- (1.) Between 16.06.1962, and 04.05.1964, respondent No. 1 was the Income-tax Officer for Additional B-XVIII District, New Delhi. The appellants have, at all material times, been carrying on business in partnership in the name of M/s. Balwant Singh Santok Singh within the said Additional B-VIII (Income-tax) District. For the assessment year 1960-61 (accounting year 1959-60), the firm was registered u/s. 26A of the Income-tax Act, 1922. During the assessment proceedings for -the assessment year 1961-62 (accounting year 1960-61), respondent No. 1 noticed that the firm had not applied for renewal of registration. The firm was, therefore, liable to be assessed as an unregistered firm. At that stage, appellant No. 1, Balwant Singh, represented to respondent No. 1 that the firm had filed an application for renewal for the assessment year 1961-62 within the prescribed period, and, therefore, its registration should be renewed. Respondent No. 1 adjourned the case to 27.05.1963, and called upon appellant No. 1 to produce evidence to show that such an application was made. On 27.05.1963, appellant No. 1 appeared before respondent No. 1 and produced a certificate of posting dated 21.06.1961, purporting to have been issued by the post office in proof of the application having been posted and also a duplicate application dated 15.06.1961, said to have been posted and in respect whereof the certificate of posting was said to have been issued to the firm. Respondent No. 1, however, noticed that the form of the certificate said to have been issued on 21.06.1961, was actually printed in 1962. This aroused his suspicion about the genuineness of the certificate. He, therefore, recorded the statement of appellant No. 1 on oath. In that statement, appellant No. 1 asserted that the certificate was genuine, that his firm had posted the original application dated 15.06.1961, on 21.06.1961, and that, therefore, the firm should be treated as registered and assessed accordingly. Respondent No. 1 rejected the appellant's claim for renewal and assessed the firm on the footing of an unregistered firm. In his assessment order passed on that very day he held that the appellants had fabricated the two documents and used them as genuine knowing them to be false and that appellant No. 1 had given false evidence on oath before him. But he did not pass an order in the said assessment order that they should be prosecuted. At the foot of the order, however, there was a separate note to the effect that the appellants should be prosecuted. On 26.10.1964, i.e., after respondent No. 1 was said to have ceased to be the Income-tax Officer of the Additional B-XVIII District, he lodged a complaint before the Magistrate alleging that the said certificate of posting and the said duplicate application were forged documents and that they had been used by the appellants in the proceedings before him u/s. 26A of the Income-tax Act as genuine knowing them to be forged, that the statement on oath of appellant No. 1 was false and that, therefore, the appellants were liable for offences u/s. 193 and 196 of the Indian Penal Code.
(2.) The appellants filed an application before the High court of Punjab (Circuit bench, New Delhi) u/s. 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the said complaint. The High court rejected the application. The appellants obtained special leave from this court and filed this appeal. Two contentions were urged in support of the said application before the High court and the same were canvassed by Mr. Gupte before us. These were : (1) that the Income-tax Officer while acting u/s. 26A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, was a court and that that being so, it was incumbent on him to follow the procedure laid down in sec. 476 and 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, before he could validly file a complaint for offences u/s. 193 and 196 of the Indian Penal Code, and (2) that in any event, respondent No. 1 had ceased to hold the charge of the post of Income-tax Officer for Additional B-XVIII District, on the date of the filing of the said complaint and, therefore, the complaint was filed without jurisdiction and the Magistrate could not take cognizance of such an illegal complaint.
(3.) Before we proceed further, it is necessary to read the relevant provisions of the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sec. 193 and 196 of the Penal Code provide for punishment for intentionally giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding or for fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in such judicial proceeding and for using or attempting to use as true or genuine any evidence which an accused knows to be false or fabricated. Sec. 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable u/s. 193 to 196, 199, 200, 205 to 211 and 228 when such offence is held to have been committed in or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, except on the complaint in writing of such court or of some other court to which such court is subordinate. Cl. (c) provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence described in section 463 or punishable under sec. 471, 475 or 476 of the Indian Penal Code when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such court, etc. Ss. (2) of sec. 195 provides that the term " court " in cls. (b) and (c) of Ss. (1) includes a civil, revenue or a criminal court, but does not include a registrar or sub-registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1878. The word " includes " was substituted for the word " means " by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act of 1923 (18 of 1923). The language of sec. 195 shows that its provisions are mandatory and a court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences enumerated therein unless the complaint is in conformity with its requirements. Sec. 476 deals with the procedure in cases mentioned in sec. 195 and provides that when any civil, revenue or criminal court is, whether an application is made to it in this behalf or otherwise, of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made into any offence referred to in sec. 195, Ss. (1), cl. (b) or cl. (c), which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court, such court may after such preliminary enquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, record a finding to that effect and make a complaint in writing signed by the presiding officer of the court. Sec. 479A was inserted in the Code by Amendment Act No. 26 of 1955 and deals specifically with offences of giving and fabricating false evidence. Ss. (1) provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 476 to 479 inclusive, when a civil, revenue or criminal court is of opinion that any person appearing before it as a witness has intentionally given false evidence in any stage of the judicial proceeding or has intentionally fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of the judicial proceeding, and that, for the eradication of the evils of perjury and fabrication of false evidence and in the interests of justice, it is expedient that such a witness should be prosecuted for the offence which appears to have been committed by him, the court shall at the time of the delivery of the Judgement or final order disposing of such proceeding, record a finding to that effect stating its reasons therefor and may, if it thinks so fit, after giving the witness an opportunity of being heard, make a complaint thereof in writing signed by the presiding officer of the court. Ss. (6) provides that no proceeding shall be taken u/s. 476 to 479 inclusive for the prosecution of a person for giving or fabricating false evidence if in relation to such a person proceedings may be taken under this section.;