- (1.) The appellant company filed suit No. 16 of 1963 against the State of Uttar Pradesh, and the Union of India, inter alia, praying for a permanent injunction restraining the State of Uttar Pradesh, its servants and agents from realising or from proceeding to realise sugar cane cess and purchase tax amounting to Rs. 33 lakhs and odd charged under the U.P. Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, the Sugar Cane Cess Act, 1956 read with U.P. Sugar cane cess (Validation) Act, 1961 and the U.P. Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act IX of 1961. In the said suit, the appellant company, inter alia, alleged that the Acts for the diverse reasons set out therein were invalid and void and therefore the State was not entitled to levy, collect or recover the said cess or the purchase tax and prayed, as aforesaid, that the State should be restrained from proceeding to realise the said cess or tax. The appellant-company paid court-fees on its said plaint under sub-section (iv-B) (b) of Section 7 on the footing that the relief sought in the suit was an injunction. The Chief Inspector of Stamps objected to the court-fees being paid under Clause (b) of Sub-section (iv-B) of Section 7 contending that the court-fees payable were as provided under sub-section (iv) (a) of Section 7 or under sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 that is to say, on the footing that the suit was for a declaratory decree where consequential relief prayed for was an injunction or on the footing that the suit involved cancellation of or of adjudging void an instrument securing money or other property having such value. The trial Judge rejected the objections and held that the court-fees payable were adequate as Clause (b) of sub-section (iv-B) of Section 7 applied. The Chief Inspector of Stamps thereupon filed a revision application before the High Court reiterating the said objections. The High Court rejected the contention that Section 7 (iv) (a) applied but held that sub-sec. (iv-A) of Section 7 applied as the said Acts were instruments securing money within the meaning of that sub-section and that though the relief claimed in the suit was injunction, in substance and effect the suit involved adjudgment of the said Acts as void. Hence this appeal by special leave.
(2.) Sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 reads as follows :- "For cancellation or adjudging void instruments and decree-In suits for or involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable..... an instrument securing money or other property having such value."
(3.) The question which falls for determination is whether an Act passed by the Central or the State Legislature can be said to be an instrument and, if so, an instrument securing money or other property having such value. The Court-fees Act does not define the word 'instrument'. That being so we have to turn for the connotation of the word 'instrument' to its ordinary dictionary meaning. According to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Ed. Vol. II, p. 1472. ' instrument' means 'a writing and generally imports a document of a formal legal kind. Semble, the word may include an Act of Parliament (see Deed of Settlement) so, in the Trustee Act, 1925 (15 Geo, 5, c. 18), S. 68 ........ (11) Conveyancing Act, 1881 (44 and 45 Vict. c. 41) Section 2 (xiii), 'instrument' includes deed, will, inclosure, award and Act of Parliament". Thus, an 'instrument' may include a statute enacted by Parliament if the particular statute in its context includes it as an instrument. According to Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, p. 984 'instrument' means "a formal legal writing, e. g., a record, charter deed of transfer or agreement". It is, however, observed that under the Law of Property Act, 1925, Section 205 (1) (viii), 'instrument' for the purposes of this Act does not include a statute unless the statute creates a settlement. "An instrument is a writing and generally means a writing of a formal nature. But where there is a power to appoint by any deed or instrument or by will, any writing, such as a letter, which refers to the power or which can have effect only by operating on the fund (such as a cheque or other order for payment), is an instrument. A telegram is an instrument within the meaning of the Forgery Act, 1912, Sec. 7 and so is an envelop with a postmark falsified for the purposes of a betting fraud." According to the same dictionary, the word 'enact' means to act, perform or effect; to establish by law; to decree and an 'enactment' means an Act of Parliament or statute or any part thereof. A statute, according to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Ed. p. 1 is the will of the legislature, i. e. an edict of the legislature. A statute is, however, different from a statutory instrument as defined by the Statutory Instruments Act (9 and 10 Geo. 6, c. 36) 1946 where power to make confirm or approve orders rules, regulations or other subordinate legislation is conferred on His Majesty in Council or on any Minister of the Crown, a document by which that power is exercised is a statutory instrument. Similarly, whereby an Act passed before enactment of the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, power to make statutory rules is conferred on any rule-making authority, any document by which that power is exercised is a statutory instrument. Thus, whereas a statute is an edict of the legislature a statutory instrument as distinguished from such an edict is a document whereby the rule-making power is expressed. In Mohan Chowdhury v. Chief Commr., Union Territory of Tripura, (1984) 3 SCR 442 = (AIR 1964 SC 173) the question arose whether the order dated November 3, 1962, passed by the President under Art. 359 (1) of the Constitution suspending the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of rights conferred by Arts. 21 and 22 during the Proclamation of Emergency was an instrument within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act 1897. In considering that question this Court approved the meaning of the word 'instrument' given by Stroud and observed :- "The expression is also used to signify a deed inter parties or a charter or a record or other writing of a formal nature. But in the context of the General Clauses Act, it has to be understood as including reference to a formal legal writing like an Order made under a statute or subordinate legislation or any document of a formal character made under constitutional or statutory authority. We have no doubt in our mind for the expression 'instrument' in Section 8 was meant to include reference to the Order made by the President in exercise of his constitutional powers." The President's Order having been made under power conferred upon him by Art. 359 that Order would have the same connotation as the Statutory instrument defined by the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946 and therefore was an instrument within the meaning of S. 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act. That does not mean that a statute like the U. P. Court-fees Act which is an edict of the legislature is an instrument. In Emperor v. Ravangouda Lingangouda Patil, AIR 1944 Bom. 259, the High Court of Bombay considered whether an order of the Government delegating its power to District Magistrates under the Defence of India Rules was an instrument within the meaning of S. 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act. The High Court held that an instrument, generally speaking, means a writing usually importing a document of a formal legal kind, but it does not include Acts of Parliament unless there is a statutory definition to that effect in any Act. There is thus ample authority to hold that ordinarily a statute is not an instrument unless as in the case of Conveyancing Act of 1881, the definition includes it or as in the case of S. 205 (1) (viii) of the Law of Property Act, 1925, the statute creates a settlement and such statute is for that reason treated as an instrument. It would not therefore be correct to say that the Acts alleged in the plaint to be void are instruments within the meaning of sub-s. (iv-A) of S. 7. In this view, it does not become necessary to decide whether the Acts are instruments securing money or other property having such value. Sub-s. (iv-A) of S. 7 would not, therefore, apply and the High Court was not right in calling upon the appellant-company to pay additional court-fees under that sub-section.;