- (1.) The appellant, a practising advocate, was engaged by Rama Shamal and Raiji Shamal two of the accused in Criminal Case No. 26 of 1963 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Baroda in respect of charges under Secs. 302, 436, 334 read with sec. 149 of the Penal Code. On January 12, 1963, the appellant presented a bail application on behalf of the said two accused. The Magistrate granted bail on each of the two accused executing a personal bond of Rs. 1500 with surety for the like amount. On January 24, 1963, bail bonds were furnished by a person calling himself Udesing Abhesing. The appellant identified that person as Udesing Abhesing and as personally known to him. On the stength of his identification the Magistrate accepted the bonds and released the two accused on bail. Thereafter, one of them absented himself from the Court on three occasions and the Magistrate issued a notice on the said surety. On March 11, 1963, the real Udesing Abhesing appeared and denied that he had executed the said bonds or stood as surety. The Magistrate issued an informal notice to the appellant to explain why action should not be taken against him for identifying a person who had falsely impersonated as Udesing Abhesing. The appellant gave his reply. The Magistrate recorded statements of the real Udesing Abhesing and of one Chiman Shamal. He did so to satisfy himself that there was substance in the allegation of the said Udesing that he was not the person who had stood as surety. On July 19, 196J, the Magistrate issued a show cause notice to the appellant under sec. 476, Cr. P. C. and the appellant filed his reply. After an enquiry under sec. 476, the Magistrate ordred filing of a complaint against the appellant in respect of offences under Secs. 205, 467 and 468 read with sec. 114 of the Penal Code. In an appeal filed by the appellant, the Additional Sessions Judge, held that the said complaint was justified but only in respect of the offence under sec. 204 read with sec. 114. In a revision by the appellant a single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat passed the following order : "This is a matter in which this Court should never interfere in revision. The revision application is, therefore, dismissed." The High Court gave certificate under Art. 134(i)(c) of the Constitution and that is how this appeal has come up before us.
(2.) Mr. Sanghi for the respondent raised the preliminary contention that the High Court's order dismissing the revision was not a final order as it did not determine the complaint filed by the Magistrate nor did it decide the controversy between the parties therein, viz., the State of Gujarat and the appellant, whether the appellant had committed the said offence. That controversy being still a live one, the order, according to him, was not final, the certificate granted by the High Court was incompetent and consquently the appeal is not maintainable. Article 134(i)(c) reads as follows : "An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order of sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court. If the High Court certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court."
(3.) The question as to whether a judgment or an order is final or not has been the subject matter of a number of decisions; yet no single general test for finality has so far been laid down. The reason probably is that a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words "final" and "interlocutory" has, therefore, to be considered separately in relation to the particular purposec for which it is required. However, generally speaking, a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final. It may be final although it directs enquires or is made on an interlocutory application or reserves liberty to apply. (1) In some of the English decisions where this question arose, one or the other of the following four tests was applied. lWas the order made upon an application such that a decision in favour of either party would determine the main dispute 2 Was it made upon an application upon which the main dispute could have been decided 3 Does the order as made determine the dispute 4 If the order in question is reversed, would the action have to go on (2) The first test was applied in Salaman v. Warnar (1891) 1 Q. B. 734 and Standard Discount Co. v. La Grange, (1877) 3 C. P. D. 67. But the reasoning in the latter case was disapproved in A. G. v. Great Eastern Rail Co. (1879) 27 W. R. 759. In Shutrook v. Tufriell (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 621 the order did not decide the matter in the litigation but referred it back to the arbitrator, though on the application on which it was made, a final determination might have been made. The order was held to be final. This was approved in Bozson v. Altrincham Urban Council (1903) 1 K. B. 547 by Lord Halsbury who declined to follow the dictum in Salaman v. Warner (supra) and Lord Alverstone stated the test as follows : -"Does the judgment or order as made finally dispose of the rights of the parties This test, however, does not Secm to have been applied in A. G v. Great Eastern Urban Council (supra) where an order made on an application for summary judgment under R. S. C. Ord. 14 refusing unconditional leave to defend was not to be an interlocutory order for purposes of appeal though made on an interlocutory application. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals.;