V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. - (1.) These appeals have come up by certificate to this Court issued by the High Court under Articles 132 (1) and 133 (1) of Constitition. As the case was opened, counsel for the appellant, Shri A. K. Sen, raised a preliminary point that these appeals had to be referred to a Constitution Bench as they attracted Art. 145 of the Constitution. In fact, he devoloped his contention, supported by many submissions. He argued that Art. 227 and its interpretation came in a substantial way, with special reference to the concept of "tribunal." He urged that once a certificate under Art. 132 had been issued, the appeal had necessarily to go before a Constitution Bench, on a fair construction of Art. 145 (3). He also put foward the plea that Art. 226, as amended by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, led to the same result. Indeed, the arguments spread over a wide ground.
(2.) This plea for a reference to a Constitution Bench based on the provisions of Art. 145 (3) was resisted by Shri Tarkunde and Shri Garg appearing for the respondents. Various rulings were cited on both sides and it was also supported by a certain alternative put foward by Shri Tarkunde that even assuming that Art. 227 and its interpretation did raise a substantial question (he refuted that plea but assumed it for argument sake), Art. 226 clearly applies and no question about the interpretation of the Constitution vis-a-vis that article could possibly arise.
(3.) Having had the benefit of extensive arguments we have reflected over the pros and cons and have arrived at a conclusion that this is a case which does not compel us to resort to the provisions of Art. 145 (3) and that the appeal can be proceeded with by a Bench other than a Constitution Bench. It is not necessary at this stage to elaborately assign reasons for our conclusion. All that we need say is that having reached the decision that Art. 145 (3) is not necessarily attracted, the appeals will proceed on the merits.;