- (1.) By the impugned common judgment, the High court has remitted the matter back to the Mandi Samitis concerned to adjudicate upon the claim of the writ petitioners/respondents herein, that no market fee is chargeable from them as no service is rendered. This direction was made despite the averment made by the Mandi Samitis in the counter-affidavits that they were rendering some services like arrangement for electric light, water, scavenging, other amenities in the market-yards, provision of tents, urinals, culverts and construction of link roads. Besides the existing services being rendered, infrastructure of future services likely to be rendered had been disclosed inasmuch as the process was said to be going on for acquisition of land for construction of market-yards, market complexes consisting of godowns, post offices, banks, warehouses, shelters and rest-houses etc. The High court in taking that step has put the Mandi Samitis into a war of wits between them and the traders; the Samitis contending that they have provided some facilities and are likely to provide more in future and the traders contending that no such facilities have been provided and none were expected to be provided in the future. This controversy has beenenlivened on the supposition that on the principle of quid pro quo, there should be near-balance of the fee demanded and services rendered. That, in our view, is not the correct approach. The High court should not have left the matter at large with the Mandi Samitis who in the nature of things, would have to be Judges in their own cause; something undesirable.
(2.) This court in Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Mohd. Yasin summing up the judge-made law on the point, observed as follows: "Though a fee must have relation to the services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. Further neither the incidence of the fee nor the service rendered need be uniform. That others besides those paying the fees are also benefited does not detract from the character of the fee. In fact the special benefit or advantage to the payers of the fees may even be secondary as compared with the primary motive of regulation in the public interest. Nor is the court to assume the role of a cost accountant. It is neither necessary nor expedient to weigh too meticulously the cost of the services rendered etc. against the amount of fees collected so as to evenly balance the two. A broad corelationship is all that is necessary. Quid pro quo in the strict sense is not the one and only true index of a fee; nor is it necessarily absent in a tax. "
(3.) This view has been constantly followed in later decisions. The element of quid pro quo in its strict sense is not always a sine qua non for a fee. See in this connection City Corpn. of Calicut v. Thachambalath Sadasivan wherefrom the following passage may be read with advantage: "It is thus well settled by numerous recent decisions of this court that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo is undergoing a transformation and that though the fee must have relation to the services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. It is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered for which the fee is being paid. If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from the authority levying the fee the element of service required for collecting fee is satisfied. It is not necessary that the person liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the fee. ";