JUDGEMENT
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(1.) These two writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution by way of
public interest litigation, challenge the constitutional validity of the Parliament
(Prevention of Disqualification) Amendment Act, 2006 (Act No. 31/2006,
Hereinafter 'Amendment Act'). It amended the Parliament (Prevention of
Disqualification) Act, 1959 (Hereinafter 'Principal Act'). The Amendment Act
adds to the list of 'Offices of Profit' which do not disqualify the holders thereof for
being chosen as, or for being the Members of Parliament.
Historical background.
(2.) The expression 'Office of Profit' is not defined in the Constitution. The view
that certain offices or positions held by a Member of Parliament (Hereinafter also
referred to as 'MP') may be either incompatible with his/her duty as an elected
representative of the people, or affect his/her independence, and thus weaken the
loyalty to his/her constituency and, therefore, should disqualify the holder thereof,
had its origin in the Parliamentary history of the United Kingdom. (See: The
Introduction to the Bhargava Committee Report on Office of Profit, dated
22.10.1955). The concept of 'office of profit' has a history of more than four
centuries in United Kingdom and it has evolved through many phases. The first
was the "privilege" phase (prior to 1640). The second was the "corruption" phase
(from 1640). The third was the "ministerial responsibility" phase (after 1705).
Initially the English Parliament claimed priority over the services of its Members
and it was considered derogatory to its privilege if any of its Members accepted
some other office which would require a great deal of their time and attention. This
led to the evolution of the idea that the holding of certain offices would be
incompatible with the responsibilities of a Member of Parliament. This was the first
phase. During the second phase, there was a protracted conflict between the Crown
and the House of Commons. Loyalty to the King and the loyalty to the House of
Commons representing the will of the people became growingly irreconcilable and
it was thought that if any Member accepted an 'Office of Profit' under the Crown,
there was every chance of his loyalty to Parliament being compromised.
Subsequently came the third phase. The King was reduced to the position of a
constitutional head and the cabinet, functioning in the name of the Crown became
the centre of the executive government. The Privy Councilors, who during the
second phase were invariably considered to be the henchmen of the King and were
as such looked upon with suspicion by the House of Commons, yielded place to the
Ministers, who for some time were also disqualified from holding a seat in the
House. Later it came to be recognized that the application of the disqualification
rule to incumbent ministers was too extreme and with the intent of ensuring
effective coordination between the executive and the legislature, it was accepted
that the Members of the executive should be represented in the Parliament. This
recognition led to the passing of several enactments by the British Parliament. The
Re-Election of Ministers Act enacted by the British Parliament in 1919 and 1926
required any Member who was appointed to a 'political office' to seek re-election.
(3.) As we have adopted the British Parliamentary form of Government, the
concept of 'office of profit' was also adopted with some modifications. The
concept of 'office of profit' began to develop with the entry of non-official
members in the Legislature. A clear and precise statement in this regard was made
in Section 26(1)(a) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which provided that a
person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a Member of either
Chamber if he held any office of profit under the Crown of India, other than an
office declared by Act of the Federal Legislature not to disqualify its holder.;
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