- (1.) "It is equally obvious that the manner in which the question of continuation of detention enjoined upon by R. 30-A (9) has to be determined is by applying the objective standard as against the subjective opinion or the belief of the detaining authority, i. e., by weighing evidence brought before or collected by such authority relevant to the purposes under R. 30 (1) (b) and Rule 30-A (9) and then coming to a decision whether the order of detention needs continuation or not. How can such an authority come to its decision honestly and properly unless it is certain that the materials before it are true and dependable How is that certainty to be derived unless the person concerned is given an opportunity to correct or contradict such evidence either by explanation or through other materials which he can place before the authority -
(2.) In the present case, a counter-affidavit has been, filed on behalf of the State Government, but there is no assertion in that counter-affidavit that, at the time when orders for continuing the detention under R. 30-A (9)were passed, any opportunity was given to the petitioner to correct or contradict the evidence either by explanation or through other materials which be could place before the Government and that the Government arrived at the decision after considering such explanation or materials. Therefore, after the expiry of six months from 11th March 1966, the detention of the petitioner became illegal. Consequently, in April 1967, when this writ petition was moved, the petitioner was under illegal detention and he was clearly entitled to an order of release.
(3.) However, it appears from the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government that, subsequently, on 12th May 1967, the Government proceeded to pass two orders; one was an order cancelling the original order of detention dated 11th March 1966, and that was followed by a second order on the same date directing detention of the petitioner by a fresh order under R. 30 (1) (b). It has been urged on behalf of the State Government that the Government was competent to make a fresh order on that date under R 30 (1) (b) itself and that order need not be a quasi judicial order, so that the procedure envisaged in Lakhanpal's case, W. P. No. 258 of 1966, D/-7-3-1967 (AIR 1967 SC 1507) (supra) by this Court was not required to be followed by the Government The Government having made a fresh order under R. 30 (1) (b) and that order being in discharge of execution function, the petitioner's subsequent detention under that order must be held to be valid, so that at this time when this petition has come up for hearing the petitioner's detention is no longer illegal and he is not entitled to be released.;