- (1.) HEARD the parties.
(2.) THERE is a delay of 3677 days. The appellant has shown sufficient cause to condone the delay. When the decision was rendered by the High court on 10. 3. 1995, an appeal was maintainable and accordingly the petitioner had filed LPA NO. 47/1995 before the Division Bench of the madhya Pradesh High Court. During the pendency of the said appeal this court in Jamshed N. Guzdar Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , - (2005) 2 scc 591 held that the LPAs were not maintainable. As a consequence, the said LPA No. 47/1995 was dismissed as not maintainable on 17. 8. 2005 reserving liberty to the petitioner to avail other remedy available to him in law. Immediately thereafter, on 4. 10. 2005, the petitioner filed this present special leave petition along with an application for condonation of delay. As the petitioner was pursuing a remedy by way of an intra-court appeal in the same High Court which was subsequently held to be not maintainable, the entire period of delay has to be condoned. Accordingly, we allow I. A. No. 1 of 2005 and condone the delay. Leave granted. Heard parties. The first respondent in Writ Petition No. 1365 of 1992 on the file of Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior Bench, filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is the appellant in these appeals by special leave. The first respondent herein had filed the said petition against the order dated 25. 5. 1992 passed by the Board of Revenue dismissing the revision against the order dated 31. 7. 1991 passed by the Sub Divisional officer, Sheopurkala. The said writ petition was allowed by order dated 10. 3. 1995. The reason given for allowing the writ petition, stated in paragraph 6 of the order of the High Court is extracted below: "the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of the order dated 29. 1. 1985 passed by the Supreme Court of India, which has been modified by order dated 22. 2. 1985 the issue regarding Mahant Ship has been determined and no inquiry can be held in the regard. The interpretation made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is right. The order of the Supreme Court as modified by order dated 22. 2. 1985 says in positive terms that gopaldas 'has to be' appointed as Mahant. this leaves no option. The learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the intention of the Supreme Court was that the appointment has to be made in accordance with law. This does not seen to be the intention. In view of the imperative language used in the order the intention is clear. The petitioner has to be appointed as Mahant. "
(3.) IT is thus clear that the writ petition was allowed only on the ground that this Court by its order dated 29. 1. 1985 (as modified by order dated 22. 2. 1985) had made an observation that on the death of Mahant prashramdas, the first respondent has to be appointed as Mahant. The high Court was of the view that the order dated 29. 1. 1985 as modified by order dated 22. 2. 1985 of this Court was binding and therefore it had to merely hold that first respondent had to be appointed as the Mahant of the institution. We however find that neither order dated 29. 1. 1985 nor the order dated 22. 2. 1985 of this Court adjudicated any issue, much less made any considered order that first respondent should be the Mahant. The order dated 29. 1. 1985 reads thus: "it is stated by the learned Counsel for the appellants that Mahant parashram Das has died and after his death, Gopaldas has been appointed as Mahant. This makes it unnecessary for us to go into the question raised in these appeals. No orders are therefore, passed in these appeals. " ;