- (1.) In these appeals challenge is to the order passed by a learned single Judge of the Patna High Court dismissing the application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code'). The validity of the order taking cognizance in complaint Case No. 40 of 1994 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna City was questioned in the petition filed before the High Court.
(2.) Background facts as highlighted by the appellant in a nutshell are as follows : A raid was conducted on 4-1-1994 in the premises of respondent No. 1 by four officers of the Bihar State Electricity Board. The appellant in each of the Criminal Appeal was a member of the raiding party along with others and one Ravindra Kumar Singh who was then functioning as Executive Engineer. Respondent No. 1 was arrested on the basis of First Information Report was lodged with the police officials. Allegation against respondent No. 1 was that he had committed theft of electricity attracting penal consequences under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and Sections 39 and 44 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (in short the 'Electricity Act'). The respondent No. 1 was released on bail on 7-1-1994 and on 11-2-1994 respondent No.1 filed a complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate alleging that the appellant in each case and aforesaid Ravindra Kumar Singh had demanded illegal gratification. Interestingly, no date of such demand was indicated in the complaint. When the learned Judicial Magistrate took the cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 347, 161, 167, 385 and 511 IPC the appellants filed petitions before the High Court questioning correctness of the order. A specific stand was that the complaint was a counter blast by respondent No. 1 to the action taken against him and no explanation was offered as to why the complaint was filed on 11-2-1994 without even indicating as to when the alleged demand for illegal gratification was made. The said Ravindra Kumar Singh had filed an application (Crl. Misc. No. 1973 of 1995) for quashing the prosecution. The same was dismissed on 20-7-1995. The High Court dismissed the application filed by Ravindra Kumar Singh while the application filed by present appellants was pending. He moved this Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 3045 of 1996. This Court granted stay on 23-9-1996 and therefore proceedings before the trial Court remained stayed. The special leave petition was disposed of on 17-7-1997. Since a statement was made before this Court by the complainant that he did not want to proceed against the petitioner in the special leave petition but he would like to continue the proceedings so far as the others are concerned, the proceedings were accordingly quashed qua the petitioner in the SLP. So far as the present appellants are concerned the High Court was of the view that this Court had interfered because of the concession made and, therefore, no case for interference was made out. The High Court did not attach importance to the fact that the complaint was lodged in February, 1994 and there was no date indicated as to when the alleged demand was made. Learned counsel for the appellant in each case submitted that the proceedings were sheer abuse of the process of the Court. The appellants and Ravindra Kumar Singh stood on similar footing. His case was disposed of by this Court and earlier in his case the High Court had declined to interfere and he had moved this Court. It was submitted that in the background facts it is clear that with a view to harass the appellants for taking action against him, the respondent No. 1 had lodged the complaint. There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent No. 1. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 State supported the order of the High Court.
(3.) Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. The Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videntur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers the Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.;