Bhargava, J. - (1.) The disputed land was the ex-proprietary tenancy of one Parmeshwar Singh who, on the 5th June, 1947, executed a sub-lease in favour of the appellants on an annual rent of Rs. 74. The sub-lease was registered on 22nd June, 1947. It laid down that the tenancy was to commence from the beginning of the year 1355 Fasli, i. e., with effect from 1st July, 1947. In pursuance of this sub-lease, the appellants entered into possession. On 15th January, 1951, Parmeshwar Singh, the ex-proprietary tenant, surrendered his tenancy rights to the landlord and on the same date the landlord executed a lease in respect of this land in favour of the respondents. The appellants, however, continued to remain in possession. Thereafter, on 1st July, 1952, the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (No. I of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") came into force. Disputes arose between the appellants and the respondents who both claimed to have become Sirdars of this land and' consequently, on 1st August, 1952, the appellants instituted a suit for a declaration that they were the Sirdars of the disputed land. They also prayed for an injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession of the appellants. In the alternative, a prayer was also made for a decree for possession in case it was found that the appellants had been dispossessed. The Munsif, who tried the suit held that the appellants had become Sirdars under Section 19 (vii) of the Act and, consequently, decreed the suit. The decree was affirmed by the first appellate Court as well as by a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in second appeal. A special appeal to a Division Bench was taken up by the respondents with the leave of the single Judge. In this special appeal, the High Court held that the appellants did not become Sirdars of this land when the Act came into force and, consequently, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the appellants. The appellants have now come up to this Court against this decree of the High Court under special leave granted by this Court.
(2.) The appellants claimed to have become Sirdars of this land under S. 19 (vii) of the Act which is as follows:- "19. All land held or deemed to have been held on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting by any person as- ********** ********** (vii) a sub-tenant referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 47 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, ********** ********** shall, save in cases provided for in clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 18, be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such person, who shall subject to the provisions of this Act be entitled, except as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 18, to take or retain possession as a Sirdar thereof." In order to substantiate this claim, the appellants thus had to prove that this land was held or must be deemed to have been held by them on the 30th June, 1952 as sub-tenants referred to in sub-section (4) of S. 47 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as "the Tenancy Act") . The question arose, because the appellants were holding as sub-tenants from Parmeshwar Singh who surrendered his rights as chief tenant on the 15th January, 1951, before the relevant date mentioned in S. 19 (vii) of the Act; Section 47 (1) of the Tenancy Act lays down that, except as otherwise provided in sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) , the extinction of the interest of a tenant, other than a permanent tenure, holder or a fixed rate tenant, shall operate to extinguish the interest of any tenant holding under him. This sub-section when applied to the case of the appellants, ignoring the exceptions laid down in it, necessarily leads to the conclusion that, when Parmeshwar Singh on 15th January, 1951 surrendered his rights as ax-proprietary tenant, the interest of the appellants who were holding as sub-tenants under him, came to be extinguished. On behalf of the appellants, however, it was urged that there are two grounds for holding that their interest was not extinguished and we proceed to examine these contentions.
(3.) The first ground, on which the continuance of sub-tenancy, even after the surrender by Parmeshwar Singh, is claimed by the appellants, is based on the provisions of Section 295-A of the Tenancy Act which was introduced in that Act by Section 26 of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act X of 1947 and which reads as follows:- "295-A. Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary or anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force every person who on the date of the commencement of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, is a sub-tenant shall, subject to the provisions of the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 27 of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, be entitled to retain possession of his holding for a period of five years from that date, and for this period nothing in sub-section (2) of Section 44 or Section 171 shall render the landholder of such sub-tenant liable to ejectment under the provisions of Section 17 1: Provided ********** " The United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act X of 1947 came into force on the 14th June, 1947, and it is urged that S. 295-A of the Tenancy Act becomes applicable to the appellants, because the sub-lease in their favour was executed on 5th June, 1947,prior to the enforcement of that Amendment Act. It is urged, that, on the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act, the appellants were sub-tenants of this land. This plea fails, because we are unable to accept the submission that the appellants were sub-tenants of this land on 14th June, 1947. The sub-lease in plain terms lays down that the sub-tenancy is to commence from the beginning of 1355 Fasli i. e., with effect from 1st July, 1947, which is a date subsequent to 14th June, 1947. The mere fact that the sub-lease was executed on 5th June, 1947 by Parmeshwar Singh cannot make the appellants sub-lessees with effect from that date when the sub-lease itself laid down that it was to commence from the beginning of 1355Fasli. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, however, relied on sub-section (1) of S. 55 of the Tenancy Act which is as follows:- "On admission to a holding the tenant is entitled to receive from his landholder a written lease consistent with the provisions of this Act and the landholder upon delivering or tendering to a tenant such a lease is entitled to receive from him a counterpart thereof. " In this case, there is no doubt that a written lease consistent with the provisions of the Tenancy Act was executed together with a counterpart thereof on the 5th June, 1947; and learned Counsel's argument was that this lease and the counterpart having been delivered in accordance with this provision on 5th June, 1947, it should be deemed that the appellants became tenants with effect from that very date. The argument fails for two reasons. One is that the mere delivery of the lease and the counterpart by one party to the other does not make the lessee under the lease a lessee from the date of delivery of the written documents, nor is any such principle laid down in S. 55 (1) . The rights under the lease can only arise in accordance with the terms of the lease. In the present case, the terms of the sub-lease themselves laid down that the appellants were to be sub-lessees from 1st July, 1947 and, consequently, the mere delivery of the documents could not bring into existence the relationship of lessor and lessee from an earlier date. The second reason is that, even on facts, there is nothing to show that the written lease and its counterpart were actually delivered by one party to the other on the 5th June, 1947. On the other hand, there is material on the record which makes it clear that there could not possibly have been such delivery of the written documents prior to 14th June, 1947 The sub-lease itself shows that it was registered on 22nd June, 1947. The sub-lease was not valid and effective until it was registered. This registration was required under S. 56 of the Tenancy Act which lays down that a lease for a period exceeding one year or from year to year shall be made by a registered instrument only. The appellants themselves came forward with the case that this was not a lease for a period not exceeding one year, so that the lease to be valid had to be registered in accordance with S. 56 of the Tenancy Act. The registration took place on 22nd June, 1947 and it is, therefore, clear that the written lease properly executed and effective could not have been delivered by Parmeshwar Singh to the appellants before 22nd June, 1947. Consequently, even if for the sake of argument it may be accepted, though we consider that it is entirely wrong, that on delivery of the written lease under S. 55 the rights as a lessee commence, such rights as sub-lessee in favour of the appellants could not arise before 22nd June, 1947 as there could not possibly be delivery of the written lease to the appellants by Parmeshwar Singh prior to that date. In these circumstances, the conclusion is irresistible that the appellants were not sub-tenants on 14th June, 1947, which was the date of commencement of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947 and, therefore, Section 295-A of the Tenancy Act never became applicable to the case of the appellants.;