Bhagwati, J. - (1.) We have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by our learned brother S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and we agree with the conclusion reached by him in that judgment but we would prefer to give our own reasons. The facts giving rise to the appeal are set out clearly and succinctly in the judgment of our learned brother and we do not think it necessary to reiterate them.
(2.) The short question that arises for determination in this appeal is as to whether it is sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. 1956 that applies where property is given to a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance under an instrument which in so many terms restricts the nature of the interest given to her in the property. If sub-section (1) applies, then the limitations on the nature of her interest are wiped out and she becomes the full owner of the property while on the other hand, if sub-section (2) governs such a case her limited interest in the property is not enlarged and she continues to have the restricted estate prescribed by the instrument. The question is of some complexity and it has evoked wide diversity of judicial opinion not only amongst the different High Courts but also within some of the High Courts themselves. It is indeed unfortunate that though it became evident as far back as 1967 that subsections (1) and (2) of Section 14 were presenting serious difficulties of construction in cases where property was received by a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance and the instrument granting such property prescribed a restricted estate for her in the property and divergence of judicial opinion was creating a situation which might well be described as chaotic, robbing the law of that modicum of certainty which it must always possess in order to guide the affairs of men, the legislature, for all these years did not care to step in to remove the constructional dilemma facing the courts and adopted an attitude of indifference and inaction, untroubled and unmoved by the large number of cases on this point encumbering the files of different courts in the country, when by the simple expedient of an amendment, it could have silenced judicial conflict and put an end to needless litigation. This is a classic instance of a statutory provision which, by reason of its inapt draftsmanship, has created endless confusion for litigants and proved a paradise for lawyers. It illustrates forcibly the need of an authority or body to be set up by the Government or the Legislature which would constantly keep in touch with the adjudicatory authorities in the country as also with the legal profession and immediately respond by making recommendations for suitable amendments whenever it is found that a particular statutory provision is, by reason of inapt language or unhappy draftsmanship. Creating difficulty of construction or is otherwise inadequate or defective or is not well conceived and is consequently counter-productive of the result it was intended to achieve. If there is a close inter-action between the adjudicatory wing of the State and a dvnamic and ever-alert authority or body which responds swiftly to the drawbacks and deficiencies in the law in action. much of the time and money, which is at present expended in fruitless litigation would be saved and law would achieve a certain amount of clarity, certainty and simplicity which alone can make it easily intelligible to the people.
(3.) Since the determination of the question in appeal turns on the true interpretation to be placed on sub-section (2) read in the context of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. 1956, it would be convenient at this stage to set out both the sub-sections of that section which read as follows: "14 (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.- In this sub-section, "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner what-soever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." Prior to the enactment of Section 14, the Hindu law, as it was then in operation, restricted the nature of the interest of a Hindu female in property acquired by her and even as regards the nature of this restricted interest there was great diversity of doctrine on the subject. The Legislature, by enacting sub-section (1) of Section 14, intended as pointed by this Court in S. S. Munna Lal v. S. S. Rajkumar, (1962) 3 Suppl. SCR 418 "to convert the interest which a Hindu female has in property, however restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric Hindu law may be, into absolute estate". This Court pointed out that the Hindu Succession Act. 1956 "is a codifying enactment. And had made far-reaching changes in the structure of the Hindu law of inheritance, and succession. The Act confers upon Hindu females full rights of inheritance and sweeps away the traditional limitations on her powers of disposition which were regarded under the Hindu law as inherent in her estate". Sub-section (1) of Section 14, is wide in its scope and ambit and uses language of great amplitude. It says that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. The words "any property" are, even without any amplification, large enough to cover any and every kind of property but in order to expand the reach and ambit of the section and make it all comprehensive, the Legislature has enacted an explanation which says that property would include "both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement" of the Act. Whatever be the kind of property, movable or immovable and whichever be the mode of acquisition, it would be covered by sub-section (1) of S. 14, the object of the Legislature being to wipe out the disabilities from which a Hindu female suffered in regard to ownership of property under the old Sastric law, to abridge the stringent provisions against proprietary rights which were often regarded as evidence of her perpetual tutelage and to recognize her status as an independent and absolute owner of property. This Court has also in a series of decisions given a most expansive interpretation to the language of sub-s. (1) of S. 14 with a view to advancing the Social purpose, of the legislation and as part of that process, construed the words possessed of also in a broad sense and in their widest connotation. It was pointed out by this Court in Gumalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva, (1959) 1 Suppl. SCR 968 that the words possessed of mean "the state of owning or having in one's hand or power". It need not be actual or physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the Hindu female, but may be possession in law. It may be actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law. Elaborating the concept, this Court pointed out in Mangal Singh v. Rattno, AIR 1967 SC 1786 that the section covers all cases of property owned by a female Hindu although she may not be in actual, physical or constructive possession of the property, provided or course, that she has not parted with her rights and is capable of obtaining possession of the property. It will, therefore, be seen that sub-sec. (1) of Section 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed by her at the date of commencement of the Act or was subsequently acquired and possessed, she would become the full owner of the property.;