IMAM - (1.) THE Judgment of the court was delivered by :
(2.) THESE two appeals by special leave have been heard together as they arise out of a single judgment of the Labour Appellate tribunal of India, Lucknow, dated 30/09/1953, passed in seven appeals before it. As the question for consideration in the appeals before this court is the same, this judgment will govern both the appeals before us. Civil Appeal Nos. 14 and 15 of 1955 arise out of Appeal Nos. 111-198 of 1953 and 111-321 of 1953 respectively before the Labour Appellate tribunal. The question for consideration before the Labour Appellate tribunal was whether the awards from which the seven appeals had been filed before that tribunal were valid in law and made with jurisdiction. It is this very question which arises in the appeals before us. Before dealing with the question raised in these appeals it is necessary to state certain facts. On 15/03/1951, the governor of Uttar Pradesh made a, General Order consisting of numerous clauses under powers conferred on him by cls. (b), (c), (d) and (g) of s. 3 and s. 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XXVIII of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act, in supersession of the general Order No. 781 (L)/XVIII dated 10/03/1948. The Order of 15/03/1951, was numbered 615 (LL)/ XVIII-7 (LL) of 1951, hereinafter referred to as Order No. 615. Under cl. 16 of Order No. 615, the decision of the tribunal or Adjudicator was to be pronounced within 40 days, excluding holidays but not annual vacations observed by courts subordinate to the High court, from the date of reference made to it by the State government concerning any industrial dispute. The proviso to it authorised the State government to extend the period for the submission of the award from time to time. On 18/02/1953, this clause was amended and the time of 40 days was altered to 180 days. On 17/12/1952, the judgment of this court in the case of Strawboard Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers' Union (1), was pronounced. In consequence of this decision the Act was amended by the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance, 1953 (Ordinance No 1 of 1953), hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, promulgated by the governor of Uttar Pradesh. The Ordinance came into force on 22/05/1953. By the provisions of s. 2 of the Ordinance s. 6-A was introduced into the Act. Section 2 of the Ordinance states 'After section 6 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act), the following shall and be deemed always to have been added as section 6-A '6-A. Enlargement of time for submission of awards. Where any period is specified in any order made under or in pursuance of this Act referring any industrial dispute for adjudication within which the award shall be made, declared or submitted, it shall be competent for the State government, from time to time, to enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or enlarged may have expired.' Section 3 of the Ordinance states : 'Removal of doubts and validation-For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that : (1)any order of enlargement referred to in section 6A made prior to the commencement of this Ordinance under the Principal Act or any order passed thereunder which would have been validly and properly made under the Principal Act if section 6-A had been part of the Act shall be deemed to be and to have been validly and properly made thereunder; (2)no award whether delivered before or after the commencement of this Ordinance in any industrial dispute referred prior to the said commencement for adjudication under the Principal Act shall be invalid oil the ground merely that the period originally specified or any enlargement thereof had already expired at the date of the mkaing, declaring or submitting of the award and any action or proceeding taken, direction issued or jurisdiction exercised in pursuance of or upon such award be good and valid in law as if section 6-A had been in force at all material dates; (3)every proceeding pending at the commencement of this Ordinance before any court or tribunal against an award shall be decided as if the provisions of section 6-A bad been in force at all material dates.' The following chart will show the date of reference, the date on which the period of 40 days expired, the dates and the periods of enlargement, the date of submission of the award and the date of filing of the appeal, in the seven appeals before the Labour Appollate tribunal: The following chart will show the date of JUDGEMENT_187_AIR(SC)_1958Html1.htm The Labour Appellate tribunal found that the award in appeal No. 111-198 of 1953 was made not only on the expiry of the period of enlargement but also long after the expiry of 180 days from the date of reference. In the case of the other appeals the awards were made on the expiry of 40 days but within 180 days of the reference. Appeals Nos. 111-321 and 323 of 1953 were filed after the commencement of the Ordinance and the others before its commencement. In the case of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co., Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1955), the governor by an order dated 19/08/1952, referred the dispute between the said Mills and its workmen to the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Kanpur for adjudication, on the issue stated therein, in accordance with the provisions of Order No. 615. In the case of Kamlapat Motilal Sugar Mills (Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1955), the governor by his order dated 28/01/1953, referred the dispute between the said Mills and its workmen, on the issue mentioned therein, to the Regional Conciliation Officer, Lucknow for adjudication in accordance with the provisions of Order No. 615. In both these orders of reference no date was specified within which the Regional Conciliation Officers of Kanpur and Lucknow were to submit their awards. All that was stated in these orders was that they shall adjudicate the dispute in accordance with the provisions of Order No. 615. It is only by reference to cl. 16 of Order No. 615 that it is possible to say that the decisions of these Conciliation Officers were to be pronounced within the time specified in the Orders of reference and that would be 40 days from the date of reference. In the case of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills, there were several periods of enlargement of time but in the case, of the Kamlapat Motilal Sugar Mills there was no enlargement of time, as will appear from the above-mentioned chart. Under s. 3 of the Act the State government, for the purposes mentioned therein, could, by general or special order, make provisions for appointing Industrial courts and for referring any industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication in the manner provided in the order. Order No. 615 was a general order made by virtue of these provisions. Clause 10 of that Order authorized the State government to refer any dispute to the Industrial tribunal or if the State government, considering the nature of the dispute or the convenience of the party, so decided, to any other person specified in that behalf for adjudication. Clause 16 specified the time within which the decision of the tribunal or the Adjudicator had to be pronounced, provided the State government could extend the period from time to time. Section 6(1) of the Act specifically stated that when an authority to which an industrial dispute had been referred for award or adjudication had completed its enquiry, it should, within such time as may be specified, submit its award to the State government. It would appear therefore, that the Act required the submission of the award to be made within a specified time, which time, in the absence of a special order of reference of an industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication under s. 3 of the Act, would be determined by the provisions of a general order made by the government in that behalf. An order of reference of an industrial dispute for adjudication without specifying the time within which the award had to be submitted would be an invalid order of reference. In fact, the orders of reference in the cases under appeal specified no time within which the award had to be submitted. All that they directed was that the dispute shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Order No. 615. If these orders of reference are read along with cl. 16 of Order No. 615, then it must be deemed that they specified the time within which the award had to be submitted as 40 days from the dates of reference.
(3.) THE proviso to cl. 16 of Order No. 615 empowering the State government to extend the period from time to time within which the award had to be submitted was found to be an invalid provision, having regard to s. 6(1) of the Act, by this court in the case of Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers' Union (1). If the matter had stood there only, the awards, having been submitted beyond forty days from the dates of reference, would be invalid as the periods of extension granted from time to time by the State government for their submission could not be taken into consideration. THE Act, however, was amended by the Ordinance and s. 6-A was added to the Act and according to the provisions of s. 2 of the Ordinance, s. 6-A of the Act must be deemed to have formed a part of the Act at the time of its enactment. Section 6(1) and s. 6-A of the Act must therefore be read together. Section 6(1) of the Act specifically stated that the award must be submitted within a specified date in an industrial dispute referred for adjudication after the completion of the enquiry. Under s. 6-A, however, the State government was empowered from time to time to enlarge the period even though the period originally fixed or enlarged might have expired. THE orders of reference in these appeals, as stated above, specified 40 days within which the awards had to be submitted. THE State Government could, however, enlarge the periods within which the awards had to be submitted under s. 6-A by issuing other orders in the case of each reference extending the time within which the awards had to be submitted. Admittedly, .no such order was, in fact, passed in the case which is the subject of Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1955, and in the case which is the subject of Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1955, although orders extending the time for the submission of the award were made and the last order extended the time to 10/03/1953, yet the award was submitted on 13/05/1953. THE awards in these cases were, therefore, made in the one case beyond the time specified in the order of reference and in the other beyond the extended period within which the award had to be submitted. It was urged on behalf of the appellant, the State of Uttar Pradesh, that as cl. 16 of Order No. 615 had been amended whereby 180 instead of 40 days had been provided as the period within which an award had to be submitted, the orders of reference in the cases before as must be construed as specifying 180 days within which the awards had to be submitted. In other words, cl. 16, although amended on 18/02/1953, was retrospective in operation. Order No. 615 is a general order under which conciliation boards and industrial tribunals may be set up to deal with industrial disputes. It is true that el. 16 enjoins that the decisions by the tribunal or the adjudicator must be pronounced within a specified number of days but this is a general direction. An order of reference is a special order. It could have stated the manner in which the industrial dispute was to be adjudicated and it could also have specified the time within which the decision had to be pronounced. As the orders of reference in the cases before us merely stated that they were to be decided in accordance with the provisions of Order No. 615, the disputes had to be adjudicated in the manner so provided and the orders of reference must, accordingly, be read as having specified 40 days as the time within which the awards had to be submitted. Subsequent amendment of cl. 16, whereby 180 days instead of 40 days was provided as the time within which the award had to be submitted, could not affect an order of reference previously made according to which the award had to be submimitted within 40 days. We cannot agree with the submission made on behalf of the appellant that cl. 16, as amended, must be given retrospective effect and the orders of reference previously issued must be regarded as specifying the time of 180 days for the submission of the awards. Section 6(1) of the Act is to the effect that the authority to which an industrial dispute has been referred for adjudication must submit its award within such time as may be specified. This section read with s. 6-A of the Act, on a proper interpretation of their provisions, makes it clear that the time within which the award shall be submitted is the period specified in the order of reference. Mere amendment of cl. 16 would not, therefore, affect the period already specified in the order of reference. It seems to us, therefore, that the amendment to el. 16 did not materially affect the position and the awards in the cases before us had to be submitted within 40 days from the dates of the orders of reference or within the enlarged time for the submission of the awards. What is the effect of s. 3 of the Ordinance is a matter which now remains to be considered. This section purported to remove doubts and to validate orders of extension of time for the submission of an award. It also purported to validate certain awards. There is no difficulty in construing cl. (1) of this section. It validates all orders of extension made prior to the commencement of the Ordinance as if s. 6-A of the Act had been a part of the Act always. In other words, orders of extension of time made under the general order, promulgated under s. 3 of the Act, would be regarded as made under s. 6-A. Clause (3) of s. 3 of the Ordinance also does not present any difficulty in construing its provisions. It directs that every proceeding pending before any court or tribunal at the commencement of the Ordinance against an award shall be decided as if s. 6-A of the Act had been in force at all material dates. Clauses (1) and (3) of this section merely re-emphasise the provisions of s. 6-A of the Act, which, in our opinion, are clear enough even in the absence of the aforesaid clauses. ;