- (1.) Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench quashing the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Nagpur Bench. By the order dated 12th August, 1999 the District Magistrate had directed detention of the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the 'Detenu') under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act , 1981 (in short the 'Act'). By the said order the District Magistrate had ordered that the detenu was to be treated as a "dangerous person" and therefore there was need to detain him. The order of detention was served on the detenu on 14th August, 1999 and the period of detention was to last for one year. The order of detention was challenged before the High Court primarily on two grounds; firstly there should have been a contemporaneous or simultaneous service of the grounds on the detenu as the said grounds alone contained intimation to him that representation could be made by him to the State Government; secondly, there was no material to show that detenu was habitually committing or attempting to commit crimes mentioned in Chapters XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The High Court did not find any substance in the first plea but accepted the second plea on the ground that use of the expression "habitually commits or attempts to commit" must be established by facts. According to the High Court, expression "habitually commits" conveys a situation where a person is conclusively known to have surely committed the crime for which he was convicted in the past by a Court of competent jurisdiction and on that background alone it can be said that he was repeatedly indulging in such acts. Mere pendency of cases would not be sufficient to treat a person as dangerous person. It was held that since there was curtailment of liberty, same has to be based on a foundation of complaint before the Court, a charge against him, a full-fledged trial and then recording of the judgment of conviction which alone may enable such person being described to have committed a crime. With the aforesaid observations and conclusions the High Court set aside the order of detention.
(2.) Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that though the detenue had suffered about 10 months' of detention before the High Court's judgment yet the conclusion of the High Court and the views expressed are clearly unsustainable in law and therefore, the appeal is being pressed.
(3.) There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent.;