- (1.) The Central Bank of India, Ltd., New Delhi, has filed this appeal, by special leave, challenging an order of the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, refusing to accord approval to an order of dismissal of the respondent, Prakash Chand Jain, underSection33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). A charge-sheet, containing two charges, was served on the respondent on 21st July, 1961 in order to initiate formally an enquiry for the purpose of taking disciplinary action against him. The two charges framed were as follows:- "1. On 14-1-1960, a sum of Rs. 30,400 was paid to Mr. P. C. Jain by the Assistant Cashier Mr. Nand Kishore out of the cheque No. 43004 dated 14-1-1960 drawn by Messrs. Mool Chand Hari Kishan for Rs. 63,000. Taking this money Mr. P. C. Jain on the same day i. e., 14-1-1960 left for Muzaffarnagar in company of some persons to retire the following bills drawn by M/s. Gupta Iron Industries:- Naya Bazar LBC 3 drawn on Puran Chand Rs. 5,100. Naya Bazar LBC 5 drawn on Hiralal Shyam Rs. 4,950. Thus it was within the knowledge of Shri P. C. Jain that the bills of Messrs. Gupta Iron Industries were drawn on bogus firms and that those were retired by the drawer's representative who accompanied Mr. P. C. Jain to Muzaffarnagar. Instead of reporting sueh serious matters to higher authorities, Mr. P. C. Jain claims that he had never visited Muzaffarnagar. 2. Mr. P. C. Jain encashed on 25-2-60 cheque No. 400506 for Rs. 46,000/- from the United Bank of India Ltd., Chandni Chowk and brought cash to Naya Bazar after 11.30 A. M. i.e., after the time for presenting of the clearing cheques at the State Bank of India. To cover the misdeeds of Mr. Shiv Kumar Sharma the then Sub-Agent of Naya Bazar Office, Mr. P. C. Jain Treasurer's representative stated in his explanation dated 16-2-1961 that cash was received at the office at about 11 A. M. i. e. before the clearing time. The above acts of Mr. Jain were prejudicial to the interests of the Bank as defined in paragraph 521-4(J) of the Sastry Award and amount to gross misconduct. The inquiry will be held on 12-8-1961 at Chandni Chowk Branch at 10-30 A. M. by Mr. P. B. Tipnis, Chief Agent, Agra." Subsequently, an enquiry was held by Mr. Tipnis, one of the senior Officers of the Bank. The Enquiry Officer, after recording evidence tendered on behalf of the Bank as well as the evidence given by the respondent, recorded his findings holding that both the charges were proved against the respondent and, on that basis, came to the view that the actions of the respondent were prejudicial to the interests of the Bank and amounted to gross misconduct, so that he proposed to award the punishment of dismissal from the Bank's service. The respondent was given a week's time to show cause against this proposed punishment and, thereafter, an order was made dismissing the respondent with effect from 18th July, 1962 and a month's wages were paid to him in accordance with the provision contained inSection33 (2) (b) of the Act. Since an industrial dispute was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, an application underSection33 (2) (b) of the Act was made requesting the Tribunal to accord approval to this order of dismissal. The Tribunal, when dealing with this application, held that the enquiry, which had been held by the Enquiry Officer, was fair and was not vitiated by any irregularity or unfairness, but refused to accord approval on the ground that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were perverse an were not based on evidence inasmuch as most of the findings were the result of mere conjecture on behalf of the Enquiry Officer. It is this order of the Tribunal that has been challenged in this appeal.
(2.) Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant Bank urged that the Tribunal, in refusing to accord approval and in disregarding the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, exceeded its jurisdiction conferred bySection33 (2) (b) of the Act. It was further urged that, when the Tribunal found that the enquiry was fair, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to go into the question whether the findings of fact recorded by the Enquiry Officer were correct and could not sit in judgment over those findings like a Court of Appeal. The Tribunal should have accepted those findings and only examined whether a prima facie case was made out for according an approval. If the Tribunal had proceeded in accordance with this principle, there would have been no justification for the Tribunal to refuse to approve the order of dismissal.
(3.) The jurisdiction and functions of a Tribunal underSection33 (2) (b) of the Act were explained by this Court in Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Dasappa (B) (Binny Mills Labour Union), 1960-2 Lab LJ 39 = (AIR 1960 SC 1352) where it was held:- "The settled position in law therefore is that permission should be refused if the tribunal is satisfied that the management's action is not bona fide or that the principles of natural justice have been violated or that the materials on the basis of which the management came to a certain conclusion could not justify any reasonable person in coming to such a conclusion. In most cases it will happen where the materials are such that no reasonable person could have come to the conclusion as regards the workman's misconduct that the management has not acted bona fide. A finding that the management has acted bona fide will ordinarily not be reached if the materials are such that a reasonable man could not have come to the conclusion which the management has reached. In every case, therefore, it would be proper for the tribunal to address itself to the question, after ascertaining that the principles of natural justice have not been violated, whether the materials on which the management has reached a conclusion adverse to the workman, a reasonable person could reach such a conclusion." The point was again considered by this Court in the case of Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen, 1961-3 SCR 204 = (AIR 1961 SC 860) and it was held:- "In view of the limited nature and extent of the enquiry permissible underSection33 (2) (b) all that the authority can do in dealing with an employer's application is to consider whether a prima facie case for according approval is made out by him or not. If before dismissing an employee the employer has held a proper domestic enquiry and has proceeded to pass the impugned order as a result of the said enquiry, all that the authority can do is to enquire whether the conditions prescribe bySection33 (2) (b) and the proviso are satisfied or not. Do the standing orders justify the order of dismissal Has an enquiry been held as required by the standing order Have the wages for the month been paid as required by the proviso and, has an application been made as prescribed by the proviso - The Court then proceeded to consider whether the Tribunal in that case had acted rightly, and noted that one had merely to read the order to be satisfied that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in attempting to enquire if the conclusions of fact recorded in the enquiry were justified on the merits. The Tribunal did not hold that the enqiury was defective or the requirements of natural justice had not been satisfied in any manner. The Court then indicated that the Tribunal had proceeded to examine the evidence, referred to some discrepancies in the statements made by witnesses and had come to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry should not have recorded the conclusion that the charges had been proved against the workmen in question. It was then held that, in making these comments against the findings of the enquiry, the Tribunal clearly lost sight of the limitations statutorily placed upon its power and authority in holding the enquiry underSection33 (2) (b). The Court then indicated the principle applicable by saying: "It is well known that the question about the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character can be raised in a Court of facts and may fall to be considered by an appellate court which is entitled to consider facts; but these considerations are irrelevant where the jurisdiction of the Court is limited as underSection33 (2) (b). It is conceivable that even in holding an enquiry underSection33 (2) (b) if the authority is satisfied that the finding recorded at the domestic enquiry is perverse in the sense that it is not justified by any legal evidence whatever, only in such a case it may be entitled to consider whether approval should be accorded to the employer or not; but it is essential to bear in mind the difference between a finding which is not supported by any legal evidence and a finding which may appear to be not supported by sufficient or adequate or satisfactory evidence.";