Nanavati, J. - (1.) This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order passed by the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No.2587 of 1990.
(2.) Some complaints of corruption and other acts of misconduct by the respondent, during the period from 5-6-1985 to 15-6-1986, while serving as a Superintendent of Police, were received by the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madras. The Directorate investigated those complaints and reported its findings to the Tamil Nadu Government. The Government after examining the records submitted to it by the Directorate decided to refer those cases to the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings (hereinafter referred to as 'the Disciplinary Tribunal') constituted under Rule 3 of Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Disciplinary Proceedings Rules') for enquiring into those cases. The Tribunal framed three charges on 21-11-1989 and communicated the same to the respondent. Thereupon, the respondent approached the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') challenging the charge memo framed against him on the ground of delay, vagueness and breach of the requirements of Rule 17 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (hereinafter referred as 'the Civil Service Rules'). The ground of delay and vagueness were not considered as sufficient by the Tribunal for quashing the charges but it was of the view that the charges were required to be formulated by the Disciplinary Authority as required by Rule 17 of the Civil Service Rules after applying its mind to the record of the case and after recording the tentative decision to impose any of the penalties specified in Items (iv), (vi) and (viii) of the Rule 8 of the Civil Service Rules before referring the case to the Tribunal for the purpose of holding an inquiry and as this was not done, the charges deserved to be quashed. The reasons given by the Tribunal for taking this view are as under:- "We would consider that the substantive provisions of Rule 17 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules in regard to the functions and powers of the disciplinary authority cannot be taken away from such authority by the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1955, which relate only to the enquiry which is only a component of the proceedings under Rule 17 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules as we have emphasised in our decision in O.A. Nos. 712 and 713 of 1990 dated 26-2-1991 wherein we have held as below: Rule 17(b)(1) therefore requires that (1) there should be a decision that the acts and circumstances disclosed and the evidence in support thereof constituting the basis for the charge would justify one of the penalties specified therein if the charges are established after the enquiry into which the delinquent officer would have the opportunities as prescribed to put forward his defence (2) with reference to the facts and circumstances disclosed and the evidence, the charge or charges should be formulated to be communicated and to the person charged with a statement of allegations on which these charges are based and other circumstances which is proposed to be taken into consideration (3). Consideration of the written statement of defence and a decision in regard to oral enquiry in the light of the written statement of defence the request of the delinquent officer for an oral enquiry or otherwise, consideration of the evidence in support of each charge to decide whether oral evidence is necessary if the delinquent has not asked for such enquiry. (4) The conduct of the enquiry and the preparation of the report of the enquiry. The enquiry can be conducted by the disciplinary authority or by any authority designated by him. None of these can be delegated except the functions of the Enquiry Officer. Whether action should be initiated under Rule 17(b)(1) or under Rule 17(a) of TNCS (CCA) Rules is a decision which the disciplinary authority alone can take. That decision cannot be taken by any lower authority empowered to impose the penalties specified in Rule 17(a); if such lower authority initiates actions proceeds with the elaborate enquiry as required under Rule 17(b)(1) and thereafter the disciplinary authority is of the view that the charges do not all for such proceedings, the entire proceedings would become superfluous and the delinquent would have been put to delay and inconvenience which would have been avoided, if the proceedings had been completed under Rule 17(a). The time and effort on the part of the department could also have been saved. Therefore, at this stage of formulation of charges on completion of the investigation into the allegations, imputations, defaults or misconduct a view has to be taken in the light of the results of the investigation whether action under Rule 17(b) is called for and only thereafter procedure as under that rule can be invoked. Further decisions involved viz., whether the oral enquiry is needed which has to be taken after considering the written statement of defence and the nature of the charges and evidence in a case in which the delinquent does not ask for oral enquiry, is again decision which can be taken only by the disciplinary authority because it involves a finding whether the charges as formulated have to be enquired into in the light of the written statement of defence, and if the charges are supported by documentary evidence whether an oral enquiry is necessary, a decision may be possible at that stage and without such consideration an oral enquiry could not be proceeded with as a normal routine without a specific decision. After referring to the observations of the Supreme Court in S.L.P. 2725/88 dated 11-3-1988 (supra) we have held that " the principle enunciated here is that the decision of the disciplinary authority has to be his personal decision after consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances and evidence on record and the representation of the delinquent officer This principle should extend to the entire classes of disciplinary action commencing from the state of formulation of charges. As already pointed out in paragraph 4 of the decisions involved are for personal consideration by the disciplinary authority and cannot be delegated. Any decision in the course of the disciplinary action has to be that of the disciplinary authority". The Tribunal, therefore, quashed the charges dated 21-11-1989 and directed the Government to reexamine the case in the light of the observations made by it in its order and if it thereafter considers it necessary to pursue the matter further then to formulate the charges, get the written statement of defence to examine the case in the light of the written statement, consider the documentary evidence and the nature of oral evidence available in support of the charges and to decide whether the cases are still to be referred to the Disciplinary Tribunal.
(3.) The appellant is challenging the view taken by the Tribunal as wholly wrong. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Tribunal has misconstrued the Civil Service Rules and the Disciplinary Proceedings Rules and thus misdirected itself as regards the correct legal position. He submitted that it is incorrect to say that Rule 17 of the Civil Service Rules is a substantive provision whereas Rule 8(a)(i) of the Disciplinary Proceedings Rules is a procedural rule and that the Disciplinary Proceedings Rules cannot affect the applicability of Rule 17 of the Civil Service Rules. He further submitted that once it is found by the Government that it is a case in respect of the matters involving corruption and it decides to proceed departmentally against the Government servant then the said case has to be referred to the Disciplinary Tribunal and in such a case the procedure prescribed by the Disciplinary Proceedings Rules is required to be followed and not the procedure prescribed by the Civil Service Rules.;