K. Ramaswamy, J. - (1.) Leave granted.
(2.) We have heard learned counsel on both sides.
(3.) The admitted facts are that the respondents through their agents had registered trade mark "Raleigh" and other trade marks (12 marks) under the Indian Merchandise Marks Acts, 1889 (4 of 1889) and the Trade Marks Act, 1940 (5 of 1940). The Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958) (for short, the 'Act) which came into force with effect from October 3, 1958 has repealed the predecessor Act and how the Act is in operation. The respondents entered into an agreement with Sudhir Kumar Sen on November 3, 1948 to render technical know-how to the Indian Company to be formed which would manufacture bicycles and market them under Raleigh's Indian Trade marks. Pursuant thereto, a company called Sen Raleigh Ltd. came into existence which manufactured cycles with technical assistance by the respondents-Raleigh Industries of U.K. and marketed the bicycles with a brand name and trade marks belonging to the respondents. On April 24, 1954, Sen Raleigh was recorded as permitted users of the trade marks. By agreement dated December 29, 1962, Sen Raleigh and the respondents agreed that Sen Raleigh was registered user for further period up to 1976. Sen Raleigh was taken over by the Government of India on September 8, 1975 under the IDR Act and the Government took over the management of Sen Raleigh Ltd. The agreement dated December 29, 1962 was modified and the respondents were given option to terminate the agreement. An agreement dated December 20, 1976 was entered into between the appellant, as registered user and the respondent in respect of 12 trade marks for a period of 5 years. On March 28, 1978, joint application by Sen Raleigh and the appellant duly signed by the respondent as proprietor and Sen Raleigh Ltd. as registered user came to be made, before the Registrar of Trade Marks. On October 24, 1980, Sen Raleigh was nationalised and got vested in the appellant-Corporation by publication of the notification under IDR Act. On March 5, 1982,the respondent wrote a letter to the appellant that in the absence of a new agreement they were instructing their advocate to prevent the appellant by restraint proceedings to use the trade mark effective from April 1, 1982.;