Untwalia, J. - (1.) This is an appeal filed by the alleged contemner under S. 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the Act), from the order dated 2nd April, 1975 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana directing the issue of notice to the appellant to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for committing contempt of the High Court. The Notice was issued in accordance with the procedure prescribed under S. 17 of the Act, to show cause against the appellant"s alleged lability to be punished under S. 15.
(2.) A preliminary objection was raised by the Learned Solicitor General on behalf of the respondents that no appeal lies to this Court under S. 19 of the Act from an order issuing notice as nothing yet has been decided by the High Court. Mr. Mohan Behari Lal, learned counsel for the appellant combated this argument and submitted that an appeal does lie to this Court as a matter of right under S. 19.
(3.) In our opinion, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents is well founded and must be accepted as correct. S. 19 (1) says:- "An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court; Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." It would appear from a plain reading of the section that an appeal shall lie to this Court as a matter of right from any order or decision of a bench of the High Court if the order has been made in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. No appeal can lie as a matter of right from any kind of order made by the High Court in the proceeding for contempt. The proceeding is initiated under S. 17 by issuance of a notice. Thereafter, there may be many interlocutory orders passed in the said proceeding by the High Court. It could not be the intention of the legislature to provide for an appeal to this Court as a matter of right from each and every such order made by the High Court. The order or the decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved. Mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt by the issuance of the notice on the prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceeding, does not decide any question. This Court, for the first time, cannot be asked in such an appeal to decide whether the person proceeded against has committed contempt of the High court or not. The matter has to be decided either finally or, may be, even at an earlier stage an order is made, which does decide a contention raised by the alleged contemner asking the High Court to drop the proceeding. It is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable to this Court under S. 19. A final order, surely will be appealable. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Mohan Behari Lal, to S. 20 of the Act which provides:- "No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." He submitted that initiation of the proceeding by the High Court will be without jurisdiction if it is in violation of S. 20. It may be so. If the alleged contemner in response to the notice appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the proceeding on the ground of its being barred under S. 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to this Court under S. 19 from such an order although the proceeding has remained pending in the High Court. We are not called upon to express our final opinion in regard to such an order, but we merely mention this type of order by way of example to show that even orders made at some intermediate stage in the proceeding may be appealable under S. 19. In our considered judgment, an order merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged contemner and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under S. 19. In a given case special leave may be granted under Art. 136 of the Constitution from an order initiating the proceeding. But that is entirely a different matter. What we are deciding in this case is that the present appeal filed under S. 19 (1) of the Act does not lie and is incompetent.;