K.S Hegde, J. - (1.) The principal question canvassed in this group of appeals by special leave is whether S. 11 (4) (a) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act 1947, to be referred to as the Act hereinafter, is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and consequently the notices impugned in the writ petitions from which these appeals arise are liable to be struck down and the respondents restrained from levying sales-tax on the appellants for the period May 1, 1952 to October 31, 1955.
(2.) The appellants are a private limited company carrying on business inter alia as dealers in iron and steel materials in Vidharba region of the Maharashtra State. In that region they have more than one place of business. They registered themselves as dealers under S. 8-A of the Act and obtained a certificate of registration on August 17, 1947. Their assessment year as shown in their registration certificate is from November 1 to October 31. They were required to submit quarterly returns of their turnovers. They did so till April 31, 1952 Thereafter no returns were submitted. On September 13, 1955, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales-tax, the assessing authority at that time, issued a notice calling upon the appellants to show cause why action should not be taken against them under Ss. 10 (3) and 11 (4) (a) , on account of their failure to furnish the return for the period 1-1-1953 to 31-12-53. Similar notices were issued to them on October 27, 1955 for the period 1-1-54 to 31-12-54 and on July 7, 1956 for the period 1-1-1955 to 31-12-55. It appears that the appellants repeatedly took time for submitting their explanation. The first respondent to whom the appellant's case stood transferred issued in 1958 fresh notices to the appellants similar to those issued in 1955. At that stage the appellants object ed to the validity of those notices both orally as well as in writing on the ground that their assessment year was not the calendar year as mentioned in those notices but the year ending October 31. Evidently in view of that objection, the first respondent issued another set of notices on July 8, 1959. The appellants contended that those notices were barred by time. Thereafter the appellants challenged the validity of the notices issued in 1959 in the petitions under Art. 226 from which these appeals arise.
(3.) In these appeals the questions arising for decision are whether S. 11 (4) (a) or 11-A (3) or any parts thereof contravene the guarantee of equal protection of the laws or equality before the law or whether those provisions are based on a valid classification which is reasonable in view of the object with which they were enacted. Mr H. R. Gokhale, learned counsel for the appellant, urged that both these provisions deal with the same class of persons having common characteristics and properties and hence there is no just basis for the classification made. According to him the classification complained of has brought about a discrimination. Further he asserted that the Act had conferred arbitrary power on the assessing authority to pick and choose from the persons belonging to the same class to be dealt with either under S. 11 (4) (a) or under 11-A (1) . He urged that as a case coming under S. 11 (4) (a) also falls under S. 11-A, as the law now stands, the persons proceeded against under S. 11-A (1) will have the benefit of the period of 1imitation prescribed therein while the said benefit is not available for those proceeded under S. 11 (4) (a) .;