- (1.) Leave granted.
(2.) This case has a chequered history, the entire narration of which is not material to the controversy at hand. Suffice it to state that pursuant to the default committed by the respondent in payment of the dues, the appellant-Board had disconnected the supply of electrical energy on 20-8-1982. For the recovery of the arrears, the appellant had laid the suit. Ultimately, the suit ended in the order passed by this Court in C.A. No. 2767 of 1987 on February 15, 1989 upholding the decree for recovery of the arrears for the disconnection of the supply of electrical energy; the respondent had a notice issued on August 1, 1985 claiming damages in a sum of Rs. 68,25,734/- which, we are informed, subsequently increased to over Rs. 93,00,694. Therein, the respondent called upon the appellant to refer the dispute to an arbitration under Section 52 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (for short, the "Electricity Act") or under Section 76 (2) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (for short, "Supply Act"). Calling that notice in question, the appellant filed suit No. 291 of 1985 on the file of the Sub-Judge, I class for declaration and also for permanent injunction restraining the appointment of an arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute raised in the notice. The civil suit was dismissed on March 31, 1989 which was confirmed in appeal. The High Court in the impugned judgment and order dated December 14, 1992 in Second Appeal No. 1993 of 1990 dismissed the appeal findings thus: "A persual of Section 32 shows that no suit is competent on any ground whatsoever "for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement .......". Furthermore, a persual of provisions of Section 33 shows that any party wanting to challenge the existence of an arbitration agreement can do so only through an application under the said provisions of the Arbitration Act. It appears that no civil suit is competent in respect of matters which can be decided through arbitration and any party challenging the existence of an arbitration agreement can only do so through the summary procedure contemplated under Section 33 of the Act. The remedy of a regular civil suit, thus, appears to have been excluded."
(3.) Thus this appeal by special leave.;