KULDEEP SINGH Vs. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
LAWS(SC)-1998-12-1
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (FROM: DELHI)
Decided on December 17,1998

KULDEEP SINGH Appellant
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

S.SAGHIR AHMAD - (1.) LEAVE granted.
(2.) THE appellant, a Constable in the Delhi Police was dismissed, after a regular departmental enquiry, from service, by order dated 3-5-1991, passed by Dy. Commissioner of Police, South District, New Delhi, which was upheld in appeal by Addl. Commissioner of Police by his order dated 22-7-1991. THE appellant then approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi and the Tribunal, by the impugned judgment dated 28/02/1997, dismissed the claim petition. A writ petition filed before the Delhi High Court against this judgment was dismissed on 19-9-1997 as not maintainable as the judgment passed by the Tribunal was given before the date on which the decision of this Court was rendered in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125 : (1997) 3 SCC 261 : (1997 AIR SCW 1345), in which it was held that a writ petition against the order passed by the Tribunal, constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, would be maintainable (prospectively) before a High Court. The Review Application filed against the judgment of the Tribunal was dismissed on 26-5-1997. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer cannot be sustained as the enquiry itself was held in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. It is also contended that there was no evidence worth the name to sustain the charge framed against the appellant and, therefore, the findings are perverse particularly as no reasonable person could have come to these findings on the basis of the evidence brought on record.
(3.) LEARNED counsel appearing on behalf of Union of India has, on the other hand, contended that the enquiry was held in consonance with the principles of natural justice and during the course of the enquiry, full opportunity was given to the appellant to defend himself. As far the evidence is concerned, it is contended that though it is true that none of the complainant was examined but on account of Rule 16(3) of the Delhi Police (F and A) Rules, 1980, it was not required to produce the complainant in person as the Rule itself contemplated that in the absence of a witness whose presence could not be procured without undue delay, inconvenience or expense, his statement, already made on an earlier occasion, could be placed on record in the departmental enquiry and the matter could be decided on that basis. It was under this Rule that the previous joint statement of the complainants was brought on record without examining any of them. LEARNED counsel for the respondents contended that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings is extremely narrow and limited. The Court cannot, it is contended, re-examine or re-appraise the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority on that evidence. It is no doubt true that the High Court under Art. 226 or this Court under Art. 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the Enquiry Officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the Appellate Authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictate of the superior authority.;


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