VIJAY SINGH Vs. VIJAYALAKSHMI AMMAL
LAWS(SC)-1996-10-142
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (FROM: MADRAS)
Decided on October 10,1996

VIJAY SINGH Appellant
VERSUS
VIJAYALAKSHMI AMMAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

N.P. Singh, J. - (1.) These appeals have been filed on behalf of the tenants of premises bearing No. 76, in Car Street, Thirupapuliyur in the State of Tamil Nadu. According to the appellants, the said premises had been let out for non-residential purposes and the appellants had been paying the monthly rent regularly. The respondent, who is the landlady (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) filed petitions before the Rent Controller for eviction of the appellants under Section 14(1) (b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It was alleged in the petitions aforesaid that the building in question was an old one and was situated in a very busy locality of the town where a number of buildings in and around the building in question had been demolished and shopping complex had been constructed with modern amenities, and as such the respondent also wanted to demolish the entire building in order to construct a new shopping complex for which necessary permission from municipal authorities had already been obtained. It was also claimed on behalf of the respondent that she had sufficient financial resources for construction of the new building. An undertaking was given on behalf of the respondent that the work of demolition of the building would commence within one month and would be completed before the expiry of three months from the date the said respondent recovered possession of the building. Those petitions were resisted on behalf of the appellants saying that the building was not an old one and it can stand for many more years to come. It was also denied that the respondent had sufficient financial resources to construct a new shopping complex. By a common order the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the requirement of the entire building for purpose of demolition and reconstruction by the respondent was bona fide and as such the respondent was entitled to an order of eviction of the appellants from the respective portions in their possession. Appeals filed on behalf of the appellants against the said order were dismissed by the appellate authority affirming the findings recorded by the Rent Controller. Civil revision applications filed on behalf of the appellants before the High Court were dismissed at the stage of admission itself saying that in view of the concurrent findings of the Courts below in respect of the bona fide requirement of the respondent for purpose of demolition and reconstruction, there was no occasion for interference by the High Court on the civil revision petitions filed on behalf of the appellants.
(2.) The aforesaid orders are being questioned in these appeals on the ground that Rent Controller could not have directed eviction merely on the ground that the respondent wanted to demolish the building in question for reconstruction of a new shopping complex; any such order could have been passed only after the respondent had satisfied the rent Controller, that the requirements and conditions prescribed under Section 14(1) (b) of the Act have been fulfilled. The relevant portion of Section 14 provides: "14. Recovery of possession by landlord for repairs or for reconstruction. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but subject to the provisions of Sections 12 and 13, on an application made by a landlord, the Controller shall, if he is satisfied - (a) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the building being vacated ; or (b) that the building, is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date. (2) No order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building under this section shall be passed- (a) on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) unless the landlord gives an undertaking that the building shall, on completion of the repairs, be offered to the tenant, who delivered possession in pursuance of an order under sub-section (1) for his re-occupation before the expiry of three months from the date of recovery of possession by the landlord, or before the expiry of such further period as the Controller may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, allow; (b) on the ground specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) unless the landlord gives an undertaking that the work of demolishing any material portion of the building shall he substantially commenced by him not later than one month and shall be completed before the expiry of three months from the date he recovers possession of the entire building or before the expiry of such further period as the Controller may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, allow."or It may be mentioned that Sections 12 and 13 referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 14 relate to buildings in respect of which the Government shall be deemed to be the tenant and the authorised officer has been vested with the power to pass an order directing the allottee to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date. We are not concerned with the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 so far the present appeals are concerned.
(3.) On a plain reading of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 it appears that it is applicable when the landlord requires possession of the building for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the building being vacated. So far clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 is concerned it contemplates a situation where there is a bona fide requirement of the building by the landlord, for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for purpose of erecting a new building on the site. It may be pointed out that in view of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 14 where the building has been vacated for repairs the building has to be offered to the tenant who had delivered possession in pursuance of an order of the Rent Controller for re-occupation. No such condition has been prescribed where order of eviction has been passed under clause (b) of sub-section (l) of Section 14 i.e. for immediate purpose of demolishing it in order to erect a new building on the site. In other words, once the Rent Controller is satisfied that the requirement of the landlord of the building for immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction was bona fide there is no scope for passing an order directing the landlord to allow any portion of the reconstructed building to be re-occupied by the tenant who had been evicted. In this background, the question which falls for consideration is as to whether for eviction of the tenant of the building under Section 14(1)(b) the landlord has to satisfy the Rent Controller that the condition of the building is such that it is immediately required to be demolished. Whether the expression immediate purpose of demolishing has any nexus with the age and condition of the building or it indicates only the immediate need and urgency of the landlord to demolish such building in order to reconstruct a new one on the same site. If it is held that Section 14(1) (b) vest power in the Rent Controller to direct the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord no sooner the Rent Controller is satisfied that the landlord is in a position to immediately demolish the building in question in order to construct a new building on the said site, it will go against the fundamental concept of statutory regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship in urban areas, where special provisions have been made different from the rights and obligations of the landlord and tenant under the Transfer of property Act, With the population explosion and cry for a roof in the urban areas a situation was created where the Legislatures of different States had to enact Acts regulating the conditions on which premises in such areas are to be let out and tenants are to be evicted. By and large there is no uniformity in the provisions applicable to different States. As such from time to time High Court has to construe the scope of special provisions of a particular State and to say what is the object behind the same. So far Section 14 (1) (b) is concerned, in the case of Metalware and Co. v. Bansilal Sharma and Co. (1979) 3 SCC 398:(P.1562), it was said: "As stated earlier it cannot be disputed that the phrase used in Section 14(1) (b) of the Act is "the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction and the same clearly refer to the bona fide requirement of the landlord, it is also true that the requirement in terms is not that the building should need immediate demolition and reconstruction. But we fail to appreciate how the state or condition of the building and the extent to which it could stand without immediate demolition and reconstruction in future would be a totally irrelevant factor while determining "the bona fide requirement of the landlord."If the Rent Controller has to be satisfied about the bona fide requirements of the landlord which must mean genuineness of his claim in that behalf the Rent Controller will have to take into account all the surrounding circumstances including not mearly the factors of the landlord being possessed of sufficient means or funds to undertake the project and steps taken by him in that regard but also the existing condition of the building, its age and situation and possibility or otherwise of its being put to a more profitable use after reconstruction. All these factors being relevant must enter the verdict of the Rent Controller on the question of the bona fide requirement of the landlord under Section 14(1) (b). In a sense if the building happens to be decrepit or dilapidated, it will readily make for the bona fide requirement of the landlord, though that by itself in the absence of any means being possessed by the landlord would not be sufficient. Conversely a landlord being possessed of sufficient means to undertake the project of demolition and reconstruction by itself may not be sufficient to establish his bona fide requirement if the building happens to be a very recent construction in a perfectly sound condition and its situation may prevent its being put to a more profitable use after reconstruction. In any case these latter factors may cast a serious doubt on the landlords bona fide requirement. It is, therefore, clear to us that the age and condition of the building would certainly be a relevant factor which will have to be taken into account while pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord under Section 14(1) (b) of the Act and the same cannot be ignored." Again a three Judges Bench in the case of P.Orr and Sons(p) ltd. v. Associated Publishers (Madras) Limited, (1991) 1 SCC 301 said: "Section 14(1) (b) in terms of which a tenant is evicted - and perhaps permanently - speaks of "immediate"means "at once. without delay.""Immediate"also means "directly connected ; not secondary or remote.""not separated by any intervening medium"(Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th edn.:Concise Oxford Dictionary, New 7th edn.). This clause no doubt denotes urgency. Section 14(2)(b) stipulates that the landlord should give an undertaking to substantially commence demolition of any material portion of the building within one month and complete the same within three months from the date of recovery of possession of the building or within such further time as the Controller may allow. Breach of this undertaking or a consequential order under Section 16(1)will result in the imposition of penalty under Section 33(3)(b), Section 14(1)(b), however, does not require instant demolition, but demolition within the specified time. "Immediate purpose", in the context in which the expression appears, relates to directness rather than speed, although absence of the latter negatives the former. It denotes connection and timely action, but not instant action, yet delayed action is a sign of remoteness of purpose. The expression must be understood as a directly connected and timely purpose, and not a secondary or remote premature purpose. Significantly, the clause does not say "for the purpose of immediately demolishing", which words might have denoted instant demolition. What Section 14(1) (b) says is "immediate purpose of demolishing". The legislative intent is, that the purpose should be immediate or direct and not mediate or remote or indirect or secondary. The condition of the building need not be such as to warrant instant demolition, but it must be grave enough to need timely action and rule out undue or protracted delay. The landlord is not expected to wait till the building is in imminent or immediate danger of crumbling down so as to necessitate recovery of possession for instant demolition. The purpose of demolition must of course be immediately or directly connected with the requirement so as not to be separated by any intervening consideration. Demolition for the purpose of erection of a new building must be the direct, immediate, genuine and real requirement of the landlord. The bona fide character of the requirement is proved by the appropriateness of time and the absence of any ulterior or irrelevant consideration separating the requirement from the statutory or permitted purpose. The direct and immediate nexus between these two elements is proved by the condition of the building and other relevant circumstances. Absence of any need for urgency by reason of the strong and sound condition of the building will negative the bona fide character of the requirement. What is the degree of urgency warranted by what extent of damage to the building that makes the requirement directly and immediately connected with the statutory purpose is a question of fact which must be decided in each case on evidence. But a building which is sound and does not qualify for demolition in terms of Section 14(1) (b). Any such building falls totally outside its ambit." ;


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