TRUSTEES FOR IMPROVEMENT OF CALCUTTA Vs. CHANDRA SEKHAR MALLICK
LAWS(SC)-1977-5-13
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (FROM: CALCUTTA)
Decided on May 06,1977

TRUSTEES FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF CALCUTTA Appellant
VERSUS
CHANDRA SEKHAR MALLICK Respondents

JUDGEMENT

Bhagwati, J. - (1.) These appeals by certificate are directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court striking down Section 78-B to Section 78G of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 as invalid on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power as also contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution and declaring Rules 11 to 21 of the Rules framed by the Government under sub-section (3a) of Section 137 as ultra vires the provisions of the Act. The facts giving rise to the appeals lie in a very narrow compass and may be briefly stated as follows.
(2.) The respondents in Civil Appeal No. 579 of 1976 are the owners of a building bearing No. 35 situate at Lower Circular Road, Calcutta while the respondents in Civil Appeal No. 580 of 1976 are owners of a building bearing No. 1/A situate in Mcleod Street, Calcutta. There was a street known as Five Lane connecting the Lower Circular Road on the East to Mcleod Street on the West. In or about November 1954 the Board of Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as the Board) acting in exercise of the power conferred under S. 39. Clause (c), passed the necessary resolution and proceeded to frame a Street Scheme for the area which included Five Lane as also the buildings belonging to the respondents. The notice containing the requisite particulars was pubished by the Board on 24th November, 1954 as required by Section 43. The respondents submitted their objections against the Street Scheme on 7th December, 1954 but the Board after hearing the respondents, rejected the objections and applied to the State Government for sanction under Section 47 and the Street Scheme was ultimately sanctioned by the State Government under Section 48 on 17th December, 1956. The Board was of the opinion that as a result of the making of the Street Scheme, lands of the respondents which were comprised in the Street Scheme would increase in value and the Street Scheme, therefore, contained a declaration that a betterment fee shall be payable by the respondents in respect of the increase in the value of their respective lands resulting from the execution of the Street Scheme. The Board gave notice of the propsoed assessment of the betterment fee to the respondents under sub-sec. (1) of Section 78-B and then proceeded under sub-s. (2) of that section to assess the betterment fee payable by the respondents. The betterment fee was assessed at Rs. 2,15,411/- in the case of the Lower Circular Road property and at Rs. 4,241/- in the case of Mcleod Street property and notice of this assessment was given to the respondents. The respondents in each case dissented from the assessment made on them and the matter was thereupon referred for determination by arbitrators as contemplated under sub-section (4) of Section 78-B. The arbitrators were appointed according to the procedure set out in Section 78C and after hearing the parties, the arbitrators made their award on 23rd September, 1964 determining the betterment fee payable in the case of Lower Circular Road property at Rupees 1,25,000/- and in the case of Mcleod Street property at Rs. 4,241/-. The respondents thereupon filed a writ petition in each case challenging the validity of the award made by the arbitrators.
(3.) The principal ground on which the validity of the award of the arbitrators was impugned in the writ petitions was that Sec. 78A to Section 78G of the Act were ultra vires and void and Rules 11 to 21 of the Rules were also invalid. There were also certain other subsidiary grounds taken in the writ petitions but they have not formed the subject-matter of debate before us and hence we need not refer to them. Though the writ petitions were filed as far back as 1964 immediately after making of the Award by the Arbitrators, they unfortunately could not reach hearing before the High Court until July 1971 and then also, the hearing took considerable time and it concluded only on 17th August, 1971. It appears that during the hearing of the writ petitions, it was brought to the notice of the High Court that the question as to the constitutional validity of Section 78A of the Act was also raised in another case, namely. Civil Rule No. 2156 of 1969 and that case had already been heard by another Division Bench of the High Court and was pending for judgment. The High Court, therefore, decided to hold back the preparation of the judgment in the writ petitions and to await the judgment of the other Division Bench in Civil Rule No. 2156 of 1969. We do not know when the judgment was delivered in Civil Rule No. 2156 of 1969 but it appears that the Division Bench which heard that case did not pronounce upon the constitutional validity of S. 78A and disposed of that case on other grounds. The result was that the High Court had to decide the question of constitutional validity of S. 78A to S. 78G in the present writ petitions and it proceeded to deliver its judgment on 1st December, 1972 striking down Section 78-B to Section 78G and Rules 11 to 21 as invalid. We are constrained to observe that the judgment of the High Court visibly bears marks of superficiality and lack of proper consideration which are inevitable when a judgment is delivered fifteen months after the conclusion of the arguments. The correctness of this judgment is impugned in the present appeals preferred by the Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta after obtaining certificate from the High Court.;


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