Registrar on 15.02.1988 for this purpose. But Leeladhar did not turn up. Deshraj expired on 16.05.1988 and, thereafter, the respondents herein filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Nainital praying for specific performance of the contract and also prayed that if any part of the disputed land is not found in their possession, then possession be given to them. In the alternative, they prayed for refund of Rs.40,000/- along with interest.
(2.) In the written statement, Leeladhar took the plea that the agreement in question was a sham document. Deshraj was a moneylender but did not have a licence to do money lending. Therefore, he used to get such documents executed to secure the loans advanced by him. It was also pleaded that Leeladhar had returned the entire amount along with interest to Deshraj on 03.03.1987. This suit was decreed by the trial court. Leeladhar filed an appeal, which was partly allowed by the first appellate court holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance. This judgment was challenged before the High Court. The second appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded to the first appellate court to decide the case afresh in light of the provisions of Section 20(2) (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. After remand, the Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal of Leeladhar and upheld the order of the trial court. The second appeal filed by Leeladhar before the High Court was dismissed and, hence, this appeal.
(3.) The main ground raised by Shri Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants is that in terms of Section 20(2)(c), the decree of specific performance could not have been granted in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents herein. It is submitted that the document was a sham document. It was further urged that possession is not with the plaintiffs and the fact that Deshraj had executed various documents but had not filed suit for specific performance with regard to those contracts indicated that this document (Exhibit P-13) was also executed only to secure the repayment of the loan. It is also prayed that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, discretion should be exercised in favour of appellants. On the other hand, Shri P.K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that all the courts below have given a concurrent finding of fact that the document executed was an agreement to sell and Leeladhar had received the full amount, transferred possession and, therefore, is not entitled to urge that the decree of specific performance should not be granted.