- (1.) This is an application for leave to appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India from the judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat dated February 23, 1988 (Vaidya Harishankar Laxmiram Rajyaguru v. Pratapray Harishankar Rajyaguru, 1988 (2) GLR 986). By the impugned judgment, the High Court has dismissed the Civil Revision Application which challenged the award made in this case.
(2.) The petitioner is the father of the respondent. Both of them are established Vaidyas in Rajkot. They come from a well-to-do family. The petitioner is advanced in age and both the father and the son have been fighting between themselves since more than a decade. The High Court found that the petitioner and the respondent had referred their disputes to one Kantibhai Vaidya (Shri Kantilal Dayaram Jani) who had intervened between them with the good intention to bring their disputes to an end. He made an award. The award was produced. It appears that the award was endorsed and signed by both the parties. In the award, it was stated by the Arbitrator that he had called both the father and the son at his residence on January 18, 1977. He had discussed the matter with both of them and had warned them that both of them would ruin themselves in the property disputes, if they did not solve the matter amicably. In the award, it was stated that the entire responsibility of solving the dispute was entrusted to him and the petitioner and the respondent had agreed to such entrustment. Accordingly, he made the award on January 18, 1977. Below the award, both the parties and the Arbitrator had signed. The endorsement reads, when translated in English, as found by the High Court that the award is agreed to and binding upon both the parties and that the entire responsibility of the Arbitrator (sic arbitration) will lie on Shri Kantibhai Vaidya and that he has taken the responsibility. Thereafter followed a spell of litigation. The respondent applied on June 20, 1977 for filing the award and sought the judgment in terms of the award under Sec. 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). A notice consequent upon the filing of the award was issued to the petitioner. The application was converted into Special Civil Suit No. 84 of 1977. It was stated in the application to file the award, that the petitioner had torn off the award and, therefore, the respondent was compelled to rely upon a photocopy of the original award, which was produced with the application. The petitioner filed his objections to the application but did not file any application within the prescribed limitation of 30 days. The learned trial Judge rejected the objections filed beyond the period of limitation and for the reasons that : (1) the notice was already given to the party concerned about the filing of the award, (2) the time for making an application to set aside the award had expired and no such application was made, (3) the award was not set aside under Sec. 30, and (4) that the award was not remitted under Sec. 16(5) of the Act. The learned trial Judge made a decree in terms of the award.
(3.) The petitioner preferred a civil first appeal against the judgment and decree passed in Special Civil Suit No. 84 of 1977 and had also preferred Civil Revision Application No. 655 of 1978. Both these legal proceedings were, however, withdrawn by the petitioner and thus the judgment of the trial Court in Special Civil Suit No. 84 of 1977 became final. The High Court had recorded that the first appeal and civil revision application were withdrawn in pursuance of an agreement reached between the parties on or about August 14, 1978. A copy of the said agreement was also produced before the Court as Ex. 40. It was signed by both the parties as well as their respective Advocates. The agreement was in the form of a letter addressed to the Arbitrator wherein it was stated that both of them had appointed him as an Arbitrator to resolve the disputes between them and that he had given an award dated January 20, 1977 in respect of which award, there had been continued objections but now they have agreed that both of them should abide by the award dated January 20, 1977 and that its interpretation should be left to the Arbitrator himself. It was also categorically mentioned therein that its interpretation by the Arbitrator would be binding on both the parties. It was clear, therefore, that both of them had re-affirmed the acceptance of the award.;