JUDGEMENT
B. P. Sinha, J. -
(1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against the concurring judgment and orders of the courts below, allowing the intervention of respondents 1 and 2, and adding them as defendants 2 and 3, in the suit instituted by the appellant against her alleged husband, now respondent No. 3, who was the sole defendant in the suit as originally framed. The main question in controversy in this appeal, is the true construction of sub-r. (2) of R. 10 of O. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and its application to the facts of this case, which are given below:
(2.) On 12-4-1957, the plaintiff - appellant in this Court - instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises against the third respondent who is the second son of His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad, and who will, hereinafter be referred to as the Prince. In the plaint, she alleged that she is the lawfully married wife of the Prince, the marriage ceremony (Nikah) having been solemnized in accordance with the Shia Law, by a Shia Mujtahid on 19-10-1948. The plaintiff also averred that the issue of the marriage, were three daughters aged 8, 7 and 5 years; that the fact of the marriage was known to all persons acquainted with the Prince; that there was a pre-nuptial agreement, whereby, the Prince agreed to pay Rs. 2,000 per month to the plaintiff as kharch-e-pandan; that the Prince stopped the payment of the allowance aforesaid of Rs. 2,000 per month, since January, 1953, without any reasons and in contravention of the said agreement. On these allegations, she asked for the following two declarations:
"1 That the plaintiff be declared to be the legally-wedded wife (Mankuha) of the defendant,
2. That a decree be passed in favour of this plaintiff against the defendant declaring her to be entitled to receive from the defendant I. G. Rs. 2,000 per month as Kharch-e-pandan".
It may by noted that she did not make any claim for arrears of the allowance aforesaid since the date the Prince is alleged to have stopped payment of the same. Only ten days later, on 22-4-1957, the Prince filed his written statement, admitting the entire claim of the plaintiff for the two declarations aforesaid. On that very date, an application under O. 1, R. 10 of the C. P. C., on behalf of (1) Sahebzadi Anwar Begum, and (2) Prince Shahamat Ali Khan, minor, under the guardianship of his mother, the said Sahebzadi was made. They are respondents 1 and 2 respectively in this Court. The Sahebzadi, respondent No. 1, claimed to be the "lawful and legal wedded wife" of the Prince, and respondent No. 2, the son of the Prince by the first respondent. In their petition, they stated inter alia that
"The plaintiff herself has stated in the plaint that the defendant is trying to suppress the facts of his marriage with the plaintiff so that the members of his family should conclude that the plaintiff is not his Nikah wife, and the defendant is interested in denying the rights and status of the plaintiff. The petitioners on being joined as parties to the suit will be equally interested in denying the marriage of the plaintiff and her rights and status".
"That the petitioners have reasons to believe that the above suit is a result of collusion. The object and motive of the plaintiff in instituting the above suit is to adversely affect the relationship of the petitioners and the defendant and also to deprive the rights and interests of the petitioners in the defendant's estate".
On 15-6-1957, the plaintiff made an answer to the petition for intervention, filed by the respondents 1 and 2 aforesaid. She denied the right of the interveners to be impleaded in that suit, and asserted that the "possibility of the rights of the petitioners being infringed are very remote, contingent upon their or plaintiff surviving the defendant or other circumstances which may or may not arise". She also founded her objection on the ground that, having regard to the admission of the defendant in his written statement, "there is no serious controversy in the suit". She also added a number of legal objections which need not be specifically noticed as they have not been pressed in this Court. She further asserted that the petitioners (meaning thereby, the respondents 1 and 2) are neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit. She anticipated the ground most hotly contested in this Court, by asserting that the "judgment of this Hon'ble Court in this suit will not be conclusive as against petitioners as they allege collusion and they will not be prejudiced by not being made parties". She ends her statement by making the following significant allegation:
"The alleged collusion and motive attributed to the plaintiff for instituting this suit are denied. On the other hand, the application to be added as defendants is mala fide and malicious and is evidently inspired by some strong force behind them interested in harassing the plaintiff and exposing her to the risk of a vexatious and protracted litigation".
The Prince, in his own answer to the application for intervention, stated that he admitted that the first respondent is his wife and that the second respondent is his son, and repeated his admission by saying that he married the plaintiff in October, 1948, and the first respondent in December, 1952. He added further that when he married the first respondent, he had already three daughters by the plaintiff, which fact was known to the first respondent at the time of her marriage with him. He supported the plaintiff in her objection to the intervention by asserting that the rights of the respondents 1 and 2 will not be affected in any way, and by insisting upon his Muslim right of having four wives living at the same time. He also supported the plaintiff in her denial of the allegation of collusion and "that the suit is intended to adversely affect the relationship of the petitioners and the defendant-respondent and to deprive the rights and interests of the petitioners in the defendant-respondent's estate". He, in his turn, added the following equally significant penultimate para:
"That the petitioners' application has been filed in order to prolong the litigation and that the defendant-respondent's father His Exalted Highness the Nizam, appears to be more interested than petitioner No. 1 herself, in creating unnecessary complications in the suit".
(3.) On these allegations and counter allegations, after hearing the parties, the trial court, by its judgment and order dated 6-7-1957, allowed the application for intervention, and directed the respondents 1 and 2 to be added as defendants. The court, after discussing all the contentions raised on behalf of the parties, observed that there were indications in the record of a possible collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant; that the relief claimed under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, being discretionary, could not be granted as of right; that the presence of the interveners would help the court in unravelling the mysteries of the litigation, and that there was force in the contention put forward on behalf of the interveners that under S. 43 of the Specific Relief Act, any declaration given in favour of the plaintiff, will be binding upon the interveners. It also held that in order effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle the present controversy, the presence of the interveners was necessary.;